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
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
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London



STATE
OF
EGYPT,
AFTER
THE BATTLE OF HELIOPOLIS;

PRECEDED BY
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
Physical and Political
CHARACTER OF THE COUNTRY.

BY
REYNIER,
GENERAL OF DIVISION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

WITH
A Map of Lower Egypt.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR G. AND J. ROBINSON,
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1802.


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John P. Montes

ADVERTISEMENT.

Whatever the AUTHOR may say for himself, the TRANSLATOR will not answer for his impartiality in all cases. His account of the English will scarcely be received with implicit confidence in this country.



PREFACE.

A RELATION of all the battles, or rather victories, of the army of the East, up to the battle of ABOUKIR, has been published by GENERAL BERTHIER. Imperious circumstances have induced me to give an account of another epoch—that which followed the battle of HELIOPOLIS. I have thought it my duty to collect accurate materials for the history of the latter period of the expedition to Egypt; and, although it is difficult to preserve perfect impartiality, when the writer treats of events in which he acted a part, I have made it my study never to lose sight of it. In speaking of the troops, I shall uniformly have occasion to trace their constancy and


courage: but it is no longer a series of brilliant victories, like those under BONA-PARTE, that I have to describe; nor a campaign, like that of HELIOPOLIS;—what I have to relate, is a series of disasters. It is due to the character of the army of the East, to publish the causes of these misfortunes; that it may be known that throughout the troops showed themselves worthy of their former reputation.

In the Introduction to this work, I have endeavoured to give the reader a general idea of the organisation of Egypt; of the system of defence suitable to the country; the political state of its inhabitants; and its interior administration. These general sketches, which I have made conducive to my principal object, will enable the reader sufficiently to understand the campaigns of the French, and the administration they introduced.

A Map of Lower Egypt is prefixed to this work, laid down from the astronomi-

cal observations and the information collected by learned men. This map is, in fact, the most accurate that has yet appeared.

The government is about to publish, with the magnificence worthy of a great nation, the researches made in Egypt by the Commission of Sciences and Arts; in which may be studied with effect the ancient monuments, natural history, and government of the country, as well as the manners and customs of the inhabitants.



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
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1811

to comprehend the causes of her loss of that conquest.

Continually engaged in military occupations, I have not been able to regard with minuteness all the political circumstances of the country: but the learned men who partook of the labours of the army of the East, and were enabled, under its protection, to dedicate their time wholly to interesting researches, will develop these to the public. My design at present is to give, to such of my readers as are unacquainted with Egypt, a general description of its resources for defence against an enemy, and the political condition of its inhabitants.

Description of the Face of the Country.

EGYPT is inclosed by natural barriers. Separated from Asia by deserts, a small number of lower grounds, in which brackish water is found, are the only routes by which an army can approach on that side. The flat shore of Egypt on the Mediterranean, and the mouths of the Nile embarrassed with bars of sand, afford only a few places proper to land troops. Bounded on the west by

Immense deserts, Egypt is subject on that side only to irruptions of the Arabs of Barbary. Separated from the Red Sea by a desert, she has little reason to dread attack from that quarter; since the two ports of that sea offer no resource to an invading army, which could scarcely procure fresh water there, and must obtain from Egypt itself the provisions and camels necessary to pass the desert.

On each side of the Nile, in higher Egypt, is a chain of barren mountains. The valley in which the river flows between these mountains is from four to five leagues in breadth, and is covered with water at the periodical inundations of the Nile. This valley alone is cultivated and inhabited. The chain of mountains on the eastern side, which separates the Nile from the Red Sea, is of greater height than the western. It terminates toward the valley by precipices, which in many places have the appearance of a high and immense wall, broken here and there by narrow valleys, formed by sudden and temporary winter torrents, which serve for paths to pass over these mountains. The western chain, which separates the valley of the Nile from that of Ouasis, generally declines in a gradual

manner. Towards Siout, however, it is more abrupt; and from the angle which the Nile forms near Hennh, it is steep, like the eastern chain, till it reaches Sienna, where the mountains rise still higher, and leave only a narrow passage to the river.

In the neighbourhood of Cairo, the distance between these two chains of mountains increases. The eastern terminates towards the extremity of the Red Sea, without any appearance of connexion with the mountains of Arabia, which terminate in the same manner*.

The western chain declines towards Fayoum, and near Cairo takes its direction to

* The manner in which the chain of mountains on each coast of the Red Sea terminates, and the low lands which form a species of valley in the isthmus of Suez—a valley inclosed on each side with sand-hills, stretching to the foot of the mountains, particularly on the side of Asia—would lead us to suppose that in former times there was a communication between the two seas by a strait, since filled with sands brought thither by the opposing currents, and the accumulation of the mud of the Nile at the mouths of that river. Some extraordinary change which has altered the level of the Mediterranean—since that is twenty-five feet lower than the Red Sea—may have contributed to the first formation of the isthmus, which has since been greatly increased by the mud of the Nile.

the north-west, and afterwards to the west, where it forms the coast of the Mediterranean. The rocks in the neighbourhood of Alexandria and Aboukir appear to be an isle detached from this chain of mountains.

In the space which lies between these two chains and the sea is the plain of Lower Egypt, formed in great part of the deposited earth of the Nile, by the branches of which river, and numerous canals cut for irrigation, it is intersected.

The seven branches by which the Nile formerly spread itself, through the Delta, to the sea are at present reduced to two princi-

The moving sand-hills extend (as will be seen in the map) from Abouzak and Bir-deodar beyond El-Arish. They occupy the entire space lying between the Mediterranean and the mountains of Arabia Petrea, whose base they cover. The winds, which in this country are considerably uniform, have given the same direction to all the sand-hills. They stretch generally from the north-west to the south-east, and are separated by narrow valleys. It is only in the lower of these sand-hills, usually lying at the foot of higher ground of the same nature, that water is found by sinking wells of several feet in depth. Palm-trees, which grow on these sands, are a sure indication of water.

These moving sands, and the inequality of their surface, render a march particularly toilsome, and are the greatest obstacle to the passage of the desert by an army.

pal branches—those of Rosetta and Damietta. One or two canals, navigable only part of the year, are the only remains of the other branches. The canal of Mœz is the ancient Tanitic branch; and that of Achmoun the Mendesian. Their mouths are still to be traced at Omfaredje, and at Dibeh. The canals of Karinen and Tabanieh, which fall into the sea at Bourlos, are the vestiges of the ancient Sebennitic branch.

Fewer traces are found of the Pelusiac and Canopic branches; which, approaching each other near the desert, are widely separated in the Delta.

The traces of the Pelusiac branch are however very distinct in the province of Char-kiéh; and its mouth is at Tineh, near the ruins of Pelusium.

It is probable that, when the seven branches of the Nile existed together, they severally contained nearly an equal body of water. The subsequent unequal division of water, canals cut in directions to affect the equilibrium of the waters, canals whose channels were neglected, and other causes, having diminished the body of water in one of these branches, the water naturally falling at its

mouth, the sea rushed in, drove back the fresh water, and completely mingled with it. The brackish quality of the water of this branch, after this revolution, destroyed the fertility of the land it overflowed, and compelled the cultivator to abandon it.

An ignorance of the cause of the sterility of the land, or the interest of cantons more favoured and popular, have prevented the re-establishment of the equilibrium of the water; and the preservation of the canals has been neglected in proportion as the cultivators retired from their banks to more fertile parts of the country.

This effect is sometimes observed in the branches of Rosetta and Damietta. The breach of a dyke, or other circumstances, increasing the body of water in one of the branches at the expense of the other, the sea penetrates into that which falls in its level, impregnating the land with salt, and compelling the cultivator to desert it, till, the equilibrium being established, the fresh water imbues the land sufficiently to restore its fertility.

Other causes have contributed to destroy the Pelusiatic branch. The crusades, by burning and destroying the city of Pelusium

and other principal cities of that canton, drove the inhabitants from that frontier province, exposed to all the miseries of war. The Pelusiatic branch was no longer preserved. The cultivators inhabiting other branches, eager to engross the waters of the Nile, diverted them to their own lands; and, the equilibrium thus destroyed, the sea flowed into this branch. The land, abandoned, and no longer irrigated with fresh water, was imbued with salt, and extensive cantons became sterile deserts.

It cannot be doubted that Lower Egypt in great part owes its existence to the accumulation of earth deposited by the Nile.—The agitated matter which that river did not leave on its banks must settle where the equilibrium of the contending motions of the river and the sea produced a calm. The matter thus deposited formed bars or sand-banks, which the different movements of the water extended to the right and left. Increased successively by the action of the winds and water, they at length formed the chains of sand-banks which lie between the various mouths of the Nile.

These sand-banks would long remain sepa-

rated from the land accumulated from the direct deposits of the river, by intervals or lakes formed by the influx of the sea, although receiving the river water at the period of the inundations. But such lakes must diminish in proportion as the growth of land, formed by the agitation of the river, filled up the channels by which the sea entered.

As the mud of the river naturally first overflows the low grounds nearest its bed, its banks would be the first to rise above the level of the other land; the growth of land from deposited mud would be slower in its progress in more distant parts; and hence there would remain lakes towards the coasts lying at the greatest distance from the point where the Nile branches into several canals. Thus there have always been marshes near Pelusium; and the bed of the lake Marcotis continues to lie very low.

The land growing from the Nile tends naturally to fill these lakes, enlarge Lower Egypt, and gain on the sea. The sea opposes this tendency. The growth of land from the Nile is perhaps arrived at that point where it no longer gains in one quarter but by losing in another. It has been observed

that, for many centuries past, more land has been gained by the sea than accumulated from the mud of the Nile. It is even to be foreseen that, if art does not direct the operations of nature, if the body of water is suffered to spread, and the beds of the principal branches of the river to be enlarged, and the equilibrium of water at the mouths of the river neglected, the sea will gain new lands from the cultivator, instead of yielding any. This is in truth the fate that menaces Egypt, if that country remains in the hands of an ignorant people.

It has before been observed, that, when a diminution of water in one of the branches of the river permits an influx of the sea into its channel, the salt water spreads over the low grounds and into the lakes bordering on the river. Sometimes aided by storms on the coast, the sea water extends the boundaries of the lakes, overflows the land which (having accumulated from the deposits of the Nile) separates the lakes from the branches of the river, and compels the cultivator to abandon a territory rendered sterile by these inundations.

By this process may be explained the for-

mation of the shallow and marshy lakes which lie on the coasts of Egypt. The largest of these, Lake Menzaleh, now covers a great part of the land formerly watered by the Pelusiac, Tanitic, and Mendesian branches. Lake Bourlos is near the mouth of the ancient Sebennitic branch, and canals cut from the branch of Rosetta. Lake Madieh is near the ancient Canopic mouth.

Lake Etko, a new lake, formed during the inundation of the 9th year (1801), was occasioned by the opening of the canal of Deirout by the inconsiderate orders of general Menou. The water of the canal spreading in a large body over the neighbouring low grounds, forced itself a passage among the sand-hills to the sea. After the usual inundation, when the level of the fresh water had fallen, the channel it had formed near *la maison quarrée* being no longer full, the sea rushed in by that passage and formed a new lake.

Lake Mareotis was too far distant from the Nile to be filled with its mud. The canal cut to convey water to Alexandria, and afterwards the neglect to keep open the canals of Bahireh which flow into the lake, diverted the waters of the Nile from the lake; and its

communication with the sea being choked up, the water of the lake evaporated. Lake Mareotis had therefore been dry for a long period; but there still remained in its bed brackish mud and a moving sand; and, receiving the rain in winter and small quantities of the Nile during the inundation through the canals of Bâhireh, it is marshy during a great part of the year.

The English, during the last campaign, having cut the dyke of the canal of Alexandria* which separates the canal from lake Madieh, that lake was again overflown by the sea. It extends through a valley parallel to the sea, from which it is separated only by a hill whose breadth in some places is no more than 500 toises: it stretches beyond the tower of the Arabs.

* This operation of the English almost entirely separates Alexandria from the rest of Egypt. The breach they made in the dyke of that canal deprives the city of water, and will inevitably occasion its ruin, if not speedily repaired. But is it to be expected that the Turks are in a condition to undertake so considerable a work without the aid of Europe? The Turkish government, which by its nature tends to destroy instead of preserving great public works, cannot be supposed to apply itself with much vigour to remedy this evil, or to make such pecuniary sacrifices as the labour would demand.

There are also a few lakes formed by the superfluous waters of the inundations of the Nile, which, spreading over hollow places that have no outlet, are dissipated afterwards only by evaporation. Such are the lakes of Fayoum, Grarak, Birket-el-Hudji, Ouadi Tomlat *, and of those named Krah, through which passes the canal of Suez. These last receive the water of the Nile only when the inundation is very great.

Besides the branches and principal canals before described, Lower Egypt is intersected by various canals of irrigation, cut from the grand branches. The waters of the inundation conveyed by these canals, and retained by dykes in several districts, first of all water the higher ground, and, having successively served to fertilise many cantons, glide into the lakes or the sea.

The swelling of the Nile begins in the

* The lakes of Ouadi Tomlat, which were filled in the extraordinary inundation of the 9th year (1801), contained too much water to dry by evaporation during the summer; and if the army had not been drawn to the coast by the invasion of the English, the circumstance of the water remaining in these lakes must have changed the nature of the military operations on the frontier of Syria.

summer solstice, and reaches its greatest extent in the autumnal equinox ; when, having displayed its grandeur for a few days, it begins to diminish. The waters of the inundation subside more gradually than they rose. At the winter solstice the river is already low ; but there still remains water in the grand canals. At this period the land is put into a course of culture, and soon after the country is passable.

The large canals employed in irrigation begin to fill at the latter end of Thermidor (*August*), and the whole of Egypt is inundated in the beginning of Vendémiaire (*September*). The waters spread more or less rapidly, according to the various cantons. Usually the communications are again opened for foot passengers at the end of Brumaire (*November*) ; but the low grounds and the canals are then still filled with water or mud. They dry up in Frimaire (*December*). At that period many of the principal canals are however still impassable for troops and artillery, the water being too shallow for boats, and the bed of the canal too deep with mud to be forded. As in Egypt bridges and roads are very rare, and no route is formed for the

principal points of communication, the Delta cannot conveniently be crossed but in the month of Pluviose (*January and February*).

The rise and fall of the Nile happen earlier or later, by fifteen days, or sometimes even a month; but it may be established as a general rule that Lower Egypt is passable in a complete manner only from the beginning of Ventose (*February*) to the end of Thermidor (*August*). None but the great branches at this time contain water, and on them may always be found boats for passage. The cantons which receive water only by cut canals, and after the higher lands have been inundated, are not passable till later. Such, for instance, is part of the province of Charkieh.

By this sketch it will be seen that military operations are not practicable in Lower Egypt during more than seven months in the year. It is possible indeed, during the other months, to march on the borders of the desert; but the villages in that quarter are little able to furnish the provisions necessary to an army wanting every thing after the passage of the desert, and no communications can be kept open from thence with the villages of the interior during Vendémiaire, Brumaire, and

Frimaire (from *September* to *December* inclusive). Thus during these months, and during the two other months of the inundation of Egypt, it is scarcely possible to execute on this frontier any other than partial enterprises.

Thus also an army landing on the coast, and wishing at this period to commence operations in the interior of Egypt, could do so only by water. An enemy would however find advantages in arriving at this season, if he was content to establish himself on certain points of the coast, where he could with difficulty be attacked, while he combined the means of his campaign for the proper season,

An army that had Egypt to defend would also be embarrassed in its operations during the inundation. Part of its movements being made by water, they would be always tardy and difficult to execute. There are even points on the coast where forces could not be concentrated, if suddenly attacked, without the greatest obstacles.

System of War adopted by the French.

SUCH are the general physical circumstances of Egypt. We will not stay to consider their influence on the conduct of a war, nor the different modes of attacking, defending, and fortifying this country, relative to the tactics and military resources of the neighbouring nations, since that would throw these observations too much into detail; we will merely examine the system of war and fortification adopted by the French in Egypt.

When the French landed in Egypt every thing there was new to them. To the climate, the tactics of the mamalukes, and the manners of the inhabitants, they were strangers. They had not only to engage the armed force of the country, that is to say the mamalukes, but the Arabs and the cultivators of the land. To gain possession of the country, and to fortify themselves against internal and foreign enemies, resources of every kind were to be created; and the inhabitants were to be won by their affections, and civilised. Bonaparte rapidly seized the system fit for these purposes.

Egypt affords none of those natural lines of defence, those chains of mountains and rivers, which, in Europe, determine the system of fortification, attack, and defence of a country. She has none of those strong places whose possession carries a province. The extensive and flat shore of the Mediterranean is every where perfectly accessible by small boats, but has few places proper for the debarkation of a large army; and in one place only vessels can ride in safety from the winds, and approach near enough the shore to support an army. An enemy, having gained footing, may, in any season, except during the inundation, easily penetrate into the country: every quarter is open before him. There is no strong post to impede his progress, if he is not checked in his march by forces occupying the narrow points between the Nile and the lakes. Fortifications to defend the mouths of the Nile can alone constrain him in his operations; and they are nothing without the protection of an army.

The passage of the desert of Syria is not without obstacles. The road is determined by the places that furnish water, some of which

may be occupied and protected with works ; but they may also be turned by the bodies of cavalry which compose the Turkish armies, possessing the means of ample convoys. These first difficulties, however, surmounted, Egypt is entirely open on the side of the desert. Places of strength that might be constructed in the desert would not stop an enemy, because there is no particular route traced either by nature or art.

If the Turks, the only enemy which could then be foreseen by the army of the East, penetrated into the interior of the country, fanaticism would raise the inhabitants for their aid. They would there find auxiliaries, subsistence, and every resource, which would at the same time be refused to the French. It was only with an army that the French could resist such advantages.

All these considerations combined to form this principle—that Egypt was to be defended by an army rather than by fortifications, which, from the natural circumstances of the country, and the kind of enemies that were to be opposed, could not be made of sufficient importance materially to influence the war.

The difficulty of conveying provision and ammunition in Egypt—the nature of the food of the inhabitants, to which the French soldiers were not yet accustomed—and the necessity of providing subsistence at the points where the French army might have occasion to concentrate, required that magazines should be formed. They were to be protected from the attacks of the Arabs, the inhabitants of Egypt, and a foreign enemy, by fortified posts, few in number, and capable of that service with small garrisons, that the army might not be weakened by too many detachments. It was at the same time seen that such of these posts as should be on the extreme frontier should be sufficiently strong to repel an enemy till it could be succoured by the main army. The vigilance necessary to support the civil government and maintain tranquillity also required fortified posts, strong enough to overawe the inhabitants, and to serve as a retreat to the French detachments, in the case of a general insurrection, or attacks from superior parties of the enemy.

On these principles, Bonaparte marked out the centre of military operations and magazines, the posts on the frontiers, and

those of communication. He also formed on the Nile a marine, strong enough to protect military movements and the necessary convoys.

Fortifications constructed by the French.

THE fortifications were extremely difficult to construct: the methods of construction proper to the occasion, and the resources for executing them, were all different from European usage. Wood was absolutely wanting; tools were scarce; a great number had been lost with the fleet; and workshops were to be raised to fabricate others. The troops, worn out by change of climate, the fatigue of incessant marches, often short of food, and entirely deprived of spirituous liquors, were with difficulty brought to work at the fortifications; and although the price promised them was excessive, they did not labour with any good will.

The inhabitants of the country, surprised and terrified with a change of masters, were not soon induced to labour at these works. Kind treatment however, and exact payments, which they never obtained from their old government, subdued their aversion, though

slowly. But the inhabitants never could be employed but upon the coarsest parts of the labour, as it was with difficulty they could accustom themselves to the use of European tools and machinery, which spare at once the time and strength of man.

The scarcity of tools and workmen, and the lowness of the finances, greatly retarded the fortifications. Notwithstanding which they rose every where with a rapidity that surprised the inhabitants, and made a powerful impression in favour of the French.

While these works were raising, the French had to guard against the attacks both of the enemy's troops and the inhabitants. They were therefore promptly to be placed in a state of defence; and, wherever that was possible, ancient constructions made part of the new ones. But the whole of these works, however hastily reared, were on a plan to remain part of a general system of durable fortifications.

The city of Cairo, situated at the opening of the valley of the Nile, near the point where that river divides into different branches, presented itself naturally as the common centre of military operations, the civil administration,

and commerce. It was therefore selected for concentrating the army, whence the troops might march upon any invaded frontier. The opinion, although in some degree superstitious, of the inhabitants of the country, who in all wars and civil dissensions consider the party in possession of the capital as masters of Egypt, had its share also in forming this choice.

The city of Cairo was too extensive, and included too large a population, to permit the French to fortify and defend it. The points only were occupied which commanded the town. The most judicious use was made of the ancient castle; and from the chaos of its ruins arose a citadel, tenable by a small body of troops, whose artillery and position commanded the entire city, and checked the inhabitants. Other small posts were constructed round the city, in quarters the most distant from the citadel, to protect certain establishments.

Magazines necessary to the army, and workshops, particularly magazines for the artillery, were to be attached to the centre of the military operations. The banks of the Nile were to be preferred, because of the facility the river

afforded to convoys. Gizeh was therefore chosen for this establishment; and an old construction of Murad-Bey was completed into a fortress for its protection.

The French having determined on this centre of their military operations, and the means of protecting a place so important towards the entire possession of Egypt, had to prepare for the defence of another place even more interesting to them—the sea-port which contained their marine, with almost all their magazines; and the passage for reinforcements.

The influence of Alexandria as a garrison and place of war is very inconsiderable. This city, cut off from the rest of Egypt by a desert, is almost regarded by the inhabitants of Egypt as a foreign place. All the cultivated land of Egypt might be possessed without any manner of dependence on Alexandria, while that city could scarcely exist without the waters of the Nile and the provisions of Egypt. But as an excellent sea-port, and the only one that is to be found on the coast, Alexandria is in fact the key of Egypt. No maritime enterprise can be considered as solid without possession of that

port; and the principal commerce of Egypt is carried on there, because the Bogaz (*mouths*) of Rosetta and Damietta can be passed only by small boats.

The road of Aboukir, dangerous only when north and north-west winds prevail, is situated near Alexandria; and at the bottom of that road is the most favourable spot for debarkation on the coast.

These reasons determined the French to fortify Alexandria, and to increase its works so much the more as it was the only place exposed to an attack from Europe. But these views demanded very strong works, and a great deal of time and labour. The army could not, without being too much weakened, ordinarily leave in that city more than a weak garrison; and the defence of the town and fort included a very extensive circle. All the ground in the environs was covered with old buildings and hills of ruins. The French availed themselves of the ruins of works made by the ancient Arabs, of the Pharus, and other places, to form a line of defence, flanked by redoubts erected upon the highest hills of ruins, which were afterwards converted into more regular forts.

These works, pushed on with as much rapidity as the means of the French permitted, speedily assumed a formidable appearance, but were in truth all along very weak.

An old mosque, standing on the Isle of Marabou, was converted into a fort, to defend the creek in which the army had effected its landing, and the western channel of the ancient port of Alexandria.

The ancient castle of Aboukir was repaired and garrisoned; and, had it been completed, might have formed an intrenchment capable of resisting an attack till the army could be assembled, supposing the enemy to have landed at the bottom of the road.

The other important points on the coast were the two great mouths of the Nile. Rosetta and Damietta were too extensive and populous to be chosen for military posts; they were too far removed from the mouth of the river to defend it; and gunboats ranged within the Bogaz could not effectually protect the entrance, if not supported by land batteries. An old castle at the distance of half a league below Rosetta was repaired and garrisoned. It was named Fort Julian. Below Damietta, in the nar-

rowest part of the slip of land which separates the Nile from lake Menzaleh, on the site of the village of Lesbeh, was constructed another fort, to which was given the name of Fort Lesbeh. It commanded the Nile; and would have checked the enemy, if, having landed on the shore to the east of the harbour, he had attempted to march against Damietta. It was however too distant from the Bogaz, to protect boats stationed to defend the entrance. Two towers, formerly built on the two banks of the river, were repaired and garrisoned.

There were still new points of the coast which it was useful to occupy, such as the mouths of Bourlos, Dibeh, and Omfaredje; but there was no opportunity of doing any thing at these places till latterly, when towers were constructed, covered with a glacis, and mounted with some pieces of cannon. These places were besides defended by gunboats.

An intermediate post between Fort Julian and Aboukir was wanting to protect the communication with Alexandria, and augment the vigilance employed on the side most menaced. An ancient caravansera, to which the name of

la maison quarrée was given, was converted into a military station. This post defended also the mouth of Lake Etko.

A central point was necessary for the operations of the army stationed on the coast, and for magazines of ammunitions and provisions. The place where the canal of Alexandria springs from the Nile, not far from Ramanieh, was selected for this purpose; and a redoubt was built, and magazines formed there. As Cairo was the centre of operations for the whole of Egypt, so was Ramanieh for the coast. A body of reserve could always from that place gain with rapidity any point menaced between Bourlos and Alexandria. In case of concentrating the entire army, the various corps from every part of Egypt might assemble at Ramanieh to march against the enemy. From Ramanieh it was three days' journey to Damietta, across the Delta. Four days were sufficient to march by the Delta, from Ramanieh to Salahieh. Roads and bridges in that direction might have kept the communication open during every part of the year.

On the frontier of Syria, Belbeis and Salahieh were marked out as the remotest posts.

The first plan was to make them places of considerable strength; but the difficulty of forming extensive works with few tools and labourers compelled the French to abandon that scheme. These posts were therefore used as magazines; and Salahieh, situated on the skirts of the cultivated lands near the desert, was the more considerable.

The campaign of Syria opened new projects of defence for that frontier. It was then thought the most judicious system, to occupy the principal stations in the desert. The ancient castle of El-Arish, situated almost at the extremity of the desert next to Syria, was fortified and garrisoned; and a post of communication was constructed at Katieh.

The valley of El-Arish is so situated that an army, marching from Syria to Egypt, must necessarily halt there to collect the indispensable means of passing the desert. A strong place at El-Arish would certainly cover Egypt, and might ever maintain a menacing attitude, if it could be so placed as to command the wells; if a force could be maintained there sufficient to prevent all other establishment in the valley; if works could be promptly raised strong enough to hold out till the arrival of succours; and if it could be sup-

plied with provisions, not only to stand a long blockade, but to furnish provisions for the army marching to relieve it, and chase the enemy into Syria.

But not one of these requisites was to be found: the works proceeded slowly in the midst of a desert, where all means were wanting: the sea was not open, and provisions that could be carried on the back of camels were scarcely sufficient for a very weak garrison: the enemy might gain a footing in the valley of EL-Arish, and find water for his army, while he laid siege to the fortress; or might hold in check with a few troops its feeble garrison, while he acted against Egypt. The works which had been begun were not finished when the visier's army laid siege to it in Nivose, in the 8th year (1800). Before the French army could march to its succour, the place was taken by surprise, aided by a diplomatic artifice.

After the victory of Heliopolis, the French army, obliged to lay siege to Cairo, were restrained from pursuing the visier to EL-Arish, where they might have made a solid station, or entirely have demolished that post. Afterwards, on further reflexion, it was considered that posts in the desert were diffi-

cult to maintain and sufficiently garrison; that they weakened the army by detachments; that other routes which had been discovered might serve for armies chiefly composed of cavalry, like that of the Turks, or at least to strong parties to overrun the interior of Egypt, while the French army was acting in various parts, or waiting for them in the desert. It was considered that, with the Turkish armies, it was always extremely important to act on the offensive: that, to cross the desert with an army, the Turks must halt at Katieh to collect the necessary means, and that the French army would have great advantage in marching to that place to give them battle; or, if that was not practicable, to attack them with a concentrated army, when, fatigued with the passage of the desert, they should be on the point of entering the cultivated lands.

The French returned therefore by degrees to their first plan. Salahieh formed a post sufficiently strong to hold out with a small garrison till succours could arrive, and to contain sufficient provisions for the troops during their operations in the desert. Belbeis served as a magazine between Salahieh and Cairo.

In the interior of the country, at Menouf, Miiit-Khramr, Mansoura, and other places, posts were formed to protect the navigation of the Nile, overawe the inhabitants, and serve as magazines.

Suez was also converted into a post; and there the works encountered almost as many obstacles as at El-Arish, because every thing was to be conveyed through the desert. The fortifications raised in that place were sufficient to protect against the Arabs the establishments designed to be formed in that quarter; but there was no intention to defend Suez against a serious attack, because it would probably form one of the points of a general invasion of Egypt, and would therefore be cut off from succours. Besides, Suez depending on Egypt for provisions, and having no marine, it might be left to itself for a time without inconvenience.

The organisation of Upper Egypt separates it in a great measure from the principal operations of a war, and reduces it to a theatre of intestine quarrels. The arrival, by Kosseir, of foreign troops alone could compel Upper Egypt to play another part in the politics of the country; but foreign troops could not

pass the desert without holding a correspondence with the interior.

In the time of the Mamalukes, unsuccessful parties driven from Cairo, and the discontented, were accustomed to withdraw into Upper Egypt, till they were again in force, when they would attempt to return to Cairo, and the successful party come out to meet them. That long valley through which the Nile descends was on these occasions the field of battle.

The French, under general Dessaix, maintained a similar war with Murad Bey. They were not long in conquering Upper Egypt, and almost entirely dispersing the mamalukes. But this bey, who had a perfect knowledge of all the valleys and the routes of the desert, constantly escaped from every overthrow with a small number of most excellent horse, although not without extreme exertion and fatigue*.

The French supposed at first that they

* When Murad Bey was closely pursued, he retired to one of these valleys, and appeared to plunge into the desert. But no sooner had he drawn the French into the desert, than he dispersed his troops, that their traces might not be discovered. His followers then crossed the mountains, separately, into another valley; whence, being re-assembled, they rushed again into the valley of the Nile. Murad Bey thus continually appeared in places where the French least expected him.

should have no occasion in Upper Egypt for any thing more than a few military posts, to protect the navigation of the Nile, overawe the inhabitants, and secure the magazines of provisions and ammunition. But the irruption of a corps of Mekkin Arabs, by Kosseir, proved the necessity of occupying that port. The French therefore formed a post there, fortifying an ancient castle of that place. Kenneh, which is on the Nile, near the mouth of Kosseir, was chosen for the construction of a fort, to serve as a magazine of communication with Kosseir, and as the principal military post for Upper Egypt; other posts were formed at Girgeh, Siout, Miniet, and Benisouef.

The occupation of Upper Egypt and Kosseir, and the war with Murad Bey, employed a number of troops that would have greatly strengthened the main body of the army to resist any attack from a foreign enemy. It was, however, necessary to draw from this country resources for the army.

He obtained his provisions from the villages. Every time that the French discovered his retreat, and marched against him, he practised the same stratagem; and, though often attacked suddenly, and even surprised in his camp, he as constantly escaped.

both of provisions and money. General Kleber accomplished these two important objects by the peace he made with Murad Bey, who became tributary to the French for the provinces confided to his government. The military posts of Siout, Miniet, and Benisouef, were held by a small number of French, to protect the operations of the government in the provinces held in its own hands. Kleber reserved the right of keeping up a French garrison at Kosseir; but he would not send French troops to that place, till, by opening some maritime communications between Suez and Kosseir, the garrison should be less insulated from the army.

A very erroneous idea will be formed of the fortifications constructed in Egypt, if the reader applies to them what is understood in Europe by the words strong place, fort, military post, &c. What I have said before of the obstacles that were to be surmounted is always to be called to mind. The French had to create a new kind of fortifications and works applicable to the country, consistent with the materials that could be obtained, and relative to the several kinds of attacks which might be expected. The engineer officers cannot be too highly praised for

having effected as much as they did within the space of three years.

Houses, or the remains of ancient works, with the addition of a battlement, and mounted with a few pieces of cannon, small towers surmounted with a terrace, and one or two pieces of cannon, formed posts in which twenty French soldiers fearlessly expected and repulsed all the attacks of the enemy's cavalry, or the insurrections of multitudes, sometimes aided by artillery, although ill served. Many of the posts which I have called forts were of this kind. Provisions and ammunition for a garrison, as well as such as were stored up for the army, were deposited in magazines constructed within these forts, or built against them, and protected by them.

To cover these posts in some degree from the fire of artillery, sometimes they were surrounded with a parapet or covered way, in which case they formed redoubts; and, to attack them with success, the enemy must have gained some ground, and established a battery on the glacis. This plan was adopted for Salahieh, which, by a succession of works, might have been converted into a regular fortress.

Ancient castles, round which there was no

time to sink ditches and to construct lined counterscarps, bore the name of forts. These forts could not of course resist artillery ; the greater number of them were merely field redoubts, which the French had scarcely begun to line, and were without counterscarp.

Most of these works were surrounded with palm-trees, ruins, mounds of sand, &c. which rendered the approaches to them easy, and from which they could not be disengaged. All these inconveniences were united at Alexandria. The works of that place, although dispersed over a large circuit, reciprocally supported each other ; but the approaches were easy, and many important points were necessarily neglected to strengthen the principal works. Latterly, neither the money nor the hands were given to these works which ought to have been sacredly reserved for them, and Alexandria was not in a condition to resist more than eight days against a regular attack.

The French had always considered the city of Cairo as too large and populous to be defended : but, after general Kleber had been compelled to besiege it, to prevent, in circumstances similar to those of the battle of

Heliopolis, parties of the enemy throwing themselves into Cairo to originate a new revolt, he gave orders to repair a wall that had anciently surrounded the town, to construct a few towers, and occupy several posts. He appointed the auxiliary Greeks and Copts to this service; but he never imagined that in any case it would be prudent to shut the French army up in Cairo.

After his death these works were continued; and as they were executed under the inspection of the commander-in-chief, they acquired an importance which ought never to have been given to them. They were enlarged in number and solidity; and money and workmen were employed on them, which would have been more usefully given to other places, especially to the works of Alexandria.

This sketch will be sufficient to give a general idea of the fortifications made by the French in Egypt. The engineer officers, who directed these works with equal zeal and talents, accomplished more than was to have been hoped for in so short a time, with so few means, and so many obstacles to surmount.

These fortifications were excellent against Turkish troops unaccustomed to regular attacks, of which their organisation even renders them incapable, and who scarcely know how to use artillery. But the resistance they could make to European troops would be very unimportant. Considered, however, as magazines to supply the wants of the army wherever it might act, they completely answered their design; the defence of Egypt rested on the army, which ought always to have been in a condition to concentrate its forces, to march against the enemy wherever he appeared to be strongest.

*The Roads, and the Marches of the French Army
in the Interior of Egypt.*

It being more practicable to preserve Egypt by an army than by fortifications, the roads to facilitate its march in all seasons became the object the most urgent, after the means of providing for the wants of the army were secured in every quarter.

The communications by water were organised upon the Nile, and protected by armed

boats. Bonaparte commenced a system for those by land, which was continued by his successor. Although marches were easy during the dry season, they could not be made practicable during the rest of the year without extensive undertakings. Such works, however, were of the very utmost importance for the season, when the retreat of the waters, permitting military operations on the skirts of the desert and a part of the coast, still presented difficulties to troops crossing Lower Egypt.

The roads which it was most important to open were, from Alexandria to Damietta, along the coast (that was accomplished by boats for the passage of the mouths); from Ramanieh to Damietta; from Ramanieh to Salahieh; from Damietta to Salahieh; from Cairo to Damietta; and from Cairo, by Ramanieh, to Alexandria and Rosetta.

To preserve these roads passable during the inundation, it would be necessary to raise them above the level of the water; and various causeways and bridges already existing might make part of the work. The new causeways and bridges that might be con-

structed ought to have for their principle the general system of irrigation throughout Lower Egypt, which it was politic well to study previous to beginning works that might have so much influence on the culture and physical state of Egypt. It was an important object to facilitate and perfect the distribution of the waters of the inundation in constructing these roads. The necessary inquiries to that end could be made only very slowly, and they were not in fact terminated when the French evacuated the country. A great number of bridges and very extensive causeways were to be made to organise the communications by land; but this great undertaking, necessary to complete a system of defence, required many years.

Although the French had not time to construct the roads I have been speaking of, the inquiries to which the scheme gave birth have furnished the engineers of bridges and highways, and the geographer, with most valuable materials for a knowledge of Egypt.

*Observations on the Civilisation of the various
People that inhabit Egypt.*

THE population of Egypt is composed of various nations and conditions of people, who, having features in common, are nevertheless distinguished by their mode of life, manners, and political and religious codes. Islamism, which is the religion of the majority of the inhabitants, excludes the followers of every other worship from all political influence. Although tolerated by the law, these latter are reduced to a very abject state, and are incessantly exposed to the insults of the haughty Mussulman.

In Egypt may be found almost every shade of civilisation, from the pastoral state to man infected with and often depraved by power and luxury; but man, as he is accomplished by a high knowledge of the arts and sciences, is not to be found in that country.

In Egypt may be discovered traces of the feudal system, which appears inherent to the first degrees of civilisation. The shades of character I have spoken of will be the more

apparent, if we separately examine the inhabitants of the desert, of the country, and the cities.

The Arabs.

THE Bedouin Arab, wandering in the desert, feeding his herds, and living on their milk, gives us at this very day a picture of the lives of the ancient patriarchs. Their manners, customs, and mode of life, are the same. The country they inhabit permitting of no other, they could not change. If certain authors had lived among these people, if they had studied men formed for this pastoral life, they would have spared themselves much declamation.

The Arab has a great veneration for old people. Very extensive are the limits which paternal authority has among them. The children remain under the dominion of the head of the family. When that becomes numerous, after many generations, it forms a tribe, of which the descendants of the first patriarch are the hereditary chiefs. Vested with the powers of government, they become powerful and wealthy. They assume to be of a superior

class, and usurp a species of feudal authority over the rest of the tribe.

The sheiks represent the father of the family, and decide the differences of their children; but the more the family or tribe is extended, the less are the sentences of the sheik respected. Quarrels arise; and man in this state, when he thinks himself injured, has recourse to his personal strength.

Jealousies among brethren, the consequences of inequality in the love and regard they inspire, or of the property they enjoy, are extremely frequent, especially after the death of the father; and, although the birth-right of the eldest is acknowledged among the Arabs, it is not uncommon to see brothers go to war, when they are sufficiently powerful to extend their quarrels to that issue. The contests between neighbouring families or tribes are no less frequent: encroachments on pasturage, and the taking away of cattle, are the causes and pretexts. No supreme authority exists to judge between the parties, or to impose an accommodation upon them; and this primitive and pastoral life, which has been fabled so peaceable, is no better than a state of perpetual warfare.

There is no principle among the Arabs to unite the individuals and tribes in one general society. Their religion, which, as a common principle, ought to be a means of union, produced that effect only during the fanatical impulse given by Mahomet to his followers, and continued under his immediate successors by a series of astonishing conquests, which conquests afterwards changed the manners of these people. Each tribe has its religious chief, who, in matters concerning the tribe, too important to be referred to the sheik, decides according to the principles of the Koran. But these ministers of religion do not possess an influence powerful enough to suppress dissensions between tribes.

Quarrels among the Arabs are inveterate. Hereditary animosities occasion combats, mutual ravages, and assassinations eternally reviving, since blood must be answered with blood. Local circumstances, common interests, and like hatreds, sometimes unite for a time different tribes and families under one head; but the conclusion of the war that brings them together, and the division of spoils, break these temporary ties, no longer

of force when the same dangers no longer press on the members of which the union was formed.

Although swayed by the jealous and angry passions engendered by this habitual state of war, the Arabs possess fine moral qualities. They exercise hospitality even towards their enemies. This virtue seems more common among men approaching a state of nature, notwithstanding their wants, than among civilised men in the midst of abundance. With the latter it loses its purity, from the ostentation that enters into all their actions, and perhaps because hospitality in some degree grows out of the want which men in a rude state frequently have of an asylum from the many storms to which they are exposed.

Enamoured of their independence, the Arabs despise the husbandman and the inhabitants of cities. They have a degree of fierceness of character, but not unmingled with elevated sentiments. It is even a question still to be resolved, if the dissimulation and treachery with which they are reproached, particularly in their individual and political relations with more civilised people,

spring from their own manners, or result from their experience of the bad faith of civilised nations *?

The qualities the Arabs hold in the highest estimation are frankness and courage. One of the greatest eulogiums they can give a man is to say of him—that “*he has but one tongue.*” They were little accustomed, before the arrival of the French, to find that quality among the masters of Egypt.

No title is so noble in the eyes of these people as that of father. As soon as an Arab has a son, he changes his name, assuming one which expresses that he is *Father of this son*. That which the Arabs most desire, is the in-

* I have frequently been surprised to hear Arabs, educated in the desert, with a savage aspect and coarsely clothed, scarcely able to read a few passages in the Koran, employ in certain negotiations a subtlety in their argument, and a finesse worthy of the most able statesmen, and flatteries that the most polished courtier might avow; while they embellished their discourse with beautiful and grand images. In general, the lively and elevated sentiments of the Arabs form a wonderful contrast with the sterile soil they inhabit, and with the simplicity and even frequent distress of their mode of life. In their poetry they sing the praises of love; although their institutions, their habit of polygamy, and the abject state to which their wives are reduced, it might be supposed, would nearly extinguish that passion.

crease of their family and tribe, because their power and influence increase in the same proportion. It is according to the number of children their wives bear that they honour them. Reduced to household cares and to tending their herds, the women have seldom any public influence. There are however examples of women who, from their reputation and talents, have succeeded their husbands in the office of sheik *.

Frequent contests determined the various families or tribes to draw the limits of the territory, and to define the wells of the desert, which should belong to each. This species of property is common to the whole tribe. Per-

* The tribe of Bekir in Syria is very powerful since the death of Akmet. Bekir, a sheik in high estimation, permitted his mother to rule. There have been examples of the same kind in Upper Egypt; but these instances are nevertheless rare.

In a visit I paid to the tribe Nefahat, I conversed with an old man, who was presented to me as the historian of his tribe. In speaking to me of their establishment in Egypt, he said that Nefoa, when he came to this country, had a wife *whose eyes were as quick and piercing as a musket-ball*. She possessed an elevated mind and much wit; therefore her children prospered, and the family of Nefahat have at present five hundred horse, while that of Tomelat have only one hundred, although descended from a brother of Nefoa, who came into Egypt with him, but whose wife had *the eyes of an antelope*, and was gentle and timid.

sonal property consists of herds, the sale of which produces them corn, arms, and tobacco; the hire of their camels; and a few inconsiderable branches of commerce, such as charcoal, gum, salt, *natron*, and alum, which commerce local circumstances confine to certain tribes. The Arabs levy no taxes to defray general expenses. The sheik is usually the richest of the community. It is his duty to support his cavalry, and provide for the expenses occasioned by general hospitality, and the assembling of other chiefs. Except in these instances, he lives as simply as the rest of the tribe.

To pillage is a passion inseparable from the Arabs. Their spoils are divided among the families by established regulations. Is this spirit of plunder inherent to their degree of civilisation? Is it the result of wars they make upon one another? Or is it engendered by the jealousy which they bear towards the more civilised people who inhabit the cultivated lands? I do not attempt to decide among these questions. The Arabs justify themselves by maintaining that pillage is a right of conquest. They regard what they seize as military trophies, and consider them-

selves in a state of eternal warfare with all who are not of their nation.

The Arab, habituated from his infancy to respect all the actions of the aged, and his parents, forms his opinion wholly upon theirs. Nothing is able to excite in him new ideas; and thus his manners are perpetuated. He believes that there is nothing more valuable or noble than himself. Occupied with his horses, his camels, his journeys, his expeditions and plunders, while his wives tend their herds and weave their coarse garments, he contemplates with disdain the rest of men, and thinks it degrading to his dignity to cultivate the land or inhabit a house. His contempt of all foreign institutions constantly opposes the influence they might gain upon him.

These habits have preserved a national character in all the Arabs, even in those who have had the most intercourse with civilised people, and adopted part of their customs. But although the character of the Arabs is not sensibly modified by their intercourse with other people, their habitation of cultivated territories has been followed with changes in their political condition. Let us examine the va-

rious states of this people, from the Arab remaining in the desert, to him who is become the lord of cultivated territories.

The Bedouin Arab, living in the desert on the produce of his flocks and his plunder, is deemed the most noble and of the purest blood. The wealthiest persons of his nation, living in plenty on their cultivated lands, are accustomed to speak of the Arab in the desert with the highest veneration, and consider it as an honour to be descended from him, however little they imitate his mode of life.

There are, in some tribes, a class composed of the descendents of foreign families, or of *Fellahs* (*cultivators*), who, worn out with oppression, have fled from cultivated territories to the desert, and embraced the Arab's life. This last is not admitted to partake of the noble idleness and the military life of the Bedouins. He is restricted to the tending of herds, to the guiding of camels, and to labouring the earth, when these tribes have any cultivated land. Such are the Hatemeh in Charkieh. Some sheiks of tribes, neighbours of cultivated territories, having greatly augmented their power and wealth, have reduced

the rest of their tribe to this subordinate condition; and their own families, being alone considered as of noble origin and of purely Arab blood, are alone exempt from labour.

The Arabs make no slaves in their wars*. Having no hard labour to perform, slaves would be useless to them; and as no purchasers could be found, they could not be made an object of commerce. When their enemies fall into their hands, they put them to death, or are satisfied with plundering of them, according as they suppose them to possess importance among their enemies. Sometimes they retain them as hostages.

They are not however wholly without

* Some powerful tribes in Upper Egypt appear to be an exception to this statement; but the slaves there do not belong to Arabs, but to another people.

The sheik of the tribe of Tarfé, Mahmoud-ebn-ouafi, sent a party, composed of hundreds of horse, a hundred and twenty-five days journey into the desert, against a tribe with whom he pretended to have a just cause of quarrel. His party, having been repulsed, passed on their return through the territory of the Dongola, where they made several prisoners, and carried off the family of the chief. The presumptive heir came to Siout to complain to the French of this outrage, and general Donzelot compelled the aggressor to restore to him his brothers and sisters, together with his subjects, who were already dispersed in various camps of the tribe.

slaves. They even sometimes purchase negroes from the interior of Africa. With them, as with most of the people of the East, slavery is only a species of adoption. When the slave is purchased, he is received into the family. At first he is employed only in domestic services; but as soon as his years and strength permit, he accompanies his master in war; he has every thing in common with the Arab's children; and often his master joins to the gift of liberty the herds necessary to his establishment, and obtains a wife for him. Descendents of negro slaves have been known to partake of authority and influence in common with other Arabs, and several have arrived at the rank of sheik. The tribes of the desert purchase fewer slaves than the Arabs who are neighbours of the cultivated lands, and have occasion for a considerable armed force to protect themselves and enlarge their power.

Several tribes have successively established themselves upon the common skirts of the cultivated land and the desert; and others in the sandy plains, which form a species of isles in the midst of cultivated territories. They continue to live under tents, or in ca-

bins made of reeds, and preserve their original manners. They retain also their district in the desert, where they send their camels to pasture, and to which they may retire with their herds when they have any attack to fear. Their vicinity to the cultivated lands induces habits and wants from which the Bedouins are exempt. These Arabs live better than the tribes of the desert, and cultivate some portions of ground, by employing either inferior classes or the Fellahs.

Other Arabs have quitted their tents to live in villages, where they are distinguished from the Fellahs by their idleness, by the military life of such as are of the families of the sheiks, and by a species of independence. Become proprietors and cultivators, they are more within the reach of government; yet many are sufficiently powerful to resist government, and others to make themselves feared. Some possess territories, which they govern as masters. The sheik Hamman was the real sovereign of Upper Egypt when Ali Bey annihilated his power. Since that time no sheik has risen to the same degree of grandeur; but there are many who possess entire villages, either as proprietors and lords

of the place, or as proprietors of free lands. They maintained their dignity by a numerous cavalry, and were feared and respected by a weak and divided government.

The Arabs consider themselves as masters of Egypt by right of conquest. The various tribes have divided among themselves the entire country by provinces and jurisdictions *, in which they respectively govern and have their particular territories. They regard the Fellahs as vassals, whose duty it is to cultivate the land necessary to the subsistence of the Arabs, and pay a tribute for what they cultivate on their own account; while they, on their part, protect the cultivators by their arms against hostile tribes. They preserve all the pride of the conquering Arabs; treat with the government of Egypt as one sovereign with another; and deem it

* I use the word *jurisdiction*, because there are still traces to be found of the institutions of the Arabs, the successors of Mahomet, who established a kind of justices of the peace named *Sanager*, who, as arbitrators, terminated quarrels in their jurisdiction. This office was hereditary in the chiefs of certain families. The Arabs still sometimes consult those chiefs; but the institution is almost abolished, since the *Mamelukes* have usurped all power in Egypt.

unworthy of their grandeur to pay a fixed tribute, purchasing their tranquillity by presents consecrated by custom, and consisting chiefly of horses and camels, but very rarely of money. They retreat into the desert rather than submit entirely. Dreaded by the cultivators, and setting the government at defiance, in their rapid flights and rapid return, they equally compel the Fellahs to purchase their protection.

The title of Arab Sheik is highly venerated in Egypt. As soon as the sheik of a village is sufficiently rich to maintain an establishment and a certain number of cavalry, he procures himself a genealogy which traces his descent from some Arab family, and takes the title of *Sheik el Arab*. If the quarrels and inveterate animosity of the Arab tribes did not prevent their union, the shieks could assemble 40,000 horse, and would be masters of Egypt. But their dissensions protect the country from their domination.

The Arab families who inhabit the villages, particularly the Aouarah in Upper Egypt, appear to be descended from the conquerors of Egypt, under the successors of Mahomet.

The establishment of other tribes is more modern. I have not been able to discover the epoch of their arrival, nor that of the distinction of their provinces. The old men of the tribes dwelling near the cultivated lands ascribe their emigration to the eleventh or twelfth century. From the earliest time the Nile has attracted the inhabitants of the desert to its banks. On the side of Char-
kieh dwell the tribes that came from Arabia. The tribes from Barbary proceeded no further than Bahireh, which lies to the west of the Nile. These are more warlike and better armed than the former.

Beside alliances among tribes, there exists among the Arabs numerous confederacies or leagues, of which powerful sheiks are the leaders. Every tribe, and every family, belongs to one of these confederacies; and those who are of the same party reciprocally aid each other in war. When a quarrel arises between two tribes of the same league, that which is deserted by the other members of the league for the time joins the opposite party.

I have not been able to trace the origin of

these confederacies. They are very ancient, and exist among all the nations of Arabs. In Lower Egypt one of these leagues is named *Sath*, and the other *Haran*. In Syria their names are *Kiech* and *Yemani*. The families of Fellahs and the villages are attached to one or other of these leagues. The beys, when they are divided into two great parties, strengthen themselves in their dissensions by an alliance with one or other of them. When the French army arrived in Egypt, Ibrahim Bey was of the league called *Sath*, and Murad Bey of that called *Haran*. In general, the *Sath* league was attached to the governor of Cairo.

The Arabs may be said to form a frame in which the population of Egypt is inclosed. They constitute an empire within an empire. And I have described their political condition and character with some minuteness, because traces of these are found in all the other classes of Egypt.

Fellahs, or Cultivators.

THE Fellahs, or cultivators of Egypt, have a great resemblance in character to the Arabs, and are probably descended from a mixture of the first irruption of Arabs with the ancient inhabitants. They preserve the same distinction of families; and those that live together in a village form a species of tribe. The animosities between families or villages are as strong as those among the Arabs; but the extreme dependence of the Fellahs has robbed them of the lofty and independent temper of the Arab. The Fellahs vegetate under a feudal power, the more rigorous because it is divided, and because their oppressors form part of the government which ought to protect them. But, with all the disadvantages of their situation, they endeavour incessantly to imitate the independence of the Arabs, and are proud of calling them ancestors.

The Fellahs are bound by families to the lands they cultivate. Their labour is the property of the *mukhtesims*, or lords of vil-

lages, of whom I shall speak hereafter. Although the Fellahs cannot be sold, their condition is more wretched than absolute slavery. They indeed possess and transmit to their children the land allotted to their families; but they cannot alienate them, and scarcely can let any part without the permission of their lord. If, wearied out with oppression, a Fellah quits his village, the mukhtesim has the right to pursue and arrest him. The hospitality practised by the Fellahs in common with the Arabs opens an asylum to the fugitives in other villages, where they hire themselves as labourers, and remain in safety, if the proprietor is not sufficiently powerful to wrest them from the place. They are also received and sheltered among the Arabs.

The Fellahs who remain in a village partially deserted by the cultivators are more unfortunate than the fugitives. They are compelled to support all the labour and pay all the dues of the fugitives; and, often reduced to despair, they entirely abandon the village, and engage themselves as domestics of the Arabs of the desert, if they can find no other secure refuge. Many villages are to be seen wholly deserted, and the lands belonging to

them uncultivated; the inhabitants taking this method to punish the excessive avidity of their lords.

The mukhtesims, or proprietors of villages, may be compared to the feudal lords of Europe. They receive the greater part of the produce of the lands, which they afterwards divide into unequal proportions: the smaller, which bears the name of the *miri*, is the territorial impost due to the grand-seignor; and the larger, known by the name of *fays*, of *barani*, &c. they reserve to themselves. Beside these rights, the mukhtesim, like the feudal lord, has the immediate property of land called *oussieh*, which the Fellahs are compelled to cultivate *without hire*, in the manner of our ancient feudal duties.

A village does not always belong to a single proprietor; many villages having several lords. To mark clearly the boundaries of this species of property, the village is supposed to be divided into twenty-four parts, named *karats*, of which each mukhtesim has a certain number. Each *karat*, cultivated by one or more families, has a sheik chosen by the mukhtesim among their chiefs. The sheik who possesses the greatest wealth, maintains

the greatest number of horse, and has acquired the principal influence in war, is acknowledged as principal sheik, and manages the general affairs of the village. But he has no direct authority, except in his own family; and his counsels are followed in the rest of the village only in proportion as he is personally respected or feared.

Beside the sheiks there are other functionaries in the villages;—the *oukil*, to whom the proprietor commits the charge of the produce of the oussieh, or his particular land; the *chahed*, and the *kholi*, who are select chiefs, and are the keepers of the small number of records of the village; the *mechaid*, the *mo-handis*, a species of surveyors, &c.

The mukhtesim sometimes appoints a *kaimaikan*, or his deputy in the village, whose office it is to preserve the police, and to superintend the cultivation of the ground and the payment of the contributions. When the *kaimaikan* is attended with a force to induce obedience, when he does not seek merely the making of his own fortune, and when the proprietor is sufficiently informed of his own interests not to make him an instrument of oppression, this officer is useful to a village,

because quarrels are then the more easily appeased; and the police being better administered, the Fellahs give themselves up almost wholly to the cultivation of the land.

The Fellahs being the cultivators of the land, more subjects of dispute arise among them than even among the Arabs. Their sheiks having no direct authority among them, except in their own families, there exists no central municipal authority in a village. If some one of the sheiks does not gain the ascendancy, if the mukhtesims do not mutually appoint a *kaimakun* with a strong armed force, anarchy pervades the village, and every family becomes the avenger of its own quarrels. The necessity of cultivating the ground, however, imposes accommodations upon them, and they choose arbitrators. But there is no force charged with the execution of the decisions of these judges. It often happens that one of the parties, concluding himself to be aggrieved by the sentence, refuses obedience to it till some powerful man compels him to submit.

The cadis, established in each province to determine disputes according to the Koran, have a very feeble hold on the public opinion.

They are seldom referred to, except for general affairs concerning various villages, or in disputes about property subject to judicial proceedings. The mukhtesims, whose interest it is to be judges in their own villages, and the Arab sheiks, desirous to preserve their jurisdictions, have drawn almost all business away from the cadis, and the Mamelukes have finally assisted to despoil them of all consideration. The wretched and unprotected state of the Fellahs compels them, when they are tired of their quarrels, to have recourse to arbitrators sufficiently powerful to enforce their decisions, who usually are the principal sheiks of their village or neighbouring villages, Arab sheiks, their mukhtesims, or, finally, the *kiachef*, or bey, who is governor of the province.

The quarrels of the Fellahs sometimes interrupt the labour necessary to irrigation and the culture of the land. Each Fellah seeks an opportunity to plunder or kill an enemy. The offender is not pursued; frequently he is unknown; but his whole family remain responsible for the offence; and then they draw into their quarrel their allies, entire villages, and even sometimes the great confe-

deracies themselves. Hence arise those wars which the most powerful mediator has alone the means of terminating.

The government, seldom strong enough to prevent or repel the attacks to which the villages are constantly exposed from the Arabs, or silence the wars engendered by the animosities of families, permits the cultivators to possess arms. According to their means, they carry sorry muskets with matchlocks, poignards, sabres, lances, and clubs. When they deem themselves sufficiently strong to withhold the tribute they pay the Arabs for protection, they go armed to cultivate the fields or reap the harvest. The appearance of an Arabian mare, the courser of the Arab sheik, is always to the Fellahs, while they are at work, the signal either of flight or battle.

Every village places guards to watch its dykes during the inundation. When the inundation is less abundant than usual, the Fellahs frequently contend for the water. An inclosure flanked with small towers, situated near the wells that are distant from the

villages, serves to protect their herds at the appearance of an enemy*.

Almost all the villages are surrounded with mud walls, having battlements; and are so many citadels to which the Fellahs retire with their herds, and stand upon the defensive if they are not sufficiently strong in horse to keep the field. These petty fortifications are considered almost as impregnable by the Arabs and the Fellahs, who have no artillery, and very few fire arms. Even the Mamalukes decline an attack upon the villages, when they can gain them by persuasion or surprise them by treachery.

The wars of the Fellahs are no more than skirmishes. They consist rather of assassinations than battles. But, it being the maxim that blood must be avenged by blood, these hostilities would be interminable, if the government, the great proprietors, or the powerful Arab sheiks, did not interfere as armed mediators, and if the custom of paying a compensation for blood (by which the families who have lost the most men receive indem-

* Similar towers are to be seen in many parts of Europe, where the feudal system has existed longest.

nities) did not suspend animosity propagated from family to family.

This almost continual state of warfare, these alliances, and general confederacies, accustom the Fellahs to resist the oppressions of their proprietors, and even of the government, when exigencies do not permit them to keep up a sufficient force to overawe the villages; and hence revolts are very frequent in certain provinces, and especially where the Arabs are numerous.

It would be difficult to conceive men in a more unhappy condition than the Fellahs, if they were acquainted with any medium of comparison, if their character and religious prejudices did not incline them to resignation, and if they were not persuaded that the cultivator of the land is destined to enjoy no milder fate. It is not enough that they pay to the government and the mukhtesims the larger share of their harvest, that they are compelled to cultivate without hire the ousieh or the particular land of their lords, that the mukhtesims daily lay heavier impositions upon them; the governors of the provinces moreover require subsistence for

their troops, forced presents, and almost every species of arbitrary exaction, the names of some of which add insult to oppression, such as—*raff el medzalim*, the composition for tyranny. It is comparatively little that the laws are feeble and ill administered, that redress is not to be obtained by the cultivators without bribes, that being unable to purchase redress, and assuming the right to obtain it for themselves, they are obliged to pay for that offence, and that even flight cannot always screen them from these oppressions; to aggravate the evil, the Arabs who immediately surround their lands tax them for their protection against other tribes;—a protection in words only, since, notwithstanding the contribution, they do not the less plunder the harvests of their tributaries; and when the government pursue and disperse the Arabs, punishments and new exactions fall upon the heads of the unfortunate cultivators, whom the Arabs always force into their party.

To this miserable condition is to be attributed the general indolence of the Fellahs, their temperance, their distaste for every

species of enjoyment, and the habit of burying their money; which last custom, however, is common to them with all the other classes. Certain to draw upon themselves by an appearance of easy circumstances new contributions, often beyond their means, they are peculiarly careful to disguise what they possess. Very different from the European farmers, who put on their gayest apparel when they visit their landlords, the Fellahs studiously cover themselves with the worst of their apparel when they appear before their lords.

Inhabitants of the Cities, the Mamalukes, and their Government.

THE population of the cities is a mixture of various classes, extremely different in their origin, manners, and religion. The principal of these are the artisans, merchants, (both of which classes are of various countries and worship); the proprietors of estates (who live on their revenues); the religious chiefs; and the principal military officers of the government.

The inhabitants of the great cities do not

belong, like the Fellahs, to proprietors. They hold their houses, gardens, &c. independent of any lord, and possess the right of selling them. The great cities, few in number, are Cairo, Damietta, Rosetta, and Alexandria. Tenta is nearly in the same political situation with these cities; but that is a privilege which it derives from its being a territory appertaining to a mosque. Other cities are free from the services due to a proprietor; but their revenues are attached to the governors of provinces*.

The distinction of families also prevails in the cities. The exercise of arts and trades is hereditary; the son imitating his father, and never improving upon his knowledge. If various families of the same religion exercise the same trade, they form a corporation, which chooses for its head the person among the old men who possesses the greatest wealth and consideration.

* The population of Alexandria differs from that of the other cities. The inhabitants, occupied by their commerce and a few mechanical trades, are an assemblage of men from different parts of the coasts of the Mediterranean, particularly that of Turkey. Having more communication with Constantinople by sea, they are under a greater subjection to the grand-seignor than the other inhabitants of Egypt, and often set at defiance the authority of the Mamalukes.

The merchants also form corporations, according to their country, the species of their commerce, and their religious worship. Each corporation at Cairo has its head, its magazines, and its particular quarter. Every business runs into corporations in the cities of Egypt, from jewellers to water-carriers, ass-drivers, and (it may even be said) robbers *. The head of the corporation is charged with the superintendence of the conduct of all the members, for whom he is answerable to the police. The only class which does not form

* There is at Cairo a sheik of the robbers, who generally produces stolen goods when the agas issue orders for their restitution.

The Arabs consider open robbery as honourable. To them it is the image of war. But they despise secret theft. There are, however, a few Arab families who do not hold that opinion, and have exercised the trade of theft, for many generations, with the greatest dexterity. I may cite, as an example, the family of the Ora-ora, in the province of Charkieh. The terror of punishments, and threats to punish the other Arabs if these robberies did not cease, suspended them for some time; but on the first opportunity they recommenced. An Arab sheik on whom they depended, and who sometimes delivered to me offenders among them, declared to me that punishments were of no avail, and that these Arabs, being habituated to theft by principle and education, there was no remedy but to exterminate the whole family. There are Arabs of the same description in Upper Egypt.

a corporation is the very numerous one of domestics, who are dependent only on the persons they serve. The Mamalukes and the mukhtesims usually chuse their domestics among Fellahs of their villages. Many domestics having made a species of fortune, not by hoarding their wages, for they receive very little, but by their extortions on those who have occasion to speak with their masters, obtain permission to settle at Cairo, and their families enter into the class of merchants or artisans.

Every religion or sect has its distinct quarter, and its chief. When, among the followers of a sect, there are many families who exercise different occupations, it has more than one chief. The Copts form the most numerous class of Christians in Egypt. The greater part of them live in the cities, where they are principally employed in the receipt of the taxes, and in managing the particular estates of the chiefs of the country. The only persons of a little learning, and versed in this species of employment, they have rendered themselves necessary. Several of the Copts exercise the trades of masons, carpenters, &c. in the towns. Others inhabit the

villages, especially in Upper Egypt, and cultivate the lands, being little distinguished from the other Fellahs. The Christians of Syria established in Egypt trade with their own country, and undertake various financial operations. The Greeks, the greater part of whom carry on a commerce with their own country, exercise also several arts, and furnish sailors. The Jews are generally *serafs*, or money-changers; some of them dealers in old clothes and locksmiths. The prejudices which prevail against these people produce the same effects in every country.

The European merchants established in Egypt are all comprised under the general denomination of Franks. They have their particular quarter in Cairo, and enjoy some privileges, although harassed with a multitude of exactions.

The merchants and artisans, of whatever worship, are not much more happy in their condition than the Fellahs. They are borne down by a tyrannical and destructive government. A great part of their gain is swallowed up by imposts, multiplied in various forms; and arbitrary exactions reduce them

to poverty as soon as they appear to be in easy circumstances.

The ministers of the mussulman religion, and the superior officers of justice, form an intermediate class, composed of individuals of the inferior classes; but partaking of the powers of government, because they are depositaries of the law, and influence the public opinion.

The vague expressions of the precepts of the Koran, the only written law in countries subject to mussulmen, afford the professors of that law a prodigious scope for their interpretations, and a fruitful means of augmenting their authority. Although there are few dogmas in this religion, the fanaticism it inspires is an instrument the priests know how to employ with success.

Every class of inhabitants is permitted to enter the career of priesthood *. The first

* Many persons of the lowest class have arrived at the highest religious dignities. When the French arrived in Egypt, the sheik of the principal mosque in Cairo, that of el-Azahr, was Abdallah Cherkaoui, son of an Arab cultivator in a small village in Charkieh: he presided in the divan formed by Bonaparte. Other sheiks are sons of Fellahs. One, the

part of their education is confined to the learning and reciting a few prayers and passages of the Koran, and afterwards to read and write. Those whose views are more extensive, perfect themselves in reading and writing, and study the commentaries of the Koran, written by the sect they have embraced. This includes all the science necessary to be admitted to the priesthood. The greater part of the imans, and assistant priests of the mosques, have made no further progress. Submission to the higher priests, religious practises, the art of imposing on the multitude by exterior forms, and the affectation of a language abounding in maxims, prepare their way to the highest employments. The principal chiefs of religion, called in Egypt sheiks of the law, are characterised by the policy common to the priests of every country, who, the more easily to govern, endeavour by artifices to gain the ascendancy over men. Their conversation abounds with fine

most distinguished by his talents, Sheik el Mohdi, who was secretary of the divan, is son of a Copt carpenter. Adopted in his infancy by a sheik, who reared him a mussulman, he has attained, although young, the dignity of sheik of one of the principal mosques of Cairo.

moral sentences and grand poetic images, borrowed from the Arabian writers. In this consists their whole knowledge. It is in vain to seek among them any acquaintance with political or any other science; they as little suspect the existence of such as their utility.

Under the humble title of fakir (poor), and distributors of alms, they enjoy large revenues, dedicated to the maintenance of mosques and other pious foundations. These revenues consist of villages and lands, given by the sovereigns of Egypt or individuals, and of certain duties upon consumption. They have been augmented by another cause. Persons of property, fearing that the government after their death would seize upon the succession, to secure it to their children, gave it to mosques, with the reserve of rents payable to their posterity. These foundations are named *risaks*.

The religious sheiks possess a great moral influence over the people; and the most despotic governors of provinces are compelled to pay homage to them. Mahomet impressed on his people the opinion that the Koran contained all precepts, religious and social. The

interpretators and commentators on that book, become the chief of sects, have transmitted their opinions to their successors; and the same studies lead at once to the offices of jurisprudence and religion. The same individuals pass from one to the other; and sometimes fill offices of both kinds together. Both have the title of *utehma*.

When the Turks, having conquered Egypt, came to organise the government, they did not leave the administration of justice in the hands of the inhabitants. The Porte annually appointed a chief *cadi* for Cairo; and subordinate *cadis*, dependent upon him, for each province. These offices were bought at Constantinople. Bonaparte restored to the inhabitants of Egypt the judicial functions. The great sheiks presented to him proper persons to discharge the office of judge; and, to suppress the sale of law, he prohibited all presents to judges, giving them a fixed salary.

At Cairo, there were two families who enjoyed the consideration attached to the direct descendents of the prophet, whose chiefs held certain high offices in the priesthood, to which extensive revenues were as-

signed. Sheik el Bekri, descended from Aboubekr, is sheik of the sheiks of religion; and sheik Saadat, who reckons among his ancestors Ali, the son-in-law, and Fatima, the daughter of Mahomet, and the Fatimite caliphs, is sheik of the mosque of Hassan, son of Ali.

Several families of cherifs, or descendents of the distant relations of Mahomet, who were originally of the cities of Hedjas and Yemen, and still preserve certain connexions with those cities, also form a class a little elevated above the rest of the inhabitants. They employ themselves in commerce and husbandry. Several villages are entirely inhabited by some of these families, especially villages whose revenues are annexed to pious foundations. They enjoy a certain degree of consideration, and are less oppressed and degraded than the other Fellahs. These cherifs, however, are not to be confounded with those who, by alliances more or less ancient, have acquired the right to bear the title of *cherif*, and to wear the green turban.

The class of proprietors living in the cities on the product of their villages is com-

posed particularly of the descendents* of the Turkish officers who conquered Egypt under Selim II.; and of Mamalukes, who have since divided the government with them. Those officers obtained grants of a great portion of the villages, whose revenues were given them as establishments, and for the maintenance of troops, which they were bound to furnish for the defence of the state. They held these villages under conditions similar to the *timariots* of the rest of Turkey, and on the ancient feudal system. They were also charged with the collection of contributions reserved by the grand-seignor, who is regarded as the sole proprietor of lands, and may therefore dispose of estates on the death of the occupiers. The heirs of the deceased occupiers of land begged, or rather bought, from the pacha, new titles of possession. The venality of the government rendered inheritances the more frequent; and easily wives obtained the grant of villages from their husbands, with the power of giving them to their children or their slaves.

* By the word descendent is to be understood not only the direct posterity, but also the Mamaluke slaves, who have rights in the succession.

This species of proprietors composed the different corps of soldiery, the *ingcharieh* or *janissaries*, the *odjaklis*, the *assabs*, &c. charged with the defence of Egypt. I will not trace here the manner in which these military chiefs, divided by ambition and jealousy, surrounded themselves by slaves whose fidelity they were too haughty to suspect ; I will not examine the influence that the custom of adopting slaves has had on the political state of this country, nor inquire how the Turkish race has gradually diminished, while the Mamalukes have been increasing in number and power ; nor trace the Mamalukes (especially since Ali Bey), as they have by terror and alliances successively seized upon the greatest number of villages :—these are topics which I shall consign to the historian.

On the arrival of the French in Egypt, the class of ancient proprietors was reduced to a small number of men, and those crushed by the Mamalukes to such degree as to be obliged to have recourse to the protection of some bey, or even Arab sheik, to collect from their Fellahs the revenues which they still retained. Deeming themselves of a class superior to the merchants and artisans, they live

in obscurity and idleness, in the towns; the Mamalukes rarely confiding to them even subaltern employments.

The body of Mamalukes, whose organisation is totally different from the institutions of Europe, has been faithfully delineated by Volney, and part of their revolutions has been developed by the same author. I shall give my reader a general idea of the character of this extraordinary body.

It is a most singular phenomenon to see, in the neighbourhood of the Arabs, fiercely attached to the distinction of ranks transmitted by their ancestors, a numerous class, who venerate only the purchased slave, whose parents are unknown, and who from slavery is raised to the highest dignities*. This sentiment prevails also throughout Turkey; and even at Constantinople, in the heart of the government, whose principle it is to preserve

* Turkish officers, as well as Mamalukes, have said to me, speaking of persons who filled the highest offices—"He is a man of birth, he was a purchased slave."

The present grand-visir and the capitan-pacha were originally slaves; and so rooted is this prejudice, that the children of these very individuals are not considered as possessing the same degree of nobility with their father and mother, who were purchased slaves.

the race of Osman, and where there are families of great antiquity and very high consideration.

Is this opinion to be regarded as a homage paid to the talents of the man who, beginning in the most humble condition, advances himself to the highest rank? Is it the result of that warlike character which naturally prefers a young man trained to war far from his parents and all connexions? Or have the sovereigns of a military government concluded that slaves, holding every thing from their favour, having no relations, and regarding them as fathers, must be more attached to their person, and less dangerous in offices of confidence, than those who, sustaining their authority by that of their families, might form parties and projects of independence?

In a military and feudal government, the custom of forming slaves to fill the highest employments could alone ward off the dangers naturally resulting from the aggrandisement of the principal families. While Europe lay under the feudal yoke, the proprietors of great fiefs contended for authority with their sovereigns, and anarchy prevailed in almost every state. The custom of governing by

slaves has probably prolonged the race of Osman. Slaves elevated to the government of provinces have assumed independence; but they have rarely had a posterity which could follow their example and maintain their new rank; and after the death of the usurper, the province returned naturally into the old order of things. No great family could raise itself to a consistency of power to dispute the government with the reigning family, or even to occasion a division of the empire. Egypt is the only province which, from its distance from the centre of government, and its political organisation, has formed an exception. The Ottoman government has shown more wisdom in its maxims than the chiefs of Egypt; for, while the sovereign employed slaves, he foresaw the danger of being surrounded with an armed body always eager for power, disposed to seize it by violence, and ready tools in the hands of the ambitious.

Mamalukes, whom the Fatimite caliphs had bought to form their guard, in the end seized on the government. The chiefs of these Mamalukes transmitted their power to their children. But the descendants of Salah-ed-din, declining into voluptuousness.

and effeminacy, increased their guards like the caliphs, and in like manner were deposed. The Mamalukes then no longer continued to have hereditary chiefs. Violence or choice decided who should take the government. The death of the ruling Mamaluke was followed by new troubles, till the contending parties agreed upon a chief, or divided the country among them.

Selim II. seized upon one of these moments of dissension to attack the Mamalukes, allying himself to one of the parties, which he permitted to share in the power of the government. They not only constituted a member of the permanent military force, but shared in the exercise of the civil power. Beys, chosen among them jointly by the chiefs of corps and the pacha, were charged with the police of provinces, admitted into the divan; and became a balance to the authority of the pacha. The great officers of government, ambitious to augment their power, bought Mamalukes. Ibrahim Kiaya, master of the largest number of Mamalukes, and attaching to his person and interests the proprietors of others, aggrandised himself by their means, and ruled Egypt. After his death, the seve-

ral beys to whom he had entrusted authority attempted to continue it; but Ali Bey, superior in talents and character to the rest, gained the ascendancy, and became master of Egypt. The Porte indeed re-established a pacha; but the Mamalukes, accustomed to govern Egypt, left him only the ensigns of authority.

All the Mamalukes bought by a chief, and even by any of his freed-men, are regarded as part of his family, and give him the name of father. This forms the great feature of the institution of the Mamalukes. He who, gaining ascendancy among them, preserves it long enough to purchase a number of slaves, and successively to aggrandise them also, becomes the chief of a new house *.

* It must surprise my reader that I do not speak of the posterity of the Mamalukes. It is natural to imagine that the chiefs will endeavour to transmit their authority to their children; but the sentiment of the Mamalukes is very different. Their sons rarely fill any important office; and the few who are raised to rank by the partiality of their fathers never enjoy any consideration. Two moral causes tend to the extinction of this race—the custom of preferring slaves to a man of family; and the disdain with which the Mamaluke views the indolent inhabitant of the towns, educated among the women of the haram.

The freed-men and slaves of the same master consider each other as brothers ; but, on the death of their master, those of the greatest authority are often divided by their personal interests. The favour they have enjoyed during their master's life determines the quantity of their wealth and power. When one has acquired the principal influence, such of his brethren as are unable to dispute the authority with him acknowledge him for chief. When several are equal in force at the death of their master, they make war on each other till one overpowers the rest, or they consent to a division of authority among them.

All the present Mamalukes are of the house of Ibrahim Kiaya. Ali Bey, and Mahammed Bey Aboudahab, long contended for autho-

The Mamalukes do not consider their sons as their successors, or the support of their old age. The birth of a son is no new motive of attachment to the mother; and the women, anxious to preserve their charms, practise the custom, too common in the East, of procuring abortion. The declension of the posterity of the Mamalukes may perhaps also in part be attributed to the climate of Egypt, which opposes the continuance of a race foreign to the country. The observations made by the French physicians, particularly citizen Dege-nettes, on births and the mortality of different ages, may tend to developpe this curious subject.

city, and enjoyed it successively. The house of Ali Bey exists still in the Mamalukes of Hassan Bey, and of Osman Bey Hassan, who on the arrival of the French in Egypt were refugees in Said. Ibrahim Bey and Mourad Bey, who were the principal slaves of Mahammed Bey Aboudahab, concluded their long quarrels by agreeing to govern Egypt between them; since which they have formed two new houses.

Turkish merchants carry slaves from Constantinople to Egypt. They are selected from six to seventeen years of age *. Pur-

* These slaves are of various countries. Some are Russians and Germans, taken in war; but those which are most in number, and most esteemed, are from Georgia, Circassia, and other parts of Mount Caucasus. These, more frequently than any other, arrive at the highest employments. This domination, of men born in Mount Caucasus over Egypt, is a circumstance worthy of notice. Going back to the earliest times of history, we find Egypt conquered by Cambyzes, and governed by Persians sprung from these mountains; the Mamalukes seized upon Egypt after the caliphs, and were replaced by Turks, also springing from Caucasus.

No historical monument proves that the conquest of Cambyzes was not preceded by some other emigration from these mountains. Traditions speak indeed of conquests made by Sesostris; but when we consider the repugnance which the inhabitants of Egypt have always shown to the quitting the banks of the Nile, it cannot be imagined Sesostris made

chased by the beys, the kiachefs, or the mukhtesims, during their childhood they are employed in the various services of their ma-

his conquests by emigrations from Egypt; especially as, on the other hand, we see from the earliest time the population of Caucasus sending soldiers to Egypt. This observation does not at all affect the question so long agitated, of the origin and antiquity of the people of Egypt; or of the influence which that nation had in the remotest ages, as the cradle of the arts and sciences, on the civilisation and sciences of other countries. Egypt may have received soldiers from Caucasus, without the nation having originated in Asia. A superior class, exercising the administration of the government, and performing the functions of religion, may have been instructed in the sciences, and that to the exclusion of the rest of the people, without having received the principles of their science from any other nation. A few sages might travel into other countries; instruct nations; civilise them; and, in governing them, direct their conquests; without these colonies and conquests having been made by great emigrations from Egypt.

If the magnificent ruins of temples in Upper Egypt are monuments of perfection in the arts and sciences, are they not also monuments of the slavery and superstition of the people? Zodiacs cut on some of these temples, by which has been ascertained the age in which they were built; the observation that the most ancient are those nearest the cataracts and sources of the Nile, and that the figures painted and cut on these monuments have the African character; are facts from which it may be concluded that the population of Egypt, or rather the class that introduced civilisation and arts into Egypt, emigrated from Africa, following the course of the Nile.

ster's establishment, but their education is entirely military. It is this which gives them the address, the strength, the ductility of limbs, by which they are distinguished in athletic exercises, horsemanship, and the use of arms. When they are sufficiently strong and practised in arms, they are removed into the master's cavalry; and, being employed in expeditions, according as they happen to inspire his affection, are removed into the troops more immediately about his person.

When, as a recompense for services, a master gives freedom to a slave, the freed-man quits his house, receives lands from him, and sometimes one of his slaves in marriage. He then acquires the right of purchasing Mamalukes, and is no longer employed in the services of his patron's household; but is always ready to obey him, and follow him to war. Permission to let their beard grow is the exterior sign of liberty.

Although the number of kiachefs is fixed, and they ought to be chosen by the body of beys, subject to the confirmation of the pacha, the powerful beys raise their dependents to this rank, and compel the other beys to ac-

knowledge them for kiachefs. The twenty-four beys were formerly chosen among the kiachefs, who, on the decease of a bey, presented one of their number for the vacancy to the pacha, whose office it was to confirm him. This had latterly degenerated into a mere form, and the chief of the most powerful house appointed beys from his family. Murad and Ibrahim, when they divided the government, agreed to have nearly an equal number of beys.

A great career is therefore always open to the ambition of the Mamalukes. From slaves, they become beys, chiefs of houses, and even sovereigns of Egypt. Their means of promotion are attachment, zeal, and obedience, strength and address in military exercises, and bravery in arms. By these they obtain the favour of their masters, wealth, and liberty. Raised to the rank of kiachef, it is open to them to obtain the government of provinces, or to head expeditions, in which they usually compel the Fellahs and Arabs to serve them. Thenceforth they accumulate wealth to purchase and maintain a number of slaves. The consideration they hence obtain, the fear they inspire by an imposing military force, and

riches, lead them forward to the greatest employments.

The wars among the Mamalukes of different houses, whose chiefs contended for the possession of the government, occasioned the overthrow of one party, who retired into Upper Egypt. The vanquished were proscribed, their property confiscated*, and their dependent beys replaced in the divan by kiachefs of the victorious party raised to the rank of bey in their place. The chief of the governing house, beside his own proper possessions, acquired in this manner the greatest part of the villages of his adversaries. He obtained others by forced concessions from the mukhtesims. He availed himself of these numerous estates to augment his own proper revenue, to enrich his dependents, and aggrandise his house.

The beys and kiachefs received annually the command of provinces or districts,

* It is to be observed that in these revolutions the property and persons of the wives of the proscribed beys and Mamalukes were always respected. The women continued to live unmolested at Cairo, receiving their peculiar revenues, and aiding their fugitive husbands. Hence the beys usually give their wives villages and lands for their peculiar revenue.

through which they made a progress to enforce the payment of imposts due to the government and mukhtesims, reduce the Arabs, and maintain the police. But their own interest was much more the business of their journey than the public affairs. They were diligent in collecting the imposts appropriated to themselves, seized every occasion of imposing fines and other exactions, extorted presents from the Arabs, and maintained their troops at the expense of the villages.

Beside the Mamalukes, who never serve on foot, the beys and the government had an establishment of infantry. Steady to the Turkish policy of rarely giving any military authority to the natives of the country, these soldiers, few in number, were men from Albania and the west of Barbary. They were employed, under the orders of the Mamalukes, to guard the cities and maintain the police of the villages of the beys by whom they were kept in pay.

The pacha sent from Constantinople was, in name, the head of the government of Egypt; but the beys, in possession of all au-

thority, left him no more than the ensigns of dignity *. I shall not therefore enter into any observations respecting this officer, nor of the officers and effendis sent by the Porte to control accounts, which the boys uniformly compelled them to settle in such a manner, that there was no tribute to send to Constantinople.

The revenues of the Mamalukes were composed of such as were their own particular property and those of the government.

Their particular revenues were such of the villages as belonged to the boys, kiachefs,

* The organisation of the Turkish armies, composed of troops numerous when an expedition is on foot, but who disperse when there is nothing more than the ordinary functions of government to perform, contributes to render the power of the pachas extremely feeble, and merely transient. The Porte is now and then awakened to a sense of this evil, and proposes to re-establish its authority. They send armies, who perform the service successfully; but no sooner is the pacha restored to his rights than the troops return home. The pacha, being then reduced to the troops he maintains from his own proper revenue, and which his avarice restrains to a very small number, the Mamalukes, who had withdrawn only during the presence of the Turkish army, return anew to usurp all authority. There have been many examples of this, especially after the expedition of the capitan-pacha, in 1788, against Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey, with the aid of the Mamalukes of Ismail Bey.

and Mamalukes, as mukhtesims; the various duties they received in their governments, and their arbitrary fines, forced presents, and other extortions. The Copts have always had the address to render themselves necessary to the proprietors. Every mukhtesim employed one for each village, who kept the rolls of contributions, and received them in his name. When a bey was proprietor of several villages, he placed a Copt at the head of all the others, who was at once his steward and secretary; and this Copt indemnified himself in his subalterns and the Fellahs for the humiliations he was condemned to endure from his employer.

The public revenues are composed of the miri, or territorial imposts, which the mukhtesims collect and pay into the hands of the effendis, sent from Constantinople, but overawed by the beys; custom-house duties; imposts on interior commerce; the farming of certain trading privileges; and the Christian capitation tax, &c.

On the arrival of the French, these various duties were farmed out—the custom-house duties to the Syrian Christians, the interior imposts to Turkish merchants, and the com-

merce of natron * and sena to the Franks, &c. These public revenues were destined to defray the expenditure of the government ; and the excess was to be sent to Constantinople, but the principal beys appropriated the surplus to themselves.

After the conquest of Egypt, the French government becoming proprietor of the villages belonging to the fugitive Mamalukes and mukhtesims, its officers received their revenues, as well as those of the oussiehs, and paid the miri. The proprietors of villages were registered, to give a legal sanction to the rights of those that remained in Egypt. The Copts, being the only persons versed in the collection, and acquainted with the produce of the territorial imposts, were continued in their employments. The custom-house duties, and other indirect contributions, were organised. The general history of the expedition will develop what the French did towards an organisation of the finances, equally consistent with the welfare of the people and the interests of government.

An estimate of the revenues drawn by the

* The *natron* of Egypt is a kind of alkaline salt, perforated like sponge, of a lixivial taste.

Mamalukes from Egypt would lead to details inconsistent with the general nature of the observations of this work. The public and particular revenues of the Mamalukes have been computed from thirty-five to forty millions of livres. They varied every year under the French, according to the circumstances of the war; but from twenty to twenty-five millions may be taken as their average amount. The reason of this difference is, that custom-house duties, and indirect contributions, during a war, yield very little; that the Mamalukes, who directly superintended the culture of their villages, particularly of their oussiehs, made them more productive than the French could afterwards; and, finally, that the French suppressed the arbitrary fines and other exactions which produced the beys a considerable sum.

The French were not able to procure any certain documents relative to the population of Egypt. The mussulmen have derived from the Jews a superstitious repugnance to the numbering the people. To this obstacle was joined the inquietude of the people relative to the motive of such inquiries. Incapable of supposing that there could be any other object than that of extorting money,

they concluded that the French wanted to discover their numbers for the purpose of a capitation tax. The inhabitants kept no register of births or deaths. It was with infinite difficulty that, in some cities, the French obtained a statement of the latter, and a long time afterwards that of births; and these returns were never exact. The returns collected by citizens Desgenettes are the only documents that could be procured.

If the Mamalukes leave few children, it is not the same with the other inhabitants of Egypt, particularly the Fellahs. Although few of them are rich enough to avail themselves of the law authorising polygamy, and the women do not live long, the Fellahs all have a great number of children. Without this fecundity, the plague would almost destroy the population of Egypt.

Having no documents of the population of the lands and villages, it is difficult to give a tolerable estimate of it. The whole population of Egypt may however be stated at 2,500,000, or, at the most, three millions; including the city of Cairo, which contains from 250,000 to 300,000 inhabitants.

Summary of the Social Condition of the Inhabitants of Egypt.

From the Bedouin Arab, to the principal officers of government, power and riches are the only roads to authority, and therefore the only objects of ambition. All are indifferent to the means of acquiring wealth. Every one is eager to attach to his person men devoted to his interest, whose courage and address he may employ to his advantage. The beys and mukhtesims purchase white slaves, and sometimes black; the Arabs, negro slaves. Each assembles around him a little army, more or less formidable; and, when he thinks himself strong enough, makes war on his rivals or oppressors. When there does not exist in the government a power capable of overawing these various and jealous forces, anarchy has the sole sway, and the spirit of faction and hereditary hatreds ally themselves to the subjects of quarrel which arise daily. The cultivator is almost always pressed into these quarrels; he has also quarrels that are proper to himself: but, in whatever man-

ner either one or the other ends, the produce of his harvests serves always to support the combatants. He must provide for the profusion of the chiefs, to augment their power, which recoils on himself; and in every case, he is only the miserable instrument of their enjoyments. Regulated in his conduct rather by the caprices of powerful men than by acknowledged laws, he is ever uncertain whom to obey, the government of Constantinople, the beys, the mukhtesims, or the Arab sheiks. Obligated to pacify them all, he executes the orders of him whose vengeance he at that moment dreads; and hence arises the custom of every year taking the field to enforce the contributions. Moral qualities and information lead to no office in Egypt; procuring but a very slight consideration, and no riches, there is little that invites to their cultivation. The sole study in Egypt is that of dissimulation, the natural arm of the ambitious when they are weak. To dissemble, is equally the fate of all classes of the people, and the basis of the government.

Vague laws, the venality of the judges, the absence of a force destined to pursue and punish the guilty, the asylums ever kept open

by hospitality, induce the government to punish a family, a corporation, a village, for the crime of one man, often a fugitive, but oftener unknown. The government adopts the custom of the Arabs to extend vengeance from an individual to entire families. The territory of whole tribes is overrun to extort a compensation for robberies committed within their boundaries. Under a feudal government, the habit of punishing an entire class for the crimes of an individual has at least, however, the advantage to interest individuals to watch over each others conduct. The asylums of hospitality form a resource for all the inhabitants against oppression. It is not from a spirit of order and justice that the government, little susceptible of these moral sentiments, pursues the guilty, or endeavours to terminate quarrels; it is, that the cultivation of the lands, the harvests, and the receipt of contributions, suffer from these quarrels, and that accommodations are always paid for with presents and compensations.

The people of Egypt have been subject, almost from the earliest times, to foreign conquerors, whose yoke they have successively detested. Ever ready to yield to the

appearance of success, but a prey to animosities and jealousies, the effect of their division into distinct classes, never will a union of efforts exist to break their chains. Insurrections have been always repressed with severity; and the people preserve still the same impatience of authority. The domination of the Osman family they hate more cordially than any other; and this aversion is continually fomented by the Mamalukes and Arabs, whose influence governs in Egypt. This disposition no doubt contributed, notwithstanding religious fanaticism, to unite the inhabitants to the French.

The elements of society in Egypt oppose themselves to all amelioration. No useful change can be effected but by foreigners possessing the government. The French were in that situation; but, beside the difficulties of a first establishment, and of a state of war, how many were the moral obstacles the French had to surmount!—Attachment to ancient usages, the pride of superstition and ignorance, which repels all new information, difference of language and worship, the manners and social state of the different classes, were among the number. A system of justice

was to be organised; municipal authorities established, with a general police and an administration solely occupied for the public good: political and religious distinctions were to be effaced; people of various worship habituated to obey the same laws; the nature of the territorial property, and the condition of the cultivators changed: the cultivator was to be interested in the perfection of his art, the manufacturer and merchant to extend their speculations, by the certainty of enjoying the fruits of their various labours: the Arabs were either to be exterminated, or their attachment to a wandering life sapped by wise institutions: in fine, to ally all particular interests to the general good, the system of taxation was to be improved, the distribution of the waters of the Nile and the irrigation of the land regulated, the culture of colonial plants developed, and canals for navigation constructed. With these resources, Egypt would be raised to the highest degree of prosperity; but to this end it was necessary to study the temper of this people, to gain their esteem, love, and veneration, which alone could give the government a moral force sufficient to establish and consolidate

new institutions ; and these things could be effected only successively and slowly. It was at the time the French had in part acquired in Egypt the knowledge and moral ascendancy on which success depended that they abandoned Egypt ; and peace, which restores tranquillity to every other people, is no benefit to the inhabitants of Egypt. They will return to their intestine divisions, and plunge again into barbarism.

The proud Mussulman knows the people of Europe by the horror only with which ignorant fanatics had inspired his ancestors. He is ignorant, or affects to be so, that the Europeans, freed from their prejudices, have taken immense strides in the career of civilisation ; whilst he, degraded by his own institutions, may scarcely be allowed to rank himself with civilised people. In the expedition of Bonaparte into Egypt, the world saw, for the first time, the sciences and arts joining the march of a conqueror. The people of Egypt from that time began to appreciate the power of Europeans, the mildness of their laws, and the extent of their knowledge. Their brave men admired the exploits of the French ; and all were astonished at their superiority.

The army of the East left in Egypt a profound impression of their amelioration of the country, and the most lively regrets for their departure. These have sown a seed that time and events will unfold and ripen.

STATE OF EGYPT, &c.

PART I.

Affairs from the Month of Floreal, in the Eighth Year of the Republic (April and May) 1800, to Brumaire, Ninth Year, (October and November) 1801.

CHAP. I.

Situation of the Army of the East; and Plans formed by General Kléber immediately preceding his Death.

AFTER the battle of Heliopolis, and the siege of Cairo, the army of the East was surrounded with the most brilliant circumstances. The troops, well clothed, well fed, and regularly paid, were completely satisfied with their situation. The bad faith of the English in the rupture of the treaty of El-Arish had excited their indignation. To them the Turks were not formidable enemies. After the 18th of Brumaire (9th of November 1799), their confidence in the government heightened their desire to preserve a

conquest, the vast importance of which they felt, and which they contemplated with pleasure, since they began to endure fewer privations, and to reap some enjoyments.

The inhabitants, astonished to see the visier of the Porte, the greatest personage to whom their knowledge extended, defeated by the French, were now convinced that the efforts of the Turks to regain the country would thenceforth be ineffectual; and, considering Egypt as the property of their new masters, began to place great confidence in them. They had experienced, on various occasions, with what facility revolts had been suppressed by a small number of troops. The expenses of the war, levied on the rebels, would deter them for ever from similar attempts; and the peace with Murad Bey tended to retain the inhabitants in these peaceable dispositions.

The extraordinary contributions imposed on Cairo, as a punishment for its revolt, afforded means to pay the arrears of the army, amounting to eleven millions of livres, including the soldiers' pay, and tranquilly to wait the season for collecting the ordinary imposts to supply current expenses. The

ameliorations, which a state of war, and the difficulties inseparable from a new establishment, had prevented Bonaparte from effecting in a country where the language, manners, and customs, opposed innumerable obstacles, general Kléber was in a situation to accomplish after the victory of Heliopolis. The regulations he ordained in every department of the administration introduced great economy into the expenditure, diminished the charges of collection, and put a stop to various exactions and dilapidations.

Kléber, desirous of profiting of the moment of general good-will in the inhabitants of Cairo, and to make them feel (particularly the Copts) that, if they had been armed during the siege, their quarters would not have been pillaged by the Turks, and that it was their interest to concur with the French in the common defence, prevailed on them to raise a battalion of 500 men, whom he trained to arms, and clothed in the French uniform. He proposed to augment these auxiliary troops as circumstances might permit.

This formation of a body of Copts was useful as introducing a military taste; but

It was a still more important object to induce the inhabitants of Egypt (Christians and Mussulmen) to enroll themselves in the demi-brigades, where they would more readily imbibe the principles, and learn the discipline, of the French soldiery. Kléber gave the greatest encouragement to these enrollments. In Upper Egypt they became frequent. The 21st demi-brigade in a short time recruited 300 men, who quickly learnt their exercise. The inhabitants of Lower Egypt seemed less disposed to enter the service; but their repugnance might have been removed.

The Greeks, of a more warlike character, offered themselves with a great deal more zeal. Two companies of Greeks had been raised by Bonaparte. One of these was at the siege of Cairo, and fought with great bravery. General Kléber raised a Greek legion, in which were enlisted numbers of Greeks who had newly arrived in the ports of Egypt. It soon amounted to nearly 1500 men.

The army had found great difficulty to procure means of carriage in moments of great urgency; because at such times the

Arabs, who let out their camels to hire, disappeared. To secure this important service, Kléber established a park of 500 camels for the use of the army; which were employed, when the troops were not in the field, in various useful services. He gave orders for the purchase of horses and camels, to remount the cavalry, and for the artillery. He established flying-bridges over the branches of the Nile, to facilitate the march of troops from the coast to the frontier of Syria; and established posts of communication between the different stations of the army.

He laid down a plan of great simplicity for works to be constructed at Cairo; embracing two great objects—to overawe the inhabitants of that extensive city, and so far to command the avenues that an enemy could not easily introduce himself to raise the inhabitants. He gave orders also for works necessary to the defence of the coasts.

He established a committee of works, consisting of five members, heads of the principal departments of the civil administration, with whom he advised on the ameliorations that the circumstances of the country would permit.

He put a stop to a multitude of dilapidations, and to peculations at the expense of the soldiery, whose condition he greatly improved by ordering a regular delivery of the rations of provisions and forage, and assigning clothing to the several corps.

The Turkish fleet, commanded by the capitan-pacha, appeared off Alexandria in the beginning of Prairial (*latter end of May*). Kléber, having no information whether or not troops were on board, and an attempt on the coast was meditated, instantly marched with part of the troops at Cairo, and ordered the troops in the Delta to assemble at Rahmanieh. He quitted Cairo on the 14th Prairial (*beginning of June*); learnt at Rahmanieh that the capitan-pacha appeared off Alexandria merely to open a negotiation if possible; prohibited the landing of any agent of the Turks; and returned to Cairo, leaving in the Delta, opposite to Rahmanieh, a flying-camp of two demi-brigades and two regiments of cavalry, to march to any part of the coast that might be menaced, or to the frontier of Syria.

General Menou had arrived at Cairo at the latter end of Floreal (*about the middle of May*). In the course of the six preceding months

he had received various orders to repair thither, at first to be employed in the negotiations with the Turks, afterwards for the approaching campaign, and after the reduction of Cairo to assume the command of that place. But, although uniformly answering that he was about to depart, and that he desired nothing so eagerly as to meet the enemy, he remained very quietly at Rosetta, till the Turks being driven out of Cairo, and chased to the desert, nothing more remained but to enjoy the tranquillity purchased by the victories of the army.

When general Menou was arrived at Cairo, he raised objections to his taking the command of that place. That of Upper Egypt, where he expressed an inclination to travel, was offered him; but to this also he raised objections. At length Kléber, in one of his moments of caustic humour, said to general Menou, in a letter, that, having offered him the most desirable commands, he had only that of commander-in-chief to add. General Menou chose the command of Upper Egypt; but did not leave Cairo.

About this time, various reports injurious to Kléber, and calculated to deprive him of

the confidence of the army, were spread through Cairo. The author was not then suspected; but since there has been little doubt on that subject.

Before general Kléber departed from Cairo for Rahmanieh, he wrote to general Reynier, who was on duty in Kelioubeh, to proceed to Cairo, to take the command of the place, and watch Upper Egypt and the frontier of Syria, while he was on the coast. The express with these orders lost his way; and general Reynier did not reach Cairo till after Kléber's departure. In the interim, general Menou asked for the command of Cairo, which Kléber gave him, recommending him to advise with general Reynier on the necessary dispositions, if there should be any movement on the side of Syria. General Reynier, on his arrival at Cairo, gave Menou every necessary information relative to the fortifications, the troops, and the inhabitants and police of the city, with each of which general Menou was little acquainted.

Kléber returned from Rahmanieh on the 21st. On the 23d he shewed to general Reynier a note he had ordered to be written in answer to a letter that Mr. Morier, secre-

tary to lord Elgin, had sent him from Jaffa. He conversed with him on the conduct he proposed to maintain with the Turks; upon which subject he had before held several conversations with him. It was Kléber's object to avail himself of the rupture of the treaty of El-Arish, and of the arrangements made by the English at that time to occupy Alexandria, Damietta, and Suez, to excite the jealousy and anger of the Turks. It was his intention to decline all communication both with the Turkish and English commander in chief, while he endeavoured to open a direct correspondence with Constantinople. By this policy he expected to be able to correspond with the French government, receive its instructions, and prevail on the Turks to consent to a neutrality till the conclusion of a general peace. A treaty to this effect would have secured the French army from any attack, except by a maritime expedition, which the English would scarcely have attempted without the aid of the Turks; and would have augmented the resources of the French, by reviving commerce in Egypt.

CHAP. II.

Assassination of Kléber. General Menou takes the Command. His Conduct in the first Instance, and till the End of Fructidor (the Middle of September).

ON the 25th of Prairial (*the middle of June*), general Kléber, after reviewing the Greek legion in the Isle of Raoudah, came to Cairo to inspect repairs that were making at his house. He was walking on the terrace of his garden with citizen Protain, his architect, when he received several stabs with a poignard. The assassin, who had arrived at Cairo toward the end of Floreal (*the middle of May*), had followed Kléber from Gizeh; and, having introduced himself into the house along with the workmen, seized for his purpose the moment when Kléber's attention was deeply engaged in conversation.

As soon as the generals heard the news of the assassination, they assembled at the house of general Damas, to which the body of Kléber

had been carried. Search was made for the assassin; and he was soon after arrested, and interrogated.

The sheiks and agas of the city had been sent for, with an intention to examine if this deed was connected with any more extensive conspiracy. An aide-de-camp entered the room in which the generals were assembled, to know if they were to be brought in. General Reynier, to whom the officer spoke, desired him to address himself to general Menou, who referred him back to general Reynier, and a discussion arose between the two generals concerning a successor to Kléber.

General Menou maintained that he was unqualified for the command; that, having been in little active service, he was less known to the troops than general Reynier; and *that he had already refused the command in chief on other occasions.* He lavished his *word of honour* that he would sooner give in his resignation, as a general officer, than accept the command; and that, even if it were imposed upon him, he would avail himself of its authority to order general Reynier to assume it.

General Reynier observed to him, that, in such circumstances, the laws ordered the oldest general officer to take the provisional command, till the pleasure of the government should be known; and that, if he desired time to come to a resolution, as to the command in chief, he could not decline to issue his orders as commandant of Cairo; and that, for his part, he deemed the command of too important a nature to assume it without mature reflexion. Perceiving that general Menou came to no resolution, he took him aside; and, repeating his arguments, added, that such a discussion ought to be postponed to a time of less difficulty.

General Menou again insisted that he could not take the command; that he had not seen service, and was unknown to the troops, who were perhaps prejudiced against him by his change of religion. General Reynier observed, that he ought not to consider his change of religion as any obstacle; that it would even render his authority more easy to the people of the country; and that all the generals, and general Reynier in particular, would assist him with their whole powers and best counsels. He invited him at all events to

take the lead at present, as commandant of Cairo. He then led general Menou back to the aid-de-camp, and the discussion ended for that time.

The examinations concerning the assassination continued. The next day general Menou assumed the title of commander in chief, *ad interim*, and appointed general Reynier president of the commission charged to try the assassin.

After the interment of Kléber, and the execution of the assassin, general Menou assumed the title of *general in chief*. The army with great reluctance saw him succeed its former generals : murmurs were heard in several corps. But they were appeased by the generals, who hoped that general Menou's knowledge of business would well qualify him to direct the civil administration, and that in actual service and times of danger he would avail himself of their military experience.

General Menou at first appeared willing to gain the good-will of every one. He received with attention the generals and the heads of the various civil departments ; paid them frequent visits ; and seemed even to anticipate

their counsels and wishes. But it was not long before signs of animosity against his predecessor, and low intrigues for the confirmation of the command, began to betray at least his feeble policy. The murmurs of the army, and the reproaches made to general Reynier for having induced him to assume the command, excited his jealousy; although the open conduct of that general ought to have quieted his mind as to any danger of rivalry.

The command of Egypt presented opportunity to acquire a brilliant reputation as a soldier, a legislator, and the head of the civil administration; and, to secure these to himself, Menou had to obtain his confirmation in the command, and to efface the remembrance of Kléber's achievements. The first step was to invent the distinctions of *colonist* and *anti-colonist*. General Menou proclaimed himself the head of the colonists, and pledged himself to preserve Egypt. In France, the opinion was circulated, that the other generals were anti-colonists, and wished to renew the treaty of El-Arish*. At this pe-

* The difference between the two periods of the treaty of El-Arish, and the time I am now speaking of, was perfectly appreciated by every individual in the army. At the former

ried the Osiris was secretly dispatched to Europe.

period, the troops received only afflicting news from France. Her armies were beaten, and her frontier threatened. The declamations against the expedition to Egypt, countenanced by the directory, reduced the army of the east to the character of an exile. At that time, unacquainted with the elevation of Bonaparte, and the happy revolution which restored both its energy and glory to France, the army of Egypt burnt with the desire of employing their victorious arms in rescuing the mother country from ruin. General Kléber had carried on negotiations, to open the eyes of the Turks to their true interests, retard their operations, and gain time to receive succours and the orders of government. Having no other means of delay left, he had proposed conferences, and a suspension of arms. The English found means to retard the publication of the suspension of arms, and the conveyance of the ministers appointed to the conference; and, meanwhile, El-Arish was attacked and taken by surprise, the French repasing on the faith of the armistice.

El-Arish taken, general Dessaix exposed to the Turkish army, and a part of Egypt in insurrection, the French could no longer procure money or provisions for the army but with extreme difficulty; and the cities on the coast were in a situation to apprehend events and a surprise similar to that of El-Arish. The Turkish army, co-operating with the English and Russians, was on the point of overrunning Egypt. The army of the east had no prospect of victory; and, receiving no reinforcements, would be worn out even by victories, and must capitulate after successive attacks; and Europeans, as auxiliaries of the Turks, would acquire a political influence with that nation dangerous to France.

Kléber, persuaded that the directory had abandoned all thoughts of Egypt, and that the veteran bands of the army of

Convinced that he could not aspire to a military reputation, general Menou turned his

the east reaching Europe at the beginning of a campaign might save their country, made the sacrifice of the glory he might acquire against the Turks to the hope of being more useful to France. His object in this treaty was to separate the Turks from the English and Russians; and to make a peace between the Porte and France, in which the latter would gain in commerce advantages to balance the loss of Egypt. But the visir depended too much on the English to consent to this openly. He went no further than to give verbal assurances that this arrangement should be accomplished after the evacuation. The negotiations were too far advanced for the French to recede; and the treaty was concluded.

The execution of the treaty was commenced when the French learnt the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire. The army had then reason to hope that it would not be neglected by the government, if it remained in Egypt; but general Kléber was too honourable, and too much a slave to his word, to break a treaty which he had signed. The mistaken calculations of the English government, and its bad faith, accompanied with insult, recoiled upon itself. The English government restored arms to the French, and aided them in their second conquest of Egypt.

If circumstances had been studiously combined, to favor the French army with a complete victory, no better could have been found than the evacuation of the eastern part of Egypt, the march of the Turks, and the concentrating of the French troops. If, instead of signing the convention, the French had opened the campaign, they would have been exposed to many partial battles, many wants, and most painful marches and difficulties, under which at last perhaps they might have fallen. At Heliopolis the French troops were all

views to a political career. He affected to do every thing himself; and, endeavouring to gain a high character for morality and probity, loudly exclaimed against dilapidations, promising to destroy all abuses;—of which, in fact, Bonaparte and Kléber left very few existing. In haste to give favourable hopes of his administration, and to interest the army in his plans, he promulgated an engagement to maintain the full and punctual pay of the troops before he could study the finances of Egypt sufficiently to secure the means; and, with great ostentation, erected a commission to superintend the fabrication of bread. When he began to imagine that he was

concentrated, and the victory was most brilliant and decisive.

After that victory, and the news of the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire, the circumstances of the army of the east were entirely changed. Secure, at least for a year, of the quiet possession of Egypt, it also might well hope that the government, which then was such as to merit its entire confidence, would vigilantly watch opportunities of affording it succour. The common and recent dangers had attached every individual of the army to the preservation of Egypt; and, if an anti-colonist was to be sought, the whole army would have pointed out that man alone, who, at Rosetta, was employed in declaiming against the operations of his general at the very hour in which the army was sealing this new conquest with its blood.

obeyed with less reluctance, his manners gradually changed; he became less accessible; in the midst of bundles of papers, he had the air of labouring very assiduously; but the most urgent affairs remained untouched.

Under Bonaparte and Kléber, the army of the east had but one mind. All were united by common dangers and common hopes. A new commander in chief created a new temper. Easily might Menou have conciliated the affections of the army, seconded by all the generals, who, impressed with the necessity of being united, acted with good faith towards him. He chose rather by insidious means to make himself a few partisans; and his policy was long covered with a veil that his ostensible proceedings rendered it difficult to remove.

CHAP. III.

Political Events.

THE note which Kléber had prepared in answer to Mr. Morier, lord Elgin's secretary, was not yet sent off. General Menou qualified some of the expressions, and dispatched it on the 2d of Messidor (*middle of June*) such as it has appeared in the public journals.

On the 9th of the same month Mr. —, lieutenant of the —, arrived at Cairo, by the desert, with a flag of truce, bearing dispatches from the visir and sir Sydney Smith. He announced that England had delivered the necessary passports for the treaty of El-Arish. He had before presented himself at Alexandria; but was sent back, according to the orders of general Kléber, who had broken off all communication with the visir. He had afterwards taken the route of Syria. Mr. — was informed on his road of the assassination of general Kléber, and at Salahieh held several conversations to induce the soldiers to

revolt against the generals who should refuse to lead them back to France. His language produced no other feeling than contempt; but his conduct subjected him to be arrested as a spy. He was however sent back.

New letters arrived from the visir on the 15th, relative to the note sent to Mr. Morier. He was answered, that he must address himself to the French government. On the 13th Fructidor (*latter end of August*) the visir sent another dispatch. He constantly endeavoured to commence a new negotiation, fearing to be anticipated by the capitan-pacha. These two principal officers of the Porte rivalled each other in activity for the renewal of negotiations with the French army, to gain favour at Constantinople.

The capitan-pacha had come to Jaffa with sir Sydney Smith in the beginning of Messidor (*middle of June*), to concert a plan of negotiation or of military operations with the visir. They had no forces to undertake any thing; and the conferences between the head of the Ottoman armies (at that time without troops, and his credit at Constantinople lessened since the battle of Heliopolis), and the

capitan-pacha (his inferior in rank, but the favourite of the sultan), passed without any thing being determined, and merely in mutually sifting each other. They separated, secretly resolved each to negotiate for himself.

The capitan-pacha entertained on board his ship at Jaffa the aid-de-camp Baudot, who had been surprised and made a prisoner at Heliopolis, and detained to serve as an exchange for Mustapha Pacha, whom Kléber had kept as an hostage. The pacha having died suddenly, after the assassination of Kléber, that event prolonged the captivity of Baudot, who did not return to Damietta till the end of Thermidor (*about the middle of August*). The capitan-pacha behaved with a politeness to this officer that greatly contrasted the visir's treatment of him.

With a little address, the personal interests of the two principal officers of the Porte might have been used to renew negotiations, not with a design to cede Egypt to the Turks, but to paralyze their efforts, to sow dissensions between them and the English, and perhaps dispose the Porte to neutrality during the

war *: but to every proposition general Menou answered, that the Turks must address themselves to the French government for all arrangements relative to Egypt. The Turks, accustomed to see the governors of the provinces act with less dependence, considered this answer as an entire rejection of their proposals, and persuaded themselves that all negotiations would be useless.

Baudot, from some conversations with the capitan-pacha, by insinuating to him that negotiations are frequently begun by commissaries for the exchange of prisoners, and that the conduct of the English and the intention they had manifested to seize on the ports of Egypt, if the treaty of El-Arish had been executed, proved that they would throw obstacles in the way of all attempts at accommodation between France and the Porte which should come to their knowledge, imagined that he could obtain his consent to the sending of a French agent to Constantinople, who, under pretext of the

* General Menou about this time received letters addressed to Kléber by the French government, announcing that the Turks were not averse to this neutrality.

exchange of prisoners, might have treated directly of the affairs of Egypt.

The capitan-pacha was gone to Cyprus to take in fresh water. On his return in *Vendémiaire* (*September* and *October*), general Menou dispatched general Baudot to restore to him Endjeah Bey, who had been made a prisoner in a vessel wrecked near Aboukir, and to endeavour to commence a negotiation for the exchange of prisoners. Menou wrote to the capitan-pacha, that he must first of all commence by this negotiation, and that afterwards he might address himself to Paris. Baudot endeavoured to convince general Menou that this would be attended with no success; but he received orders from the general to depart, and an officer was joined in the mission, to be a spy upon him.

The capitan-pacha, after a short stay before Alexandria, returned to Rhodes. Baudot could not accomplish his mission; and Endjeah Bey was shortly afterwards sent to the capitan-pacha in a Greek vessel.

CHAP. IV.

Disposition of the Inhabitants of Egypt.—Military Events to the End of Brumaire (November).

EGYPT was perfectly tranquil. The contributions were paid throughout the provinces without the necessity of strong detachments for their collection. The greater part of the Arab tribes were reduced to obedience. Such as were not so, had fled into the desert, or were dispersed in villages, to shun pursuit. Convinced of the power of the French, it was less hostile intentions than their natural distrust which prevented a cordial connexion between them. The approaching inundation of the Nile, and the distressed state of the visir's army, insured the French from any exterior attack for many months. A party of four hundred Turkish horse, who had escorted Mr. —— (the English negotiator), could give no uneasiness to the French. In the beginning of Thermidor (*the middle of July*) it was reported that the army of the

visir was preparing to march. Although this was improbable, the garrison of Salahieh was reinforced by a demi-brigade, which soon after returned to Cairo.

Mahammed Bey Elfi advanced from Syria by the desert, under pretence of joining Murad Bey; but he remained among the Mahazi, a tribe of rebel Arabs inhabiting the deserts of Chark-attich. He was chased from that quarter by a detachment of dromedaries. Other parties marched to the isthmus of Suez, to intercept him, if he attempted to fall back. After being long pursued, and his baggage taken, he was reduced to wander with twenty-five horse.

Towards the end of Thermidor (*middle of August*), general Menou withdrew into Cairo the 75th demi-brigade, which Kléber had posted in the Delta, to form a corps of reserve with the 25th and the 20th regiments of dragoons. The flying-bridges established by Kléber at Rahmanieh and Semenhoud, to facilitate the passages of the Nile, and preserve the communications of the army from the coast to the frontier of Syria, were withdrawn.

Soon after this the inundation covered the

country. The army could not be attacked before the retreat of the waters. No reason existed at that time for movements of the troops: notwithstanding which, general Menou ordered the division of general Friant to relieve, at Alexandria, Rosetta, and Rahmanieh, that of general Lanusse, whom he said he wished to have at Cairo. Very important reasons ought to have prevented this change. General Lanusse had commanded for a long time at Alexandria, was perfectly acquainted with the defence of the coast, and was well known to the inhabitants of that city and of Bahireh. The plague reigning almost always at Alexandria, it was greatly to be feared that this change would introduce it into Cairo. In a word, this movement could not be effected during the inundation without boats, and to occupy them was to throw away the means of provisioning Alexandria at the only favourable season. But general Menou recollected that Kléber, incensed by his pretensions to hold the command of Alexandria and Bahireh without quitting Rosetta, had replaced him by Lanusse; and in return he hoped to excite discontent among the troops of Lanusse, and, by persecution, drive that officer, whom he

did not love, to demand his passport for France.

Three Arab tribes in the neighbourhood of Gaza, the *Tarabins*, *Teha*, and *Anager*, had taken refuge in the desert, after carrying on a short war with the Turks, who had treacherously assassinated their sheiks. The Arabs never pardon this injury, so frequently inflicted on them by the Turks. The three tribes sent to general Reynier to demand permission to settle in Egypt, under the protection of the French. They urged in their behalf that their alliance with the French in the campaign of Syria was the cause of their misfortunes. That was, in fact, the pretext used by the Turks; but the real cause was that Mahammed-Aboumarak, principal domestic to the grand visir, lately raised to the dignity of pacha of Gaza, had a hereditary quarrel with these tribes, and availed himself of his elevation to take vengeance upon them.

General Reynier was persuaded that some use might be made of these Arabs. Established in the desert between Syria and Egypt, they might give advice of the movements of the Turks; and he hoped that, by protection and kindness, they would be induced to watch

and check the contraband commerce of grain constantly carried on in the immense extent of the deserts ; and, finally, in case of a new campaign in Syria, might render considerable service to the French. He proposed to Menou to grant them part of Ouadi-Tomlat, and the desert which separates it from Katieh and Suez.

These Arabs stated their number to be 7000, including women, children, and old men ; and spoke of having 500 horse, and 800 men mounted on dromedaries, together with a great quantity of cattle ; but, as they presented themselves successively in parties, which dispersed in the desert as soon as they arrived, no correct estimate could be made of their numbers. Their principal sheiks being killed, there did not remain among them any men of influence whose information and authority could be usefully employed ; and general Menou having given them a cold reception, very little use was made of these tribes.

CHAP. V.

Intrigues—Origin of Dissensions in the French Army.

THE months of Thermidor and Fructidor (from the middle of July to the middle of September) produced few remarkable events. The intrigues that were carrying on were as yet undetected. It was however a subject of surprise to see attempts made to tarnish the glory of Kléber. These attacks, indeed, were directed in the dark : but the known instruments were well received ; and it was already discovered, that, to be one of them, was the surest means of obtaining favour.

General Menou, whose hatred to Kléber rebounded upon general Damas, perceiving that, notwithstanding his artifices to excite disgust in that officer, he did not resign his rank of chief of the staff ; and now deeming himself sufficiently strong, (this was in Fructidor—*August and September*) ; sent him an order to cease from exercising the duties of

his station. Menou's letter assigned no reason for this measure. General Damas was perfectly astonished ; and returned for answer, that he could not divine what had occasioned this proceeding, and that it was incumbent on general Menou to wait for the orders of government, unless there were reasons sufficiently weighty to bring him before a court-martial. He received no answer. General Menou even refused to see him.

General Reynier, and Friant, general of division, alarmed at this quarrel, which might sow other dissensions in the army, went to general Menou, hoping to induce him to lay aside his personal animosity, the less founded in this case, as general Damas had sought to render him services with Kléber. Menou excused himself by saying, that he felt an incompatibility in their dispositions ; that he could not transact business with general Damas ; protested, *on his honour*, that no personal animosity influenced his conduct ; and concluded by offering to resign the command.

After this menace, general Reynier ceased to press the matter further. He had already, from delicacy, forbore to represent to Menou that, commanding the army only *ad in-*

terim, he ought not to make a change of such magnitude in the army before he was acquainted with the intentions of the government, except in a case of the most urgent necessity. General Reynier confined himself merely to demand of Menou, to explain himself to Damas, to make up this breach, if that were still possible, and to continue him in his station, or give him some other suitable employment.

General Damas, resolved to afford no excuse for dissensions in the army by continuing in the station of chief of the staff in defiance of the general, accepted the command of the provinces of Benisouef and Fayoum. The order of the day of the 21st of Fructidor (8th *September*) announced his retreat, and contained eulogiums on his conduct.

General Menou was several days before he appointed his successor. He named general La Grange; but, while he appeared to give that officer his confidence, he reserved to himself the exercise of all the duties of the station, even to the most minute, and the affairs of the army languished as before.

General Reynier had penetrated Menou's secret intention to form a party, which he

might have counteracted, by exposing his crooked policy to many persons who, strangers to all duplicity, judged of general Menou only by the mask he wore. But, to undeceive these persons, would be to disgust them with the commander in chief, and to divide the army; and general Reynier thought it his duty to be silent.

General Menou, observing that his party did not increase with sufficient rapidity; informed also that, although the most perfect discipline prevailed in the army, the greater part of the officers and corps were dissatisfied with him, resolved to make himself popular.

On the 1st of Vendémiaire (23d September) he made six new generals of brigade, and filled up all the vacancies in the army. Some officers, preferring rather to remain with their own corps than to be advanced, refused the promotion; but they were compelled to accept their new rank. The greater part of these promotions were given to officers who were entitled to them by services or seniority; but it was perceived that general Menou had less an intention to distribute military rewards than to paralyse by his favors those whom he feared, or raise to places of trust

men whose frankness was not likely to detect his deceitful policy... It was soon perceived that there was no longer occasion for military services, or brilliant actions, to gain the highest stations. General Menou expected, by a prodigality of promotion, to engage the officers to carry him tales of what was said concerning him; but he found few mean enough to gain his good will at such a price. Almost in all cases his civilities were repelled with indignation. This attempt to introduce spies into the army remained some time unknown at Cairo. General Lanusse, while at Alexandria, was the first to hear of it, some officers having informed him of similar offers of advancement made to them by general Menou.

CHAP. VI.

Innovations in the Civil Administration.

TILL the month of Fructidor (*August and September*), general Menou confined his activity to details in the administration and police of the hospitals (already re-organised by general Kléber after the siege of Cairo); the manufacture of bread; and the composition of his orders of the day, which he filled with declamations on morals and probity, no doubt the more widely to separate his former life from his present situation. But in Fructidor he undertook to re-model the civil government and the finances of Egypt.

I shall take a rapid review of his administration, and the vast multitude of his ordinances.

According to an ancient custom in Egypt, the mukhtesims, on taking possession of their territories, confirmed the existing sheiks, or appointed others, by clothing them with pelisses and shawls; which ceremony, ac-

cording to the manners of the East, announced that they were vested with authority. The sheiks returned the favour of the investment by a present of horses, camels, and cattle, usually of double the value of the ensigns of their office. The sheiks of wealthy or considerable families received pelisses and shawls from Cachemire; and, according to custom, must make presents in return proportionably valuable. The great proprietors renewed this investiture whenever it was convenient to their affairs; and some had even converted it into a money-tax. The burden of this duty, which they received every two, three, or four years, was afterwards apportioned and levied upon the Fellahs.

If no means of levying the usual imposts were to be neglected, it was right to continue this duty. But a great occasion was to be seized to gain the good will of the sheiks, and to interest them in the collection of the ordinary contributions. The custom of clothing the sheiks with marks of distinction at certain epochs might have been continued, and would have given employment to the French manufactories, and cultivated in the

inhabitants the pride of receiving the ensigns of distinction from the government. This last was one step towards civilisation. Those who had studied the municipal organisation of the villages, and the influence of the sheiks, saw how necessary it was to gain their good will, if the government would secure the interior tranquillity of the country, and the receipt of the imposts. They knew that the sheiks, whenever they were terrified or disgusted with the government, were accustomed to abandon their villages, prevailing on the inhabitants to desert with them, and sometimes even to rise in arms; and hence a frequent deficiency in the receipt of the contributions. But general Menou was seduced by the expectation of an increase of three millions of livres, into which he was betrayed by an unfounded calculation. The receiver general, who, from his situation, had in every regulation only to consider the means of filling the public coffers, without attending to any political motives, readily adopted a project which promised an augmentation of revenue. He saw nothing in this scheme but an operation of finance. The ordinance was inserted in the order of the day of the

8th of Fructidor (23d August). Nothing however existed to hasten its promulgation, because the plan could not be executed till after the inundation.

If such a duty included various general inconveniences, its new mode of collection was still more dangerous. The sheiks were withdrawn from the inspection of the governors of provinces, the only persons who, from the ancient prejudices and customs of the country, could have any influence over them; and subjected to the control of the receiver-general, and more immediately under Turkish inspectors, and a director-general. This scheme made the director-general the head of the municipal authority of Egypt; who, by the functions of his office, was authorised to correspond with all the sheiks, and might by an abuse of that power raise every part of the country at the same moment, without the government having any suspicion of his design. This extraordinary office was given to a sheik of Cairo, who had twice before betrayed the confidence placed in him by the French.

On the 12th of Fructidor, general Menotti appointed a director and accountant-general of the revenues of Egypt. Citizen Estevé,

receiver-general, gave his sanction, from devotion to the public service, to Menou's wish of changing the name and functions of his office; but he was uniformly counteracted in the duties of his situation, and his plans for the public service rendered abortive.

The order of the day of the 20th of Fructidor named the directors and subordinate officers of the new department. They were more numerous, and received larger salaries, than similar officers under Kléber.

A decree respecting foreign commerce appeared in the order of the day of the 12th of Fructidor; but it was not by declamation that commerce could be revived, it stood in need of substantial encouragement.

The order relative to the stamp on articles of silver and gold, which was published on the 14th of Fructidor, was useful to check the mal-practices of the goldsmiths, and the melting down of money; but the collection of this duty cost much more than the receipt.

General Menou recollected that in some of the colonies there existed a select council. Kléber had in part imitated that institution, by forming a committee of administration of

five members. General Menou first added several persons to this committee. Afterwards he suppressed the committee by his order of the day on the 15th of Fructidor; and, as a substitute for this committee, appointed a select council, composed of all the principal officers of the army resident at Cairo, and a few members of his own nomination. But what was to be expected, in an affair of this kind, from an assembly of forty or fifty members? It is not a body of this nature that has the habit of dispatching business. Debates on the various branches of the administration would infallibly have led to a censure of the general's measures; and even if those had been treated with the utmost delicacy possible in the council, this assembly would have given birth to fermentations in the army injurious to discipline. To establish this council was in fact to create a club in the army. The order I have spoken of relative to the sheiks had organised the means of raising the country; the formation of a select council was calculated to organise revolts in the army.

The greater part of the officers who were to compose the new council advised general

Menou to dissolve it, observing, that his predecessors had administered the affairs of Egypt without such an institution, and declaring that it would be productive of many inconveniences. Whether general Menou perceived that tendency himself, or had published the order merely that it might be thought in France that he called to his aid the counsels of the superior officers of the army, the opening of the council was postponed from day to day, on account of repairs which it was said were necessary in the room designed for its sittings: and afterwards the plan was heard no more of.

It is well known that, even in Europe, commerce takes alarm at innovations in the system of duties. A new duty is less productive at first, because the government is obliged to manage it themselves, subject to many deficiencies, as it cannot be farmed in a manner advantageous to the government before its fair produce is ascertained. Inconveniences of this nature are much greater in a country where the inhabitants are alarmed at the smallest alterations in their ancient usages. These considerations did not terrify general Menou; who, on the 16th of Fruc-

fidor, published new regulations relative to the customs. He expressed an intention to encourage the commerce with Syria; but he perplexed it with duties and forms which disgusted the Arabs conducting the caravans, and tempted them to carry on a contraband trade, which the open frontier of the country rendered extremely easy.

Kléber, to encourage the Greek vessels to frequent the ports of Egypt, granted exemptions from duties, and even premiums, for the importation of articles most wanted in the army. The duties were now again laid on; and for the premiums were substituted printed papers, promising security and protection to the trade. At the same moment, a multitude of formalities were imposed upon the ships in the sale of their merchandise, in their loading for their return, and even on obtaining permission to depart.

Egypt derives great advantages from her commerce with Arabia, sending thither the surplus of the corn of Upper Egypt, and receiving in exchange coffee, gums, incense, and the manufactures of India, which serve to pay for the merchandise she draws from Europe. The port of Cosseir, which, from

its neighbourhood to the ports of Arabia, is the most convenient for this commerce, was situated in the territories of Murad Bey. To draw this trade into the port of Suez, occupied by the French, general Menou loaded all articles exported from the territories of Murad Bey with excessive customs, without providing in the port to which he wished to draw the Arabs the merchandise they wanted. The commerce with Arabia suffered extremely from this policy; and the few vessels that came to Suez, unable to procure a cargo back, received money for their merchandise.

The alteration of the customs at Siout, imposed on the commerce with the interior of Africa, made an unfavourable impression on the caravans, which began to increase in number from the previous conduct of the French. They were also odious to the Mamelukes, from the manner in which they were imposed.

In the order of the day of the 20th of Fructidor, (*7th of September*) general Menou new modelled and reduced a duty on successions, which had been levied from the earliest times under the name of *Beit-el-Mahl*.

The duties on the consumption of the interior had been suppressed by the order of the 16th of Fructidor, regulating the customs. Soon after that, general Menou re-established the former, under the name of tolls; but it may be asked, if his reform was as beneficial as the ancient mode? In the trading cities, articles are deposited in vast places, named *Okels*. The duties on consumption were farmed annually to private persons, who collected them with little expense, and in a very simple manner, at the gates of the *okels*. The war had greatly reduced the rent of these farms, immediately after the conquest of Egypt; but confidence and tranquillity being restored in the country, the competition of merchants would have greatly raised their value. There were also particular duties on certain provisions; on the consumption in small towns; and on the markets of certain villages. Various abuses, vexations from individuals, and inefficient taxes, ought to have been suppressed. Portions of these revenues were appropriated, by ancient grants, to particular families, establishments, or mosques. The mode of their receipt might have been reformed, and

their produce augmented, without incurring, by a total change, the uncertainty and difficulties of an innovation.

These duties relaxed internal commerce. All kinds of provisions rose in price; and the troops, who received their pay and indemnity for their rations in money, were greatly the sufferers. It would have demanded a host of agents to have collected these duties for the first month. Rapacity, and the hope of being supported in their exactions as formerly by authority, induced many individuals to become farmers of these taxes. They offered very high prices; but their hopes of plunder being deceived, they incurred losses on the greater parts of the duties.

The divan of Cairo had been dissolved after the convention of El-Arish; and Kléber had not thought proper to re-establish it before the entire payment of the ten millions imposed on that city. But that imposition being discharged, the divan might have been made useful in giving to the inhabitants an apparent influence in the government, and habituating them to business. The idea of forming at the same time a tribunal of ap-

peal was also excellent. Justice was either not administered, or partially; by judges without consideration or authority, and guided more by their personal interests than by laws. The guilty almost always escaped. The connexions or animosities of families or villages balanced authority; and there existed no municipal, no judicial power.

It would have been an interesting work, to prepare Egypt for a good government; and on this depended the progress of civilisation. It was only by degrees that it could be introduced among an ignorant people, servilely attached to their ancient customs. The task demanded great delicacy of management relative to religious opinions. It was difficult to lead men, divided by various modes of worship, to obedience to the same laws.

General Menou had appointed on the 4th of Fructidor a commission to inquire into the ancient administration of justice, and to present a new plan to him. Always eager however to promulgate a law, he did not wait the result of their labours; but published the order of the day of the 10th of Vendémiaire (*the 2d of October*).

It had been the policy of Bonaparte to compose the divan of men of various modes of worship, and thus to wear out religious distinctions. General Menou by this last order excluded all but mussulmen. The heads of other religions, the nomination of whom he reserved to himself, enjoyed only the right of the sittings, and the power of giving their opinion. He granted exclusively to the mussulmen tribunals invested with the power, not only of deciding in causes between mussulmen, but in their disputes with Christians. He left to the latter indeed the right to terminate their law-suits by arbitration; but in certain cases they were referred back to the mussulmen cadis. The ordinances which Bonaparte had published to prevent the corruption of the judges were renewed. General Menou also prohibited the *dieh*, or the composition for blood; an institution odious indeed in the eyes of reason, but consecrated by custom, and confirmed by the Koran. Nothing could be more contrary than this custom to the laws of civilised people; but it still remained to be considered if this was the moment in which it could be destroyed. There ar

errors which have taken so deep root with time, that it is necessary to sacrifice to them till the people are sufficiently enlightened to comprehend their nature.

Assassinations are very frequent in Egypt, and multiply wars between villages and families*. The guilty, almost always unknown,

* I frequently received complaints relative to assassinations. One day a Fellah came to my house, and took from the folds of his garment the head of his brother, still bleeding.

The relations of the murdered, who brought me pieces of their garments, steeped in blood, demanded vengeance upon some family or village. They rarely desired the apprehension of the guilty individual.

Their wars rekindled as soon as the military force was no longer present to keep them in awe. At the time when Bonaparte gained the victory over the Turks at Aboukir, the province of Charkieh was left without troops. When I returned to that quarter, the villages of *Ihieh* and of *Maadieh* had renewed an ancient quarrel. Their allies were assembled. The various Arabs had taken part with one side or the other. From five to six thousand men formed the army of each village; and during ten days that they had been engaged, seven or eight fell on each side daily. I arrived with a battalion, and dispersed the mob. I sent for the sheiks of each village; and shewed them, by a calculation of the killed on each side during several years, that the present quarrel had no motive, since the numbers were equal. They embraced in my presence, repeating the formula of peace; but as, in their opinion, it had not been sanctioned and confirmed by the payment of a composition, they began again to

asily find an asylum, or the means of escape. These wars frequently suspend the irrigation and culture of the lands, and the payment of the imposts. To put an end to them, the military chiefs formerly compelled the parties to appear before the *cadi*, and make their peace. The slain on each side were counted, and the party that had the greatest number received a compensation in money. The government adjudged itself a heavy penalty; and the reconciled enemies lived in peace. The penalties derived from these reconciliations brought annually to the different *beys* not less than 500,000 *livres*. It will easily be supposed that men accustomed to rapacity, and little delicate in the means of accumulating a fortune, would more frequently excite than pacify these quarrels. Sometimes each party was pro-

cut each others throats during the inundation of the following year.

The sheiks of the villages of *Baisons* being referred to, in a quarrel which was renewed for the failure of payment for the composition of blood, told me that, being little accustomed to affairs of that kind, they had consulted the sheiks of *Serikous*, who they found were accustomed to pay 400 *patagues* (about 1200 *livres*) for every assassination.

ted by a bey. Then peaceful arrangements were always more difficult, but they were not therefore the further from terminating in a payment of money from both parties to their protectors.

An assassin was with difficulty arrested. Even his execution did not terminate the quarrel; it was a death more only to place against the other party. The offended family preferred the receiving a compensation for blood, which alone could restore peace.

A custom as ancient as this, and with an influence so great on the manners of the people, was not to be rooted out merely by an order of the day: it was not to be destroyed without establishing the sure means of arresting the guilty, organising the civil authority in the villages, and abolishing the asylums offered by hospitality. But those who had lived only in Cairo, and the other great cities governed by a severe police, were ignorant that all the institutions necessary to form a police for the lands and villages were wanting in Egypt.

The order of the 16th of Vendémiaire burthened commerce with an increase of expenses, which brought nothing into the

treasury. Before that order, the officers sworn to weigh and measure, and the serafs, received a duty fixed by custom, according to the nature of the merchandise. General Menou, while he compelled them to pay for patents for their offices, increased the duties they received from two to three *per cent.* on the value. In a single day one of those officers would have made his fortune, if the articles he had to superintend had been of a high value. Appeals from traders multiplied without end. Menou had also extended that order to the provisions which the government received for imposts in kind. It was more than a tenth that was gratuitously given out of the public treasury. But he was obliged to modify this article, after innumerable remonstrances.

It was reasonable that the army should pay the customary duties on merchandise. Great inconvenience would have resulted from an exemption in their favour; but the order of the 19th of Vendémiaire extended to the successions of the French the impost called Beit-el-Mahl; and this imposition was contrary to the laws of the republic. This impost was farmed by inhabitants of

the country ; and to augment its produce in their eyes, it was pointed out to them in an indecent manner how much the farmers would receive from the fortunes of generals and other officers dying in the country. This order excited universal disgust.

Commerce, already burthened and embarrassed by a multitude of imposts and formalities, was almost crushed by the order of the 20th of Vendémiaire, imposing new duties on corporations, on the principle that commerce ought to pay for the protection it receives from government. Scarcely did the merchants of Cairo and Boulak begin again to breathe, after their magazines had been pillaged or confiscated, when that last city was taken, and they had subsequently paid more than half of twelve millions of the expenses of the war, than they were burthened with a multitude of new imposts. Those of Damietta, of Mehalleh-el-kebir, Tanta, &c. who had been equal sufferers, were now burthened in like manner. The hope of selling their merchandise at a higher price to the individuals of the army, almost the only consumers at that period, had borne them through their first difficulties. But the order of the 20th

of Vendémiaire completed their ruin. The greater part abandoned their commerce. Some turned their speculations to the farming of the new duties; others, as the heads of corporations, and charged in that quality with the re-partition of the duties, exempting themselves, and laying their share of the burthen on the poorer traders, still preserved a part of their former ease.

It was certainly necessary, to the defraying the expenses of the army, to establish regular duties on the towns; but they ought to have fallen on the rich, on proprietors, and, in a word, on luxury. It might have been prudent to preserve some old duties on trading corporations, which being in Egypt almost all concentrated in a few quarters, were collected with great facility. A moderate duty on patents might also have introduced a superintendence that would have been the source of some advantages. But it was previously necessary to study the nature of the ancient imposts, and to examine maturely what it would be proper to continue. General Menou scarcely took time to inquire where corporations existed.

To civilise Egypt, and confer on it a good

system of civil administration, the principal difficulty was to undermine the political influence of religious opinions. The ordinance which followed that upon the corporations, imposed particular duties on every nation, designated by its worship. The Copts were even distinguished as a foreign people. Undoubtedly it was politic to lay the burthen of the duties heavy upon the rich Copts, who, collecting the taxes, oppressed the people, and would rather bury their wealth than put it in circulation. It might be proper to levy the annual million which they were taxed; but the manner ought to have been very different. If traces of religious distinctions were to be preserved, then the capitation, which bears so hard on the Christians in every part of the Turkish empire, ought to have been modified, by granting exemptions to the Christians who should devote themselves to military duties; and thus might have been formed a regular force for the defence of the country.

The Syrian merchants had lost part of their property at the taking of Boulak. They had before paid heavy contributions to the Turks

during the seige. Kléber had promised them some indemnifications. General Menou, shortly after his assuming the command, astonished and terrified them with a requisition of 500,000 francs, part of which only could possibly be levied. He afterwards fixed their capitation at 150,000 francs, at a time when their commerce was almost entirely interrupted.

No nation in Egypt ought to be so carefully protected and encouraged as the Greeks. They alone during the war can in some degree preserve the foreign commerce. The Greeks began to devote themselves to this branch; and a little encouragement, that might easily have been afforded them, would have produced benefits of the greatest importance to the army. Through them political communications of the most interesting kind might have been opened with the Archipelago. Warlike by their taste and national temper, they would have furnished recruits, and filled the Greek legion. It is to be observed that, except those who carry arms, there are but few Greeks established in Egypt. Menou might therefore have for-

borne to harass them for the acquisition of the small sum of 50,000 francs, which might have been obtained, and even more, if the duties on corporations had been levied without distinctions of worship.

The Jews, who are almost all artisans, brokers, or serafs, would have been much more equally taxed without that distinction.

The greater part of the merchants called Franks had been ruined or pillaged during the siege of Cairo. Many fathers of families were massacred, and their children left without means of subsistence. This class of merchants, formerly privileged and accustomed to carry on prodigious speculations in the trade of the east, had a right to expect special grace and protection. 40,000 francs was levied upon them.

In a word, the order of the day of the 20th of Vendémiaire, which spoke only of encouragements to be given to commerce, contained in effect every measure by which it could be most easily crushed. Instead of inducing the French, who were followers of the army, to begin establishments from which the army would have drawn many articles they were in want of, it was announced that in a little

time the duties on such establishments would be fixed: This notice produced the effect that might well be expected. Many Frenchmen who had formed designs of establishments of real utility instantly gave up their projects.

CHAP. VII.

The Finances.

AT the time of Kléber's assassination, part of the contribution in money imposed upon the inhabitants of Cairo, and the whole of the contribution in merchandise, remained unpaid. These were received during the Trimestre of Messidor, together with part of the ordinary territorial imposts. The pay of the troops was ordered to be discharged regularly, and without deduction, and the greater part of the arrears paid up; funds were assigned for the fortifications; and the engineers of the bridges and highways received more than was sufficient to continue the demolitions necessary to the defence of Cairo, and to add some embellishments to the town. Grants, bounties, an augmentation of indemnity for rations, various useless expenses, and the immense number of French and Turks employed in the various services of the administration, the consequence of a system too

much complicated, by degrees raised the expenditure of the army to 17 or 1800,000 francs per month; although every change was announced as intending to reduce the expenses of Kléber's administration, which did not exceed 13 or 1400,000 francs.

Very large receipts, the produce of the new duties, were announced in the orders of the day; in which general Menou also incessantly repeated his engagement to maintain the full payment of the troops; and in Vendémiaire almost all the funds were expended. The duties on merchandise as yet produced little. The territorial imposts could not be collected till after the inundation. In a short time money was wanting. The Copts were ordered to furnish a forced loan, for which at first they were promised a mortgage on the contributions in arrears; and that security would have produced more if it had been put in effect. The first money gone, new wants succeeded; and the Copts furnished a second loan. It might be prudent no doubt to make them regorge part of their plunder; but general Kléber regarded the Copts as a reserve for moments of great embarrassment; and in effect, during the siege of Cairo, he

procured from them all the money he wanted.

The reports of citizen Esteve, and other persons charged with the direction of the various branches of the administration, will point out with precision the revenues the army might draw from Egypt in time of war; and the augmentations that would result from peace, and the re-establishment of commerce. I shall merely give my reader a general estimate of the revenue of Egypt.

The territorial impost, after Murad Bey occupied Said, could not be taken higher than 12 millions, including the impolitic imposts on the sheiks, which the French were afterwards compelled to receive as advances on account of the ordinary imposts - - 12,000,000

Francs.

The various indirect duties were farmed at about three millions; but the farmers sustaining losses, it would be necessary to grant them a reduction at

least till commerce should
revive, - - - - - 3,000,000

The duties on corporations and
national bodies were fixed by
an ordinance at two millions;
but ought to be reduced. By
means however of various vex-
ations these duties might pro-
duce - - - - - 2,000,000

The mint of Cairó, and the
duties for stamping gold and
silver articles, produced at the
most - - - - - 500,000

The customs might produce in
time of war, if the commerce
with Arabia and the Greeks
was encouraged, one million
(peace would increase this
revenue to many millions) - - 1,000,000

The *oussiehs*, and the national
domains - - - - - 1,500,000

The *miri* of the proprietors, and
the tribute of Murad Bey - - 1,000,000

Total - 21,000,000

The contributions in kind would be sufficient to the ordinary consumption of the army, and to form magazines of reserve.

The sum-total of the revenues of Egypt might therefore amount to about 21,000,000 of francs *per annum*; or 1,750,000 francs per month. But the collection of these revenues depended on the internal tranquillity of the country, which various causes might disturb. An attack, or even the menacing attitude of an enemy, by compelling the troops to concentrate, would entirely suspend the receipts; for, throughout the East, it demands a military force to collect the contributions.

It was, therefore, an essential point to govern the expenditure by the greatest economy; so that if the sources of revenue suddenly failed there might always be a reserve found for the wants of the army. None of these considerations could check general Menou in the career of his innovations, nor deter him from an augmentation of the expenditure. He easily persuaded himself, that nothing foreign or internal could disturb the tranquillity of the country.

It is a justice however to be rendered general Menou, to state, that, in squandering the resources of the army, he uniformly exhibited the greatest personal disinterestedness.

CHAP. VIII.*Administration of the Army.—Extraordinary
Magazines.*

WHILE general Menou affected to be entirely occupied with the wants of the soldiery, and in truth entered into the most minute details, he neglected the formation of magazines of reserve for subsisting the troops. He put a stop to the baking of biscuits, as too expensive; but that establishment could not be spared in Egypt, because of the small number of ovens (which were confined to a few manufactories belonging to Frenchmen), and because Alexandria ought to have been furnished with a quantity of biscuit, in reserve, to supply the army if compelled to concentrate there, and vessels bringing reinforcements. Persuaded that Egypt was secure from all foreign attack, general Menou, on a system of economy, neglected to provide magazines for sieges. The commissary in chief, Daure, in vain remonstrated with him on the necessity of forming considerable

magazines for all the important places. Kléber had issued orders for these; but he fell before they could be effected. That general intended that Alexandria should contain provisions for the whole army for a year. General Menou authorised merely magazines to subsist the army two months, and the garrison a year.

When general Menou was informed of the establishment by the government of inspectors of revision, he announced to citizen Daure that he intended to re-organise the inspectors and commissaries of war agreeable to the decree of the consuls. He painted in high colours to Daure the importance of the office of *inspector in chief*, and, with very artful flattery, offered him this place, proposing that he should resign the office of commissary in chief to some other person, whom the general would instruct in the duties of his office. Daure, unsuspecting of the treachery of this offer, consented; and a few days afterwards appeared the order of the 30th of Vendémiaire, in which, with infinite surprise, he saw himself named simply *inspector of revisions*. He claimed of general Menou the execution of his promise, or the of-

fice he had quitted. He observed to the general that he could not resign it for a place inferior, or even equal, without giving colour to suspicions of the rectitude of his conduct; adding, that, if any accusation could be brought against him, he demanded to be brought before a court-martial.

Daure enjoyed the public esteem, earned in every relation in which he stood, and sanctioned by the voices of Bonaparte and Kléber. General Menou's conduct in this affair excited universal indignation; but he was deaf to the public voice, and to the remonstrances of individuals. He excused himself by pleading the increase of expense that would be incurred by the office of inspector in chief. But he was not restrained by this motive in other appointments. The obstinacy with which he maintained this point, betrayed that his sole object was to disgust and drive Daure from Egypt. To remonstrances which were made him by several of the generals, he first declared that he had never given his word to make Daure inspector in chief, and afterwards promised to keep it. Daure, tired of the contest, perceiving clearly that he could do no good to the ser-

vice by persisting in holding the office of commissary in chief, in despite of the general commanding the army, and hoping also to escape from the snares of his incessant intrigues, accepted the office of inspector in chief. General Menou, from that moment, no longer thought of organising the body of inspectors of revision, which before he affected to find so necessary.

CHAP. IX.

Murmurs of the Army against General Menou.

The Generals of Division remonstrate with him. His Confirmation in the Command in Chief.

THE innovations of general Menou, his conduct towards various individuals, the childish declamations, the lessons of morals and probity, so often repeated in the orders of the day, which had the appearance of being addressed to an army profligate and without honour, raised an almost universal discontent.

The inhabitants, terrified with such incessant innovations, complained *that a mussulman* * *general, from whom they had reason to expect so much, compelled them to regret the loss of a Christian general.* They were accustomed, under the government of the Turks and Mamalukes, to endure all the caprices of their masters. They would have

* These complaints were made in these very terms by the principal people of the country, and particularly by El-Mohdi, one of the principal sheiks of Cairo.

endured the same from Menou, if the two generals who preceded him had not taught them to comprehend the mildness of European laws. The difference they found between these generals and Menou was immense; and they could not believe that such a man could long command the French army.

The conduct of general Menou opened a vast field of reflexion; and the following questions naturally presented themselves, even to individuals of the army the least given to observation.

What object can that general have, who, holding his situation only *ad interim*, overturns the whole administration of the country for experiments, evidently contrary to the interests of the army, opposed to the true principles of the interior government of the country, to the inveterate habits of the people, and to the means of civilization? And why does he begin with experiments of uncertain issue at a time when the wants of the army require prompt and certain resources?

Why, on every occasion, declare Egypt a colony, without instructions to that effect

from the government? Why contradict what Bonaparte and Kléber had always asserted to the Turks, that Egypt was held as a pledge till the peace? Was it not evidently to compel the Porte to redouble its efforts for the recovery of the country, and call in the aid of other powers?

Is not the responsibility of the commander in chief, pushed forward on all occasions by general Menou, illusory? and is not the safety of the army endangered under that pretext? Must not a man, an innovator by character, a destroyer by system of whatever, is done by his predecessors, labouring to banish from the army all the well-informed generals and functionaries, expose the army to inevitable disasters? Does he not expose it even to lose a precious conquest, acquired at the price of so much blood and labour? and after that, of what avail is his responsibility?

What misfortunes might not be expected to befall the army, if it should be attacked under the command of a general without practice in war, who had annihilated its resources, refused to form magazines, sown divisions among the generals, filled them

with disgust, and excited against them the suspicions of the troops?

Does not all that he has hitherto done too clearly foretell what he will still do? Will not the discontents, that are apparent, be the forerunners of revolt? Discipline once violated, will not the safety of the army, and the preservation of the country itself, be evidently at stake? and do means exist of preventing these evils?

In what manner, since it is almost impossible to correspond with France, can be averted the evils which threaten the army from the elevation of an officer to the command in chief merely by the accident of his seniority?

It was the opinion of many, that general Menou was incapable of commanding the army, and that it would be right to prevail upon general Reynier to assume the command. Others proposed to bring him to trial; and a third party, more moderate, wished only that the other generals should unite to remonstrate with and advise him.

The generals of division at Cairo felt the justness of the above reflexions. They saw that, placed by their rank in the second

degree of authority, it behoved them to prevent the evils which might be occasioned, either by the conduct of general Menou, or the insurrection of the troops against him; that, at a great distance from the government, and having only tardy, uncertain, and difficult means of informing them of the truth, they ought to watch over the safety of the army. Of the various means proposed they preferred the last that I have mentioned, which appeared to them to include the least inconvenience.

The situation of general Reynier became extremely delicate. While he engaged general Menou to assume the command of the army, he had promised to aid him with all his counsels and resources; and afterwards found himself the object of his intrigues, which, indeed, he could not but despise. He dreaded the influence that dissensions might have on the fate of the army; and, although he forbore to foster them, the discontented had their eyes fixed on him. He felt that another commander in chief was necessary to the troops; but it was difficult to command with success after general Menou. The entire overthrow of the civil administra-

tion, the dissensions he had fomented, the funds saved by Kléber dissipated while the expenditure had augmented, the promises which had lavished every day of punctually maintaining the full pay of the troops almost impossible to realise,—in a word, the various fallacious hopes which he endeavoured to inspire by his administration,—all these causes might have consequences, which were not yet apparent, and whose disastrous issue would be attributed to his successor. To these considerations were to be added the probability of his confirmation in the command in chief by the government; and the mischief of such an example to discipline. These reflexions determined general Reynier to refuse his sanction to every measure that might tend to raise him to the command. He communicated his sentiments to the other generals of division, who agreed with him in a resolution to prevent general Menou by their counsels from completing the discontent of the army, and the disorganisation of the civil government.

They were preparing to wait upon him with this intention on the 4th of Brumaire (*the 26th of October*), when the arrival of an

officer from *Toulon* with dispatches was announced to them. They postponed their intended visit to general Menou, till they should learn if the dispatches brought the decision of the government respecting the command in chief. The dispatches were still addressed to general Kléber.

In announcing the news from France, in the order of the day of the 6th of Brumaire, general Menou observed, that dissensions existed in the army; but this was certainly not the means of opposing them. This dangerous conduct of Menou urged more strongly on the generals of division, Reynier, Damas, Lanusse, Beliard, and Verdier, the necessity of the measure they had before resolved upon; and on the same day they went to his quarters. General Menou was extremely perplexed by this visit. The generals stated to him, that, having constantly lived with the armies, they had seen nothing but union and the greatest good will among the troops, because intrigues had not yet been introduced among them; that the army of the East enjoyed perfect tranquillity under Bonaparte and Kléber; that with sorrow they perceived the germs of division arising among the troops;

and that, in searching for the cause, they found it in his conduct since he had taken the command ; that the surest means of restoring harmony would be to recall some orders, contrary to the general interest ; to govern himself in future by the laws of the republic, with the aid of his chief officers ; and above all things to banish all intrigues. They dwelt on the mischiefs of innovations in general, and more particularly of some of his ordinances, especially the new organisation of the duties on the sheiks, and the law of successions. They urged to him, that he could not in any case place himself above the French laws ; that if he represented the government as to the civil administration of Egypt, he was to the army no more than their general in chief ; and that he had in that quality a sufficiently extensive latitude to do good : that if Egypt was to be declared a colony of France, the government would determine upon the form of its administration ; and that this should be a motive to him not to be impatient to innovate. They insisted, that it was imprudent in him publicly to proclaim Egypt a colony, before the government had declared its intentions on that subject. They called to

his mind the policy of Bonaparte and Kléber on that delicate point, and endeavoured to make him feel what inquietude that name would give the Turks. They invited him to follow the example of the generals his predecessors, who had always been sparing of innovation, that the inhabitants might not be alarmed and disgusted at too precipitate changes; to express his orders of the day in more suitable language; and to spare his declamations on morals and probity, which seemed to say, that the army was no better than a horde of robbers, whom Bonaparte and Kléber had been unable to discipline. They also demanded that he would not correspond directly with the subaltern officers, which was contrary to military usage. They counselled him not in future to make any promotions, but the appointments left to the discretion of the general in chief on the field of battle, and to fill vacancies. The generals of division also observed to him, that he ought, for the good of the service, and not to check the zeal of the public functionaries, to abstain from discharging persons in offices confided to them by the government without bringing them to a court-martial.

They spoke to him of the subscription for a monument to Kléber, and of the ill effects that must be produced by his refusal, not only to join the subscription, but even to announce it in the order of the day, at the same time with Dessaix's. He at first declared *on his honour*, that no one had ever spoken to him on the subject; but the witnesses of his refusal being named to him, he promised to mention the subscription in the order of the day.

He acknowledged the increase of the price of provisions occasioned by his new duties, and promised to put the troops in a condition to procure provisions with their indemnity.

The generals forbore to complain to him of matters personal to themselves. The discussion was a little violent on some topics. General Menou was embarrassed, and made only vague replies. At length he demanded a day for consideration, declaring that he would give his answer in writing. He did not send the answer, but the next day took occasion to say to one of the generals, that he found their representations just, but desired time to return gradually to former measures, that he might not be convicted of too much instability.

On the 10th of Brumaire the generals had a new interview with Menou, previous to the funeral ceremonies in honour of Dessaix. He confessed the necessity of the changes demanded by the generals, and said, that he had already given orders that the duties on successions should no longer be collected in the army, adding that he would announce those instructions in the order of the day. He again promised to conduct himself according to the representations that had been made to him.

The troops were assembled on the 10th of Brumaire to render a funeral homage to general Dessaix. The ceremony passed with profound silence. The loss was deeply felt; but it required a commander in chief of a soldier-like character to offer, in a worthy manner, to one of our bravest warriors the expression of the regrets of his brave army. The place renewed the sentiment of the double loss they had sustained. It was in sight of Heliopolis, and of the field of battle, in which Kléber had regained Egypt, that the cenotaph was erected. It would have been natural to throw also some flowers upon his tomb—but the jealousy and hatred of

general Menou restrained the feelings of the troops. The generals chose rather to be silent, than to exasperate the minds of the soldiers, already too much moved. About this time general Menou caused offers to be made to generals Damas, Lantusse, and Verdier, of passports for France. But zealous for the preservation of Egypt, and seeing the army in feeble hands, they hoped still to be useful, and declined the offer.

General Menou had sent no dispatches to the government since the departure of the Osiris, which had conveyed the news of Kléber's death; but at length the fear that the discontents of the army would reach France, and the necessity of preventing the consequences to himself, determined him to write. He laboured to conciliate the bearers of his dispatches; but the better to prejudice the government against those who obtained permission to depart, and to discountenance their reports, he sent particular notes against them, declaring that they were persons *at least useless, to say no more of them.*

He complained in his dispatches, that it was difficult for him to promote the public service, and contend with the anti-colonist

party. He multiplied almost infinitely the obstacles that, he said, he had to encounter, to introduce order into the civil administration and the finances. He declared, that he made himself enemies, only because he sacrificed individual to the general interests. He added lofty declarations of his devotion to the public good, and his determination to defend Egypt. In this manner he endeavoured to turn aside all denunciations from his administration.

The report of general Kléber, relative to the campaign of Heliopolis, concluded after his death by general Damas, was sent to France; but general Menou previously suppressed almost every thing in the report, relative to the state of the army at the time of Kléber's death, but more especially the formations of corps of auxiliary troops. He afterwards asserted, that the brilliant circumstances of the army were due solely to his administration; and that the inhabitants of Egypt blest his reforms and his justice. He deceived the government by false statements of the resources of the country, and of the expenditure they would cover. He betrayed the government further by boasting of forti-

fications, works, encouragements given the sciences, journeys and researches of learned men, of all which things none existed in Egypt*. The generals of division, willing

* Officers arriving from France were extremely surprised not to find the canals navigable the whole year, nor any of the roads and forts, which they saw enumerated in Menou's correspondence, printed in France; and they very simply inquired after the success of the journeys of the learned men, also announced in the dispatches. Far from giving encouragement to the sciences, general Menou threw obstacles in the way of the members of the Institute, and of the Commission of Arts. He affected constantly to speak with enthusiasm of researches, but he did nothing for them. Several learned men and artists absolutely persecuted him to obtain permission to travel in Upper Egypt. They were in despair at losing their time at Cairo; while the tranquillity of which they were secure, at least during the inundation, would afford them the necessary escorts for a multitude of interesting researches. There were but two scientific expeditions that he could be brought to approve, after they had been resolved on;—the journey of citizens Coutelle and Rosière to *Mount Sinai*, and that of the chief of the battalion, Berthe, to *Jebal Doukkan*. Journeys to *Oasis* were in agitation when the campaign commenced.

The researches among the pyramids were not ordered by general Menou till after the researches made there by general Reynie with some members of the Institute, and which that general had proposed to continue.

If, during this period, general researches by the learned bodies were opposed and prevented, the members of the Institute, and of the Commission of Arts, were not the less zealous and persevering to acquire individually information on what-

to see the effect of their representations to general Menou, did not write to the government by this ship.

An officer arrived from France on the 12th. Private letters announced to general Menou, that he was confirmed in the command. The bearer of the dispatches brought the news of the taking of Malta, and of the peace with the States of Barbary.

On the same day, the generals had a new interview with general Menou, who again promised to adopt the changes proposed to him, but still expressed the desire to introduce them successively. He observed, that he had already suspended the ordinance on successions, that he had announced in the order of the day extra-indemnity to be allowed for the rations of provision for the troops, as well as an augmentation of the pay of the lieutenants and sub-lieutenants; and that he was preparing regulations in certain duties, which embarrassed commerce without benefit to the revenue.

ever was worthy of notice; and, when they could not obtain the means of travelling, they arranged in their cabinet the observations they had made under *Bonaparte* and *Kléber*.

This augmentation of pay, and of indemnity for rations, burthened the treasury of the army with a demand of 600,000 francs annually. It would have been possible to have secured the welfare of the troops in a manner less burthensome,

PART II.

From the Month of Brumaire to Ventose, in the Ninth Year of the Republic (from October 1800 to March 1801),

CHAP. I.

AN officer, who arrived at Cairo on the 15th of *Brumaire*, brought general Menou his brevet of commander in chief. Perceiving, after the funeral ceremonies at Paris in honour of Kléber, that he could no longer decline to render similar homage to his memory, he announced in the order of the day a subscription for a monument, but he secretly opposed its execution.

The generals had in some degree obtained their objects. General Menou was more cautious in his innovations. Several of his measures were modified, and he had promised to repeal all the rest gradually.

When his commission arrived, and when, by temporising, he had calmed the public

mind, he judged himself sufficiently strong to take bolder measures, and endeavoured to disgrace the generals by reports circulated in secret. It was insinuated, that they had an intention of arresting him, and compelling him to give in his resignation, but that he had defeated their machinations by his firmness; that their object was to oblige the French army to evacuate Egypt; that they held a correspondence with the enemy, to whom one of them had even sent corn; and other calumnies not less absurd.

The generals had been delicate enough to promise him secrecy relative to the object of their conferences, and despised these reports, which were credited only by a few. These officers continually fostered the hope, that, as soon as the government were apprized of Menou's conduct, a successor would be appointed, and they had resolved, if possible, not to denounce him. General Reynier in particular could not accuse him to the government, without appearing actuated by the desire of filling his place; but at length feeling that the division among the generals (which seemed to form a party, of one side of which he was the leader) might be fatal to

the army, he wrote to the first consul, requesting to be recalled to France, as soon as the campaign, which appeared to be about to commence after the retreat of the waters, should be terminated. The generals wrote to several persons to inform the government, that to preserve Egypt another commander must be sent, and one not selected from the army. But when they were informed of the reports concerning them, to which great pains were taken to attach credit, they concluded that general Menou was equally capable of calumniating them in France, and addressed to the government an extremely moderate note on the subject of their interviews with the commander in chief. To avoid all appearance of a denunciation, they did not sign this paper collectively. It was delivered on the 3d of Frimaire (*the 24th of November*) to an officer, whose departure was retarded till the 19th of Nivose (*the 9th of January*), by the same indecision which paralysed all affairs. This officer was taken by the English.

The title of general in chief conferred by the government on Menou occasioned little sensation in the army, accustomed for a long

time to see him in that station. The desire of seeing him removed, however, had inspired many persons with a hope that he would not be confirmed in the command; yet these did not fail to make the following reflexions:—The government see that general Menou's authority is acknowledged by the army, and are ignorant of the discontents existing among the troops, and that the generals were not consulted when his seniority raised him to the command. They imagine that he is sufficiently practised in business to direct the civil administration; and presume that, feeling his inexperience in war, he will avail himself of the advice of the other generals, and will be careful to preserve union and confidence between them and himself. The government also may consider his change of religion as rendering him more acceptable to the inhabitants of the country, and giving him that ascendant over opinion necessary to the amelioration of the civil institutions of Egypt.

Such were the reasonings that prevailed in the army. The motives, in fact, ascribed to the French government must naturally have an influence in France, deceived by general

Menou's statements. The opinion he had propagated of an anti-colonist party, an opinion which could not at that time be combated by those who were accused of forming it, was also another motive with the government to confirm general Menou in the command.

The dispatches sent from Egypt on the 12th of Brumaire arrived at Paris at the end of Frimaire. The flourishing state of the army, of which the dispatches spoke, was read with extreme satisfaction. General Menou, attributing to himself the labours and reforms of Kléber, boasted of having placed the army in its present brilliant circumstances. In the dispatches were seen so many operations of the civil government, general Menou so often repeated, that his administration was *blessed by the inhabitants*, that it was natural he should be credited in France, where there was no one to contradict his assertions.

The splendid picture which he presented of the state of the army, of resources he had created for its use, and of his hopes for the future, might seduce even those to whom Egypt was known. The mischiefs of his innovations could be distinguished only on

the spot. Distance concealed the incoherence of his plans. The report that there existed in Egypt an anti-colonist party, composed of all who had possessed Kléber's confidence, was again circulated in France with a new affectation, after the arrival of these dispatches. Articles inserted in some of the public papers, assuming to come from foreigners, were contrived to make it appear that the enemy gave credit to these reports.

General Menou had the precaution to render all persons suspected who might unmask him on their arrival in France. How should the truth reach the government? Must not the new discontents and divisions in the army appear to the government consequences of this imaginary party? Informed indirectly of the want of harmony among the generals, without knowing the real cause, the government must be in fear of augmenting the dissensions in superseding general Menou by one of the other generals; and would hope also that the approach of the enemy would bury all animosities in oblivion. General Menou had erected Egypt into a colony, pledging himself to preserve it. The government, no longer able to recal this impolitic and prema-

ture declaration, had no course left but to turn it to as much profit as possible, by detailing the advantages of the country, and exciting in France an ardour to send succours for its preservation.

The expeditions preparing by the English and Turks against Egypt were known at Paris; public eulogiums, promises of national rewards, and the perspective of glory and honours, might lead the army to surpass itself in the combats it had yet to sustain; anticipated praises might stimulate a general without experience to merit them; they were therefore prodigally lavished in advance upon general Menou; but this stimulant, so powerful for a noble mind, did but swell his arrogance. In these splendid eulogiums, he regarded nothing but the means they afforded of increasing his ascendant over the army; and, although he forbore directly to attack the generals, whose influence he feared, he thought circumstances favourable to discredit them in the public eye; he hoped to disgust them with the service while it remained under his command; and to compel them to quit Egypt before they could inform the

government of the real character of his administration.

Every individual in the army perfectly understood, that the surest means of obtaining favour from general Menou was never to wait upon the other generals, and to declaim against them. The generals, disdaining to languish in his anti-chamber, or to be dismissed without audience, no longer visited him. Having frequently found that they could not rely upon his verbal answers, they chose to transact business with him in writing. They endured and despised his machinations; but it was their duty, as they often did, to remind him of the principles that ought to govern the commander in chief and other principal officers, and that his direct correspondence with subaltern officers was destructive of discipline.

It was important to general Menou that the inhabitants of Egypt should appear satisfied with his administration. The people of that country are habituated to flatter the caprices of men in power. The members of the divan addressed to the first consul a letter on the affairs of Egypt, in the style

agreeable to general Menou. He afterwards endeavoured to procure addresses in his favour from the different corps of the army; but in that attempt he could not succeed.

Men placed by accident on a theatre too vast for the extent of their means, while they endeavour to mask their weakness, identify their cause with the general interest. Strangers to the art of governing, far from daring to acknowledge to themselves what they are, they employ all their activity in seducing the vulgar by splendid professions, and statements of great success. This artifice has from the beginning been employed by those political *charlatans* which the revolution has seen spring up and disappear in such great numbers. To question the infallibility of *Robespierre* was to conspire against *France*. That despot never represented his interests in any other light than those of the republic. Whoever censures the conduct of such men, or does not implicitly adopt their opinions, is characterised as factious, and an enemy of the state. But the mask of such once torn off, the slight edifice of a usurped glory crumbles away; and their fall is so much the

more ignominious for their having been placed on too great an elevation.

Toward the end of Nivose, general Menou received a number of the *Gazette de France* of the 5th Vendémiaire, 9th year (27th of September 1801), containing a letter dated Syria, assuming to be written by an English officer, which described Menou as the officer the most capable of defending Egypt, and insisted at great length on the impossibility of recovering Egypt from France, except by exciting an insurrection to supersede the commander in chief by a general of the party anti-colonist. General Menou read this Gazette, on the 1st Pluviose, to many persons at his table; but the greater part were disgusted with the vanity and ignorance of the artifice*.

* A few days after this, he used the pretext of an inspection of the barracks to appear in public, surrounded with the generals of division; who, treating him with the respect due to his rank before the troops, he availed himself of that circumstance to spread a report, that the generals had confessed their design of removing him from the command of the army, for which they had begged his pardon. Thus he gave an air of baseness to that which was simply the effect of discipline. To provoke the self-love of the generals to refuse him even the ordinary deference when they appeared in public with him, was an extraordinary mode of healing the divisions in the army!

The two frigates that arrived at Alexandria brought the news of the attempt on the person of the first consul. General Menou, in announcing this detestable conspiracy in the order of the day of the 23d Pluviose, connected it with what was personal to himself; and inserted, after that intelligence, the article from the *Gazette de France*, of which I have just spoken. This order of the day excited universal indignation. That was natural enough against the authors of an atrocious crime; but the indignation was as universal against the author of the order of the day.

Although the generals of division, Reynier, Damas, Lanusse, and Belliard, were not named in that singular order of the day, they were nevertheless indirectly attacked. The silence they had observed till then, it was now their duty to break. The insult was publicly given. Still they contented themselves with writing to general Menou in very forcible terms. They demanded of him a formal denial of his indirect charges; they reminded him of the moderation with which they had supported all his former unworthy proceedings towards them, menacing

him with a public statement of all that had passed between them, if he did not repair that injury.

These letters were sent to general Menou on the 25th of Pluviose. He answered by a circular letter, expressing, in vague terms, that he had no intention to point at them. The generals, fearing to raise commotions in the army, accepted this answer as a sufficient apology.

This order of the day was as impolitic as unjust; for if an anti-colonist party had really existed, to proclaim it publicly was to give it importance, and afford it means of consistency. It was also to aggravate dissensions, at the very instant when the campaign was about to commence.

CHAP. II.

Military and political Events till the Commencement of the Campaign.

A PARTY of 300 Turkish and Mamaluke horse came on the 12th of Brumaire to Katieh, to escort caravans of corn and rice. These provisions, exported secretly by the lake of Menzaleh, were conveyed on camels into Syria, by Arabs, who derived a prodigious profit from this contraband commerce. This detachment had also orders to disperse the refugee Arabs of Syria, who greatly harassed the caravans. These tribes were flying from Ouadi with their cattle, when they were met by general Reynier, who was on his march to inspect the garrison and works of Salahieh. He demanded a detachment of dromedaries, which he sent to Katieh, but the enemy had already retreated. This movement of the Turks, before its real object was ascertained, excited a suspicion that they meditated some attack, although their army was greatly disorganised, and the inun-

dation prevented their acting in the interior of Egypt. The French put themselves in a posture of defence, and were even prepared to attack them in Katieh, if they should endeavour to establish themselves there.

A reconnoitring party of forty Mamalukes came again to Katieh on the 7th of Frimaire, but they immediately retired. The dromedaries at Katieh made a new excursion, and scoured the desert to the neighbourhood of El-Arish.

A hundred Greeks had been selected to be incorporated (on the 26th of Vendémiaire) into four demi-brigades, reduced in their number. They learned their exercise with sufficient readiness. Two hundred marines were afterwards distributed (the 15th of Frimaire, 6th of December) among the demi-brigades the most reduced. The 21st light infantry had enlisted, before the death of Kléber, 300 recruits in Upper Egypt, who were now perfectly disciplined for actual service in the ranks. This success was due to the activity of general Donzelot; but no extensive measures were taken to induce the inhabitants of Egypt to enlist in the demi-brigades. The corps of Copts still remained at 500. Kléber

had given that corps drilling officers and a European dress. Their officers were French; and, in the end, they were organised entirely in the French manner. This battalion manœuvred exceedingly well. The Greek legion had made no recruits since the death of Kléber; they were long before they received the French uniform, and a few officers to drill them. The companies of Mamalukes and Syrian horse were formed into a corps for the service of the interior administration.

The grand-visir had remained at Jaffa since his retreat from Heliopolis. His army amounted from 10 to 12,000 men, including horse and foot. He received some reinforcements, but these were balanced by desertions; and the plague, which prevailed in his army, continually reduced his numbers. The corps of Mamalukes of Ibrahim Bey, and that of Hassan-Bey-Djeddaoui, reduced to 500 horse, were encamped near him. Some English engineers repaired the fortifications of Jaffa. At El-Arish, the breach had been repaired, and a battlement erected upon the parapet; 400 janissaries composing the garrison. From 15 to 1800 Albanais, horse and foot, en-

camped in the neighbourhood, with a few field-pieces, formed an advanced-guard.

The visir, to keep together the undisciplined multitudes composing his army, every day gave out that he should march against Egypt; but the battle of Heliopolis, and the siege of Cairo, had left so profound an impression of fear on the minds of the troops and inhabitants, that he was in want of the moral, as well as physical means of success. He peremptorily fixed the month of Rhamadan, however, for the time of his march; but that was afterwards postponed. He was destitute of sufficient forces, and the other ordinary means of success; he was without authority or influence, and in open quarrel with the djezzar, who commanded a more numerous body of troops, and had received several pachas of his army. The plain of Palestine alone remained under his control; to that were his resources bounded, and the inhabitants had sent part of their cattle into the mountains. The rest of the country absolutely furnished him with nothing; the orders he sent into the mountains were contemned; the forces he detached against the inhabitants were repulsed; to subdue a single canton,

the troops were obliged to return several times to the attack, with reinforcements. Multitudes, rather than obey the visir, abandoned their villages, and fled with their cattle into the mountains of Karak, to the east of the Dead Sea, or into the desert of Hauran. Sometimes, when he seized upon the sheiks by treachery, the submission of the canton was the fruit of the surprise. The province which resisted his authority the longest was that of the Nablousains, which was supported by Djezzar Pacha. The principal officers of the visir's army, sent successively against the inhabitants, were all defeated in the defiles of the mountains. At length, tranquillity was restored, but the provinces furnished little for the visir's army. Such is the weakness of the Ottoman empire, that the first officer of the state was surrounded with rebel provinces, and reduced, for the means of subsisting his army, to the almost uncultivated plain of Palestine.

The pacha of Damascus ought to have sent a corps to reinforce the visir; but the jealousy of the pacha, and the repugnance of the inhabitants to encounter the French, prevented its assembling. Reinforcements were

also to arrive from the interior of Asia, and assemble at Aleppo; but a body of 10,000, already sent by Battal Pacha, was recalled from that city, to march against Passawan Oglou. Some troops, sent at various times by sea, dispersed immediately after their landing.

The visir receiving little money from Constantinople, he attempted (in Frimaire) to raise the value of the coin, to provide pay for his troops; but the army revolted, and it was with difficulty he pacified and retained them under his standard.

At the end of Bonaparte's campaign in Syria, the harvests were destroyed in the plain of Palestine, and the army of the visir completed the devastation of the country. The greatest dearth afflicted Palestine, which usually draws corn, rice, and other provisions from Egypt, and no longer received any, but now and then by a contraband trade. The visir was at length constrained to import from Europe subsistence for his army, and that resource was ill administered; many of his soldiers made a commerce of it, and others lived by plunder.

Finding it impossible to act without an ally,

he demanded aid from the English; and they, in their turn, incessantly urged him to march, waiting only for a pretext to send a sufficient force to Egypt to execute their project. Already general Keller, with some officers of the line, and the artillery, disciplined the visir's troops. He demanded an auxiliary body of 5000 or 6000 men, and was extremely surprised when an army of 16,000 men arrived, disposed to act as the principal party. The success of such an ally appeared to him as much to be dreaded as that of the French; for, whatever was the result of the contest, the most important posts of Egypt would remain in the hands of the victorious party, and not in those of the Turks.

Part of the English army appeared off Jaffa in the beginning of Nivose (*the latter end of December*), but were prevented from landing, by the apprehensions of the plague, which made great ravages in the visir's army; and afterwards sailed to Rhodes and the gulf of Macri, to finish their preparations for the campaign.

Towards the end of Frimaire (*about the middle of December*), a capidji-bachi brought to the grand-visir, from Constantinople, the

plan of the campaign, and orders to act in concert with the English generals. Couriers on dromedaries were sent to Arabia, to take dispatches to the fleet, expected to arrive by the Red Sea.

The spies the French employed in Syria, and the Greek vessels arriving at the ports of Egypt, gave information, about the 10th of Nivose, of these hostile dispositions. Every thing tended to prove that the English prepared a great expedition against Egypt. They could not, with any hopes of success, send to any other quarter the army which had been shut up on board their vessels so long a time; and they had too many reasons to employ their marine in taking Alexandria, to permit them to land in any other part than the neighbourhood of that city. But Menou believed, or affected to believe, that only the visir could make any attempt on Egypt; that the English, foreseeing the partition of the Ottoman empire, were willing to *have their share*; that they would be satisfied with the Archipelago, and would commence by establishing themselves at Rhodes, and would never attack Egypt. He even made himself merry among his

companions with the fears of those who would gladly have opened his eyes to the real designs of the English.

He made some inadequate movements to assemble the troops. Part of the twenty-first light, quartered in Upper Egypt, received orders to march to Benisouef, and to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to Cairo. Persuaded that the coast could not be menaced, he weakened the important garrisons on that side, ordering 500 infantry and 100 horse to be sent from Alexandria to Cairo, and an equal number from Damietta. Two frigates which entered the port of Alexandria on the 14th of Pluviose (3d of February), with 300 conscripts, a company of artillery, and ammunition, brought more certain intelligence of the designs of the enemy against Egypt. The government sent instructions for its defence, and announced the sending of more considerable succours.

The cavalry were well clothed and in fine condition, but no regiment had horses sufficient to mount all its men. The requisition made by Kléber had not only completed the regiments with horses, but formed a reserve to re-mount the cavalry. The requisition

was suspended by general Menou; the reserve of horses sold under pretence of economy; and, at the end of Pluviose, the cavalry were 400 deficient of their number of horses.

The continual excursions of the regiment of dromedaries had destroyed a great number of those animals, of which the corps had received no supply since those ordered by Kléber. The commanding officer of the regiment had several times fruitlessly demanded general Menou's permission to purchase dromedaries with funds arising from the booties made by his corps.

Several officers of the artillery imagined that the horses of that service would be more tractable in harness if they were gelded; this operation was proposed to general Menou, and received his authority at the very moment when the army was menaced with a double attack, and when it could not be ascertained that the horses would be cured before they went into the field.

Mulley Mahammed, that fanatic, who, during the campaign of Syria, raised the province of Bahireh, and several other cantons of Egypt, by assuming the character of an angel

sent by the prophet ; and afterwards came to Cairo during the siege, and greatly contributed to retard the capitulation ; and finally joined the army of the visir ; was sent, in the beginning of Pluviose, into Egypt, to prepare a new revolt for the period when it should be attacked by the combined armies. He was pursued in the Delta, and obliged to fly to Upper Egypt, where he found only one Arab tribe (that of Djehemah) disposed to rise.

Murad Bey received the enemy's plan for their ensuing campaign from the Mamalukes of Ibrahim Bey, with whom Kléber had authorised him to correspond, purposely to penetrate the designs and learn the movements of the Turks. Kléber felt that it was better to approve of these connexions between these beys, and to turn them to his own purposes, than to expose himself to secret communications, which it was impossible to prevent. Murad Bey hated the Turks, and dreaded their vengeance ; but it was his policy to keep well with all parties. His treaty with Kléber had united his fate with that of the French army. From the French he had more to hope than from the Turks, in the reduced

condition into which the war had plunged him, which had removed all hope of his ever becoming master of the country. The esteem he had conceived for the French weakened, or perhaps even effaced in great part, the remembrance of the evils they had inflicted on him; but that which is at least certain is, that, either from attachment to the French or policy, he informed general Menou accurately of the enemy's designs, their forces, and even their plans of operation.

The grand-visir, made acquainted with the ascendant which the party opposed to the English began to regain at Constantinople, would have preferred negotiations to the chances of war; but all correspondence with him had been broken off. He requested Murad Bey, through Ibrahim Bey, to offer himself as mediator between the Turks and French.

This happened at the time when Murad Bey was accustomed to send the tribute for his provinces to Cairo. He gave this commission to Osman Bey Bardisi; instructing him, at the same time, to lay before general Menou the enemy's plan for the campaign, and the propositions from the grand-visir. This bey arrived at Cairo on the 18th of Plu-

viose, and had an audience on the 19th. Having made declarations of attachment, and complained of the bad harvest which did not permit Murad's completing the tribute of corn that ought to have been paid in kind, he laid open the projects of the enemy, prepared to act immediately against Egypt.

The English army, according to his report, amounted to 18,000 men. They were to attempt a landing in conjunction with the capitan-pacha, while the visir crossed the desert, and an English fleet with troops from India should arrive at Suez. He produced the letters which Ibrahim wrote to Murad on the part of the grand-visir; who charged Murad to represent to general Menou, that the French could scarce resist the combined attack of three armies; that even the victories of the French would be gained by losses, in their circumstances impossible to repair; and that they must sink under new efforts. He insisted on the inconstancy of fortune, which might no longer favour their arms; and invited the general to say if it was not possible to renew the negotiations. Murad Bey prayed general Menou not to forget his interests if he should treat; but offered,

in the contrary case, to send him the succours fixed by the treaty of alliance, and to aid him with all his resources.

The policy that became general Menou was to show great firmness, confidence in his resources for the defence of Egypt and in the valour of his troops, and at the same time to accept the offers of Murad Bey, giving him to understand that it was rather from esteem than from necessity. He ought to have availed himself of the advances of the grand-visir, to create dissensions betwixt the English and Turks, paralyse their preparations for the campaign, and facilitate the negotiations begun at Constantinople.

But general Menou gave Osman Bey a very unfavourable reception ; affected not to credit the possibility of executing the plan of the campaign laid before him ; spoke with anger of the visir's observations on the inconstancy of fortune ; and declared, that he had no need of the aid or of the mediation of any person ; observing that Murad Bey would do well to remain tranquil in the provinces ceded to him, and to forbear all correspondence with Syria.

Osman represented to him, that Murad Bey had kept up an intelligence with the vi-

sir's army by the desire of general Kléber, to learn the plans of their common enemy. General Menou answered, that he did not govern himself by Kléber's conduct; and was not willing, like him, to sell Egypt; that he was displeased with the connexions of Murad Bey in Syria; that he suspected him of ill designs; and that it was not without inquietude he saw him cordially receive and arm the Mamalukes coming from Syria to join him. Osman Bey replied, that Murad had, from the beginning, been authorised to assemble round him the Mamalukes of his house, and of the deceased beys, to diminish, by the deduction of those forces, the army of the visir.

He afterwards turned the conversation to another object of his mission, informing general Menou, that Mahammed Bey Elfi had surrendered himself of his own accord to Murad Bey, thrown himself at his feet, and solicited his pardon, which Murad could no longer refuse him; that, however, he had banished him and his Mamalukes to a village, till he could obtain from the commander in chief of the French army the same clemency. General Menou loudly blamed Murad Bey

for not sending Mahammed to him, bound hand and foot.

Osman demanded permission to deliver the letters, with which Murad Bey had charged him, to the principal general officers, and to wait upon them personally to assure them of his attachment to the French army. General Menou angrily answered, that Murad Bey ought to correspond only with him, as commanding in chief, and representing the French government. He added, that Osman might make his visits to the French generals, but that he must not deliver any letter.

Osman Bey was extremely embarrassed with this reception, and indignant at general Menou's language respecting general Kléber. He related the circumstances of his interview to general Damas, and the inspector Daure, with whom he was more particularly acquainted. Both of these generals endeavoured to convince him, that he ought to take no offence at a few harsh words falling from general Menou; and said, that he might assure Murad Bey of the esteem and attachment of all the French. Osman Bey expressed his surprise, that the French could endure, as the successor of Kléber, a man so different in

character from the former generals; adding, that he feared *such a commander must occasion the destruction of the French army*. Damas and Daure observed, that subordination and obedience were the soul of armies; and that the army of the East was in a condition to oppose whatever force could be brought against it. They then changed the conversation, that Osman Bey might not discover the contempt they felt for general Menou, nor the divisions he excited in the army; although the commander in chief seemed willing enough to publish them, by forbidding the letters of Murad Bey to be delivered to the other generals.

Osman remained at Cairo to take back dispatches from general Menou. On the news of the appearance of the English fleet in the Road of Aboukir, he repeated Murad's offers to strengthen the French army with all his resources, but he received only evasive answers. When general Menou was at length determined to march, he sent for Osman, and ordered him instantly to quit Cairo, and return to Murad Bey. Not content with refusing Murad's assistance, he menaced him with a severe chastisement if he made the

least movement in favour of the enemy. Osman Bey departed from Cairo alarmed and grieved at the ill success of his mission.

The plague showed itself at Cairo, and in many of the neighbouring villages, at the beginning of Pluviose; and at the same time broke out in Upper Egypt. This malady might gain the barracks of the troops, as long as the soldiers remaining in the city had frequent intercourse with the inhabitants, in narrow streets, in the coffee-houses, and had communications with the women. And even suppose the malady not to be propagated by immediate intercourse, it might be spread by the unwholesome air of Cairo during the season of *Khamşin*.

The most secure means of preserving the troops from the plague was to encamp them without the city, in the desert. The Mamelukes themselves, little habituated to take any precaution against this disorder, employ these means at the time of its greatest ravages. The encampment of the troops would also have the advantage of preparing them for the campaign on the point of being opened. The generals, actuated by these strong motives, demanded general Menou's

authority to encamp with their divisions; but always slow to determine, devoured with suspicions against the generals, and fearing that they would avail themselves of the moment when the troops were at a distance from him, and under their immediate orders, to prejudice their minds, he returned no answer to this demand. He eluded also the proposition of a commission of health, which had the same object.

CHAP. III.

Finances. Produce of the new Duties. Vices of the Innovations. Augmentation of the Expenditure of the Army. The Receipt of the Miri is retarded. The Treasury is empty at the Moment of taking the Field.

THE tolls ordered to be collected at the entrances of all the cities had been received during the month of Vendémiaire, by officers employed for that purpose ; but the produce did not much exceed the expense of collection. They were afterwards farmed by auction ; and various merchants of the country, whose commerce was ruined, sought employment by farming different branches of this revenue. Competition raised the rents very high, because each bidder, as I have already observed, expected to regain his advances with large profits, in a country where, from the earliest times, the people have been oppressed with impunity. Bound to pay every month, they were at first punctual ; but seeing themselves

deceived in their hopes, they began to pay with difficulty.

These duties, with the other revenues, were not sufficiently productive during Vendémiaire, Brumaire, and Frimaire, to defray the expenses of the army. The loans from the Copts were received, and expended at the end of this *trimestre*. This resource being exhausted, and general Menou unwilling to excite murmurs among the troops by suspending the pay, employed a sum of 500,000 francs in gold, which Kléber had deposited as a reserve, and intended to raise to a million, that at any moment the army might have funds to take the field.

The impost on the sheiks was not put in a course of collection till the commencement of Frimaire. The universal murmurs at the inconveniences and vices of general Menou's administration could not prevail on him to change his measures. The slowness of the receipts of this impost, and the aversion of the sheiks to pay it, induced the director of the public revenues to promise, by his agents, that the payments on this duty should be allowed in the *miri*, a third of which was at that time due. This promise a little quick-

ened the receipts. But this was to abandon the object of this revenue. It had been estimated at 3,000,000, exceeding the ordinary imposts; and general Menou's obstinacy in continuing this mode, after its vices were fully detected, occasioned his receiving only a portion of the imposts due at that very time.

General Menou, ambitious to create a system of finance entirely new, eagerly changed the territorial imposts, and their mode of collection. Without considering the difficulties of forming a proper register for the apportioning the territorial imposts, or the time requisite to complete such a work, he made that the basis of his new system, which he proposed to put in execution the same year. He did not consider that such a register is an immense work, including a multitude of researches, and a variety of labours; that, even in Europe, where all means are combined to facilitate such an undertaking, it has never been accomplished but in territories of small extent; and that in Egypt, besides the difficulties belonging to the nature of the work, there are others which are local; that the measur-

ing of lands, ordained only by the most powerful proprietors and Mamalukes, had always been a military operation, because the villages, dreading an increase of taxes, had always opposed it by force of arms; that, in a word, to accomplish it to the extent of general Menou's system, would require numerous detachments, and more than a year even to obtain the necessary documents.

General Menou wished also to change the mode of collection, and withdraw it from the hands of the Copts; who, under the former government, regulating the accounts of the villages, were the only persons that had a correct knowledge of their produce, and therefore with facility defrauded their employers.

These projects were good in themselves. It was necessary to reform the apportioning and the collection of the territorial imposts. The soundest basis for the former was a register of lands; and it was prudent to confide the second to hands more trusty than those of the Copts. But general Menou ought also to have perceived, that he did not yet possess the means of effecting all these changes; that they ought to be postponed to a more ripe period; and that the

wants of the army, when the enemy threatened an immediate attack, required a prompt levy of the contributions. He ought also to have comprehended, that delays would lose the most favourable moment for the levying the duties, of which the possessors of Egypt have always availed themselves; namely, when the harvest was yet standing, and the cultivators, restrained by that consideration, would not withdraw themselves from the payment.

In Nivose the embarrassments of the army increased. The money, placed in reserve by Kléber, was expended. A demand was made of the payment of the duties on corporations and national bodies.

The villages paid advances on the imposts on the sheiks; and in the month of Pluviose (*from the middle of January to the middle of February*) the general was in a condition to discharge part of the pay and expenses of Nivose (*from the middle of December to the middle of January*). But these extraordinary efforts drained the treasury, and the director of the public revenues was embarrassed to keep his engagements. At length, by repeated applications, he obtained an

order, issued on the 15th of Pluviose (*4th of February*), to receive 3,000,000 francs, in advance for imposts. General Menou, still persisting in his design of completing his project within the year, would not permit a demand of more, although, according to ancient usage, he might have demanded 4,000,000 at the end of Frimaire (*middle of December*), and nearly as much in Ventose (*from the middle of February to the middle of March*). He would not employ the Copts in the receipt of this advance. He persuaded himself, that on the authority of his mere order the sheiks of the villages would hasten with the sums demanded of them; and that it was unnecessary to employ troops for the collection, a measure that had been always indispensable in this country. It was not till the end of Pluviose (*the middle of February*) that he could be brought to comprehend, that the receipts would be extremely slow and trivial if troops were not employed; and if, along with them, he did not send into the villages the Copts seraphs, accustomed to apportion the contributions; with some Copts intendants, and French agents to superintend the collection.

These delays prevented the departure of the force to collect the 3,000,000 francs till the beginning of Ventose (*the latter end of February*). The whole of the first decade was lost in issuing orders with very little receipt. Only a very small part of the expenses of Pluviose could be discharged with the produce of the duties on consumption; and on the corporations, together with the *miri* of Murad Bey. In a word, the treasury was empty when the English fleet appeared; and the march of the troops to the posts which were menaced suspended the collection of the imposts, and deprived the director of the money necessary to answer the demands of the army.

CHAP. IV.

The Magazines. The Administration of Subsistences. The Revenues in Kind.

DAURÉ, the former principal commissary, had been unable to persuade general Menou of the necessity of providing considerable magazines for the subsistence of the troops. His successor, Sartelon, was not more fortunate; nor had the advice of the preparations of the enemy any more influence to bring the general to a decided conduct. The baking of biscuits was not resumed, even to replace those which had been wasted by mismanagement. The corn, destined for a store in Alexandria for the consumption of the army for two months, and of the garrison for a whole year, was sent by water to Rosetta in Brumaire and Frimaire, whence they were conveyed successively to Alexandria. Besides, the general formed a magazine of wheat and barley (*why* it is impossible to imagine) at Rosetta, when it had been much

better deposited at Alexandria or Rahmanieh, Rosetta being untenable.

The small forts erected on the coast, on the banks of the Nile, and in the neighbourhood of Cairo, were provisioned only for a month. Belbeis and Salahieh were not supplied with the necessary provisions for the army, if it should be obliged to assemble on the frontier of Syria. The magazines of Damietta and Lesbeh were inconsiderable. The citadel of Cairo was provisioned for three months.

The physical organisation of Egypt, the species of culture it requires, and its sterility when the inundation of the Nile is not sufficiently ample to cover all the lands, have in all times obliged the government to pay particular attention to the forming magazines of corn, sufficient to supply the people in bad years, or at least to afford seed. In good seasons the quantity of grain greatly exceeds the consumption. The harvests of middling seasons admit of a considerable exportation to Arabia, Syria, and Constantinople. Part of this excess is always stored, till the extent of the inundation is ascertained. Under the divided government of the Mamalukes, the

public magazine; into which was poured the produce of the *miri* in kind, was speedily exhausted by its distribution among privileged persons. But the beys, proprietors of almost all the villages, always had stores of their own.

When, besides the inhabitants, the subsistence of an army was to be provided for, when the country was in a state of war, internal and external, susceptible from one moment to another of great changes suspending all receipts of revenue, the masters of the country had still greater reasons to form magazines for extraordinary necessities.

Bonaparte had established near Mekias a public magazine of corn, to provision the forts and strong places; to supply the army; and, if that should be necessary, the inhabitants. The contributions, paid in corn in Upper Egypt, were poured into this magazine. The corn in Lower Egypt, drawn from the *oussieh*, or produced by requisitions, or purchased, was also deposited in the same magazine.

The insurrections, which preceded the battle of Héliopolis, had prevented the supply of the magazine from being very consi-

derable. The inundation had not been great, and the harvest had failed. Towards the conclusion of the siege of Cairo, Murad Bey had furnished corn to supply the army.

As soon as Kléber was freed from the enemy, and could turn his attention to the civil administration of Egypt, he hastened the formation of magazines of grain. This was the principal object of the vigilance of the committee of administration. Two members of the committee went afterwards into Upper Egypt to urge the collection of grain; but, in the midst of their labours, general Menou abolished their commission. One of the members indeed remained, charged with the superintendence of the revenues in kind. But it was not his office to take care, as Kléber had designed, in framing the committee of administration, that the subsistence of the army should not be sacrificed to objects of finance; to superintend with equal jealousy the collection of grain and that of money; and to prevent the commutation of money for contributions in kind. The magazines were daily decreasing instead of augmenting. They were empty at the beginning of Frimaire. The director of revenues

in kind had in vain declared, that the magazines must fall off, and proposed the means of filling them. When the administration was pressed by the necessity of the case, the Copts were ordered to pour grain into the magazines, as a loan, for which they were to be reimbursed. But they obeyed very slowly, and only furnished enough for the current consumption of Cairo.

The director of the revenues in kind wrote to general Menou, inviting him to take some great measure to remedy the evil. He proposed, the more to engage the Copts in his interest, to abandon to them the arrears of various villages, which in consequence of their negligence had not been received. He informed general Menou, that, if the army took the field, it would be without means of subsistence. These representations were fruitless. This officer was not seconded in his zeal. The collections, which he hastened, as much as was possible for him to do, during the months of Frimaire, Nivose, and Pluviose, scarcely sufficed for the current demands. And, when the English appeared, the general magazine could not furnish subsistence to the army for more than twenty days.

PART III.

Campaign against the English and Turks,

CHAP. I.

Arrival of the English Fleet. Military Dispositions.

THE English army had been provided at Rhodes and at Macri, in the beginning of Pluviose (*about the middle of January*), with whatever was necessary to open the campaign. The English minister sent positive orders to the English general to act against Egypt* ;

* The English minister had to justify the breach of the treaty of El-Arish, and to calm the indignation of the Turks, irritated from having lost Egypt at the moment they expected the French to depart ; he had to wrest from the opposition a powerful engine ; and, to divert the public attention from the responsibility which bore upon him, he directed against Egypt an army that had been wandering upon the seas many months. The public opinion in England was averse to this expedition. Accidents, and the innumerable mistakes of the French general, crowned it with success. But what is the benefit to

but the Turks were not in haste to move in concert with them. They equally feared the success of their allies, and their defeat. The visir, still dismayed at the recollection of the battle of Heliopolis, dreading to expose himself to new disasters, was absolutely resolved not to march, till the success of the English had opened the way to him. His authority was contemned in the greater part of the provinces of Syria. To form an army and magazines, he had only the reinforcements and the convoys that he received from the capital. The capitan-pacha was at Constantinople with part of his fleet. He inclined to treat with the French, rather than again to incur the hazards of an expedition, and waited the issue of the irresolution of the Porte.

These two principal officers, persuaded that their efforts to regain Egypt would be ineffectual, severally feared to expose themselves to the first check. But the orders of the English government became peremptory,

England? Enormous expenses, and a waste of blood. The army of the East has evacuated Egypt with conditions similar to the treaty of El-Arish; and the English troops cannot boast of a success, which is due neither to their bravery, nor the talents of their generals.

and its generals were obliged to proceed to the attempt. They feared, as well as their soldiers, the veteran bravery and the series of victories of the army they had to encounter; but, informed of the character of the commander in chief, they hoped from his errors to establish themselves in some strong post, to weaken the French by successive actions, and to maintain their ground till they should receive reinforcements, and learn what the visir, with a body of troops expected from India, could effect. As soon as they were informed that the capitan-pacha had sailed from Constantinople, bringing them a reinforcement of 6000 Albanians and janissaries, they departed from Macri. On the 10th of Ventose (*latter end of February*) they appeared in the road of Aboukir*, but were obliged to delay the debarkation till the 17th, the winds from the north and the north-west rendering the sea too heavy at the place chosen for the debarkation.

The frigate *La Régénérée* arrived in the port of Alexandria on the 10th of Ventose (*the*

* In the tables (Nos. 1 and 2) will be found a statement of the forces of the English army, and those of the army of the East, with their distributio.

1st of March) from Rochfort, with 200 men of the 51st demi-brigade, a company of artillery, and ammunition. The brig *La Lodi*, which arrived the same day from Toulon, had met with Gantheaume's squadron, having on board a reinforcement for Egypt of between three and four thousand men, which had been detained by various circumstances in that port. It was then seen, that the favourable moment for reaching Alexandria had been missed by this fleet. But this news, and the arrival of these frigates, convinced the army of the East, that the government were anxiously occupied with the design of sending them succours.

The appearance of the English fleet was known at Cairo at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th. According to reports, the boats were already launched to attempt a landing; and the taking of three English engineer officers under Aboukir left no doubt of the point that was menaced.

We have seen, that general Menou had hitherto constantly deceived himself, repelling advice that came to him from various quarters, as to the nature and true object of this expedition. He had even refused to di-

spatch vessels to observe the preparations of the English, and watch their movements. There was no corps of reserve on the coast, that could successfully oppose a landing. The troops had even been drawn from the coast, and not one of the forts was sufficiently provisioned.

All reports agreed in stating, that the visir's army was not yet in motion, and that they would not pass the desert till they were informed of the success of the English. It was well known, that Aboukir was the only point on the coast at which the descent could be prudently attempted, because it was in that road only the fleet could find a shelter, and from that point the enemy might instantly march against Alexandria. Every man who had studied the nature of the country and the system proper for its defence, and all who were acquainted with the numbers and character of the French army, were convinced, that the only wise measure was to concentrate the troops.

Receiving the news of the debarkation of the English, the whole army expected to march towards Aboukir, and were extremely surprised to see the dispositions made by ge-

neral Menou. He gave orders to general Reynier instantly to march for Belbeis with two demi-brigades, and the artillery of his division; to general Morand, to hasten to Damietta with 500 men of Rampon's division, which a little before had been withdrawn to Cairo; and to general Bron, to march to Aboukir with the 22d regiment of chasseurs, consisting of no more than 230 horse. The rest of the cavalry were to wait for orders at Boulak. The division of Lanusse did not depart till the 14th; and the 88th demi-brigade, the strongest of the division, was recalled to Cairo on the day of its departure.

Some of the generals endeavoured to convince general Menou of the necessity of promptly concentrating the army near Aboukir. They urged, that the visir would not move till he was certain of the success of the English; that there would be time to defeat the English and to march to Salahieh, before the visir could reach that place; that even in case the visir, by more rapid movements, should obtain some success, his troops would be easily dispersed, when they learned the defeat of their allies; that, in a word, by

dividing the army, it was continually exposed to disasters.

General Reynier communicated these observations to general Menou in writing*,

LETTER from General REYNIER to General MENOUE.

* Cairo, the 13th of Ventose, 9th year
(the 4th of March, 1801).

" YOU have sent me, citizen general, orders to march to Belbeis with two demi-brigades, taking with me general Robin; and I shall execute your orders, because the first duty of a soldier is to obey. But the interest of the army constrains me to make some observations, which you will listen to with candour. I am ordered to defend the frontier which may be attacked by the visir. But in our circumstances it appears to me, that this frontier ought for the present to be left to itself. The visir is arrived, or expected, at El-Arish; but it is not probable that he will march before he hears of the success of the English. His preparations to pass the desert are not completed; and he will do no more than to push some parties to Katieh, or perhaps a little further. If he should attack Salahieh, that place is in a condition to hold out till it can be succoured. While we engage the English, he will push, perhaps, some troops to Belbeis and Cairo; but that is less dangerous than to give the English opportunity to make any progress.

" The army, which is to attempt a landing at Aboukir, must amount to between 10 and 12,000 men. If general Friant has not been able to prevent their debarkation, he must at this moment be shut up in Alexandria; and, to meet the English with hopes of success, we have occasion for the whole of our disposable force.

" At the time of the landing of the Turks at Aboukir, Bonaparte left at Belbeis and Salahieh no more than a hundred men.

and afterwards repeated them to him verbally; adding, that personal animosities should

a very few troops at Damietta, and a very small garrison at Cairo. He concentrated the army to march to Aboukir. Our situation is similar; and we ought to make like dispositions. It is most especially in this army, that the great maxim of war should be practised, to supply the want of numbers by the rapidity of movements.

"I am of opinion, that it would be proper to march my division, with all the disposeable troops, to Alexandria.

"The garrison of Salahieh is more than sufficient to its purposes. I will throw a small reinforcement into Belbeis. Dromedaries will reconnoitre the desert; and I will leave the necessary instructions to the commanding officers of the above places.

"I have frequently fought the English; and I and my troops wish to share in the glory of beating them in Egypt. In several of my former letters I have spoken to you of this expedition. It is of the most important nature; and we ought to overlook nothing to repulse it, in a manner glorious to the army of the East, and worthy of the examples we have received from the other armies.

"If you wait for new intelligence respecting the debarkation before you resolve to march all the troops to Alexandria, I request that my division may remain here, or at Birket-el-Hadji. This is more consistent with my plan of defence for the frontier of Syria; and these troops will be much better situated to march for Alexandria whenever you shall think that proper.

"This letter, and all its observations, are dictated by a profound regard to the interests of the army. We ought all to unite at this moment, to extricate the troops with glory from the difficulty of their circumstances, menaced at two distant

give way to the necessity of defeating the enemy. But all was fruitless. Finding it impossible to induce him to adopt a better plan of operations; general Reynier hoped that his departure would quiet the jealousies and fears his presence excited; and that afterwards the other generals might make the same representations with better success. But general Menou was deaf to all remonstrances; and the next day, the day following, and several days afterwards, receiving no advice of the debarkation, he the more firmly persuaded himself that he had made the most excellent dispositions.

Doubtless, when it was seen that general Menou obstinately resolved to remain at Cairo, and to divide the army, the only means of saving Egypt was to choose another com-

points by two different armies; one of which, however, is more dangerous than the other."

General MENOU's Answer.

"YOU will receive my orders at Belbeis, citizen general. You shall not be left ignorant of any thing; and all shall be provided for. You must watch the frontier of Syria. Depart without delay.

I salute you,

(Signed) **ABD. J. MENOU."**

mander in chief. The circumstances of the army, and its distance from the government, perhaps would have sanctioned the measure. But it was an example dangerous to discipline, which the most complete success alone could justify, and none of the means were prepared, by which that could be ensured. It was impossible to foresee that the English would remain seven days without landing. Besides, it would have been said after a victory, that it would have been equally gained by general Menou.

CHAP. II.

*Debarcation of the English. Battle of the 22d
of Ventose (13th of March).*

ON the 16th, the wind changed to the north-west. The sea was more calm, and the enemy might attempt a landing. They dispatched armed vessels to the mouth of lake Maadieh, to seize upon the ferry, and interrupt the direct communication between Alexandria and Rosetta. But a hundred men, who landed to effect this service, were repulsed by forty grenadiers of the 61st, and the enterprise failed.

General Friant, on the arrival of the English fleet, had disposed of his troops in the following manner.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
<i>At Rosetta and Fort Julian</i> , three companies of the 61st	- 150	
<i>Eske and La Maison quarrée</i> , a battalion of the 75th, a company of the grenadiers of the 25th, and a detachment of the 3d regiment of dragoons; in all	- 300	150
<i>Aboukir</i> , two battalions, and the grenadiers of the 61st	- 700	
two battalions of the 75th	- 600	
half of a battalion of the 51st, and a detachment of the 25th	- 250	
the 18th regiment of dragoons	- 100	
a detachment of the 20th regiment of dragoons	- 80	

There were at Aboukir in all 1550 infantry, 180 cavalry, with ten pieces of cannon.

The marines and invalids alone were left to guard Alexandria.

These troops were too weak to oppose the landing of an army, which had at its disposition a prodigious quantity of boats, and the whole force of the English fleet. There

were no hopes of success but in driving into the sea the first that should land, before the troops could have time to form, and in throwing the boats into disorder by a well directed fire from the artillery.

The English, who founded their only hopes of success on the small number of troops charged with the defence of the coast, selected for this first operation the flower of their troops. On the 17th, before break of day, they put the following troops on board their boats, under the command of major-generals Moore and Ludlow.

Guards	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2000
23d regiment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600
28th	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600
40th	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	250
42d	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900
58th	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600
Corsican legion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	400
Artillery men	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200
Marines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	300

Total - 5850

The boats, formed in one line, separated into five divisions, slowly approached the

shore. The French troops, to cover themselves from the enemy's gun-boats, posted in front and on the flanks of the transport boats, placed themselves behind sand-hills in the following order.

The 67th demi-brigade with one twelve-pounder, two howitzers, and their two four-pounders, with their right towards the beginning of the dyke of Lake Maadich; the 18th regiment of dragoons to the left of that demi-brigade; the 20th of dragoons and the 75th, to the rear of the height of the Wells. The detachments of the 25th and of the 51st, with two eight-pounders and a howitzer, formed a reserve between this last corps and the fort of Aboukir. The height of the Wells is a moving sand-hill, with a rapid descent, especially on the side next the sea, and is the only point on which the enemy could find an advantageous military position *. The line of English boats remained long in the

* After the battle of Aboukir of the 7th of Thermidor, in the seventh year, Bonaparte ordered a fort to be constructed on this height; but it was neglected for fortifications of less importance, although the government had recommended the same measure to general Menou. This fort would have rendered the debarkation very difficult.

midst of the bay, menacing every point of the coast, and then formed into two lines. Being within cannon shot of the shore, they closed still more, and approached the foot of this height. The sailors rowed standing with incredible vigour, and without regarding the fire of the French artillery, while the troops lay at the bottom of the boats. The enemy's fight, having landed, rapidly climbed the height and formed, and the left extended towards the rear of the heights, supporting its flank by the sea. The 61st demi-brigade instantly charged the enemy's left, who were unable to sustain the first shock. A company of grenadiers, posted in twelve boats, took them in the rear. Already several threw down their arms, when the second line, having landed, brought them succours. The 61st, being then too weak to repulse the English and retake the height, confined its efforts to the maintaining its ground.

The 18th and the 20th of dragoons charged, on the left of the 61st, the first of the enemy's troops formed on the height. These two regiments, repulsed in their first charge, attempted a second on the enemy's left, but

the fire of the second line compelled them to retire.

The 75th, informed too late of the enemy's landing, found the English already formed upon the heights. Almost instantly half of its first columns fell from the fire of the English line; and being unable to form, it was compelled to retreat.

The artillery, which were on the left, being unable to fire with much effect, were ordered to approach the height, with a detachment of the 51st and of the 25th; but this movement being retarded by the sands, the English were already formed on their arrival; and they joined the 75th demi-brigade, which had retired to the distance of 300 toises,

The 61st then received orders to retreat. The soldiers, who for two hours had been mingled in warm combat with the English, and were animated by the success they had obtained, reluctantly quitted the field of battle. This demi-brigade effected its retreat in the best order, carried off all its artillery, and formed the rear guard. A company of the 51st was detached to Aboukir to reinforce the garrison, and the troops united

at the *Embarcadair* *. Alexandria had been left almost without a garrison ; and as the English might have attempted some new movement, which would have prevented the troops from defending this important station, they retired thither during the night.

The battalion of the 75th, the detachment of the 25th, and the 3d regiment of dragoons, who were at Etko, received orders by signal to come to Alexandria. From a bad interpretation of this order, La Maison quarrée, a fortified post, whose preservation was of importance to defend the passage of the mouth of the lake, was evacuated and dismantled. At Rosetta there remained fifty men of the 61st, and at fort Julian a company of this demi-brigade and of the invalids.

When the English were quite certain of the retreat of the French troops, they sent a party on the heights which command the village of Aboukir, to blockade the fort, and pushed their advanced guard to the defile of the *Embarcadair*.

On the 20th, at five o'clock in the even-

* This name was given to a part of the bay of Canopus, where the slip of land, which separates the sea from lake Maadieh, is very narrow, not being above 150 toises broad.

ing, the debarkation of the English was known at Cairo. The whole army then saw the fault that general Menou had committed in not marching at the first information. The most favourable moments had been lost. Seven days had elapsed between the first appearance and the debarkation of the enemy. The cavalry, by forced marches, might have arrived on the 17th. Two days afterward 10,000 men and 50 pieces of cannon might have been collected near Aboukir, and have wholly destroyed this army before it was able to organise itself, to land its artillery, and fortify its camp. This moment being past, the success became more doubtful. We were informed that the visir was encamped at Yabneh; that he was expected at El-Arish, and prepared to pass the desert. It was impossible to know whether there would yet be time to attack the English and return to the frontier of Syria before his arrival; and we had received news, that a part of the English fleet from India was already arrived in the Red Sea. We were ignorant whether or not the English had vigorously pursued the troops which had opposed their landing, had caused a considerable loss in them,

and had taken advantage of this first success, immediately to attack Alexandria, and to carry it by a bold *coup de main*. This city was not in a state to hold out a week against a regular attack. We feared that we might not arrive till after its fall; and even if the English had not attacked it, they had had sufficient time to entrench themselves in a strong position. In fine, we feared that they might have obtained some partial successes over the three demi-brigades that had marched under the command of general Lanusse. All these motives must have shown the necessity of quickly assembling a considerable force, of evacuating several posts, and of leaving only feeble detachments in those which it was thought necessary to retain.

On the 21st, general Menou dispatched from Cairo the 88th demi-brigade, a battalion of the 35th, 850 men of the 21st, who had arrived from Benisouef, the cavalry, and a park of artillery which he limited to three twelve-pounders. He wrote to general Rampon to march to Rahmanieh with the 32d, the carabineers of the 2d, and a party of the 20th dragoons; and to leave at Damietta,

Lesbeh, and other forts, the remainder of the 2d light infantry, 100 dragoons of the 20th, and a company of light artillery. General Reynier received orders to dispatch the 13th for Rahmanieh by the route of the Delta, and to send to Cairo the 9th demi-brigade, to replace the 85th, which was destined for Rahmanieh. This order, very ambiguous in its style, left that general at Belbeis with his artillery and its equipage without any means of opposing the visir. Two demi-brigades of his division were dispersed in the fortresses of Cairo, Belbeis, and Salahieh; and as the march of the 13th by the Delta at this season must have been very long, general Reynier determined to march with it by Cairo, to put himself at the head of the two demi-brigades of his division, which were going against the enemy, and to take his artillery with him.

These arrangements left too many troops at Cairo, Damietta, Belbeis, Salahieh, and in Upper Egypt. General Menou gave no orders to evacuate the latter; and it was not till after his departure that general Belliard gave orders for that purpose to general Donzelot.

On the 17th, general Lanusse arrived at

Rahmanieh. He heard the sound of the cannon at Aboukir, and immediately hastened to the assistance of general Friant. On the 19th, he effected a junction with him on the heights of Nicopolis before Alexandria. The cavalry, which since the 18th had been reinforced by the 22d regiment of chasseurs, formed a strong advanced post near a house situated at the distance of half a league from the *Embarcadere*.

The main body of the English army, which had landed on the first day, had been left a long time to itself. The debarkation of the other troops, as well as of the artillery and horses, having been retarded by a heavy sea, was not finished till the 20th. On that day the English marched towards the *Embarcadere*, already occupied by their advanced guard, where all their troops were completely assembled.

On the 21st they put themselves in motion at eight in the morning, and repulsed the advanced post of the cavalry, which sent us notice of their approach. Generals Friant and Lanusse, considering that lake, Mareotis was not passable at that season, and that, if the English established themselves on the

dykes of the canal of Alexandria, and of lake Maadieh, the rest of the army would have a difficulty in joining them, resolved with their feeble means to oppose the march of the enemy, in order to preserve this important communication. They left the guard of Alexandria to the sailors, and advanced to the point of lake Maadieh, on the heights near the Camp of the Romans, with the following troops :

		Men.	12-pounders.	8-pounders.	Howitzers.	4-pounders.
FRIANT, } general of division,	DELEGORGUE, } general of brigade,	25th demi-brigade,				
		2d and 3d battalion,	500	-	-	1
		61st, -----	600	-	-	2
		75th, -----	750	-	-	1
		Artillery, -----		1	3	1
LANUSSE, } general of division,	SILLY, } general of brigade,	4th light infantry, -	650	-	-	3
		18th of the line, --	650	-	-	2
		69th ditto, -----	800	-	-	2
		Light artillery, -----		-	4	2
		3850	1	7	3	10
		<hr/>				
BRON, } general of brigade,	{	22d regiment of chasseurs, -----	230			
		Detachment of the 3d dragoons, ---	150			
		18th ditto, -----	80			
		Detachment of the 20th ditto, -----	60			
			520			
		<hr/>				
TOTAL, ---		{ Infantry, -----	3850	} men.		
		{ Cavalry, -----	520			
		{ Artillery, -----	21			
				pieces.		

With this small number of troops, generals Friant and Lanusse had the boldness to receive the whole English army, that is to say, 16,000 infantry, 2000 marines from the fleet, 200 horse, and 10 pieces of cannon. The English marched slowly, their infantry with difficulty advanced through the moving sands they were obliged to cross. Their gun-boats proceeded by the lake of Maadieh, towards the heights on their left, together with a great number of vessels laden with ammunition, provisions, and fresh water. When they saw the French troops posted on the heights, which they wished to occupy, they stopped, and a cannonade followed on both sides. They did not dare to begin the attack, and they encamped at three in the afternoon, not two leagues from the point of their departure.

On the 22d, at day-break, they resumed their march: fearing the impetuosity of the French, especially of the cavalry, they formed in three lines: in the centre of their army was a square, whose sides were composed of infantry in close columns.

The left wing was first in motion; they marched along the edge of lake Maadieh,

and supporting themselves by the canal, with a design to turn the right of the French; the centre put itself in motion later, and afterward the right wing.

The centre marched slowly on the other side of a height, by which it was hid from the French, so that the left wing appeared insulated. General Lanusse, hoping to overpower it by a brisk attack, before it could be supported, and having proposed this movement to general Friant, ordered the 69th to advance along the heights overlooking the sea, to engage the attention of the enemy's right; left a battalion of the 18th in reserve on the heights of the Roman Camp, and a battalion of the 4th light artillery, with one cannon and a howitzer of the light artillery, on the right of the heights, and instantly marched with the rest of his troops, and the 22d regiment of chasseurs.

Whilst the brave Lanusse began his movement, the English centre appeared on the height. The first line advanced. It was no longer possible to flank the left wing before the attack. The 22d regiment of chasseurs therefore charged it with the greatest bravery, broke through it, and obliged two battalions

to lay down their arms; but the fire of the English second line, being directed with great briskness and precision, forced them to retire, and abandon their prisoners. During this time, the 4th light infantry, led on by the adjutant *commandant* Boyer, engaged the remainder of the first line, and made them give way. The 18th formed on their left; but the column, which marched on the right of the English centre, opened rapidly on their flank; its fire threw them into disorder, and they could not complete their movement to withstand that column. The 4th light and the 22d chasseurs, being too weak to sustain the combat alone, then began their retreat.

During this time general Friant had advanced with the 25th and 75th, preceded by *sharp shooters*, who galled the left wing of the English. The 61st had also marched to the point of lake Maadieh, and attacked that wing, which halted, and received them with a well-supported fire: therefore, finding themselves too weak, and the movement projected by general Lanusse not being executed, they retired along the dyke of the canal, and general Friant made the 25th and 75th again take up their position on the height.

Generals Friant and Lanusé felt, that it would be imprudent to contend any longer with so superior an army, and that it was in vain to attempt to hinder them from occupying that position. A vigorous charge, executed by the 3d of dragoons, protected the retreat of the 4th light, which had been warmly engaged, and checked the advance of the English. The 69th formed the rear guard on the left, marching along the sea shore, waiting till the right of the English were within musket-shot, and executed in the best order a retreat by *echelons*, which extorted the enemy's admiration. The 61st made a similar manœuvre on the right near the canal, and the French troops took a position on the heights of Nicopolis.

The English, having passed the heights of the Roman Camp, formed their columns into a line. They appeared a long time doubtful whether to attack the French; they had a superiority of numbers; and their soldiers must have been animated by the easy success they had just obtained; but yet they did not dare make the attempt. They contented themselves with advancing their left wing upon the great sand-hill beyond the lakes,

and detaching a battalion along the canal; but the fire of some cannon, placed on the heights of Nicopolis, and of some *sharp shooters* from the canal, quickly forced them to retreat, and the left wing, unable to continue on the sand-hill, fell back. The English army encamped with its right to the sea, near the Roman Camp, and its left to the canal of Alexandria, opposite to the point of lake Maadieh, and immediately set to work with great activity, to fortify this position by a line of redoubts.

In this affair the enemy lost 1500 men. Our loss was only 500. This difference arose from the small number of French engaged, from the superiority of their artillery, and from the charge of the 22d regiment, which did great execution. General Lanusse was slightly wounded.

This general, as well as general Friant, sensible that the position of the heights of Nicopolis would not be capable of defence, if attacked, and that it was above all important to provide for the safety of Alexandria, left there a very strong advanced guard, to make the enemy believe that their intention was to defend it. But in order to secure their

retreat, and to prepare means for the defence of Alexandria, they caused the ancient works of the Arabs to be repaired, in which they posted the 4th light, with two battalions of the 18th; the 3d battalion of this demi-brigade was posted on the height called Cleopatra's; and the 3d battalion of the 25th occupied the heights near Pompey's Pillar. At the same time the French were indefatigable in completing the fortifications of Alexandria. As the cavalry had become useless for the defence of this place, and as there was little forage in the magazines, the 18th of dragoons only was kept, the rest were sent during the night to Rahmanieh to meet the army. They had much difficulty in traversing lake Mareotis, and were obliged to take a circuit as far as Marabou.

The generals, who were at Alexandria, dispatched a vessel on the 25th, to acquaint the government with what had happened, and to inform admiral Gantheaume, who they knew was on his passage, of the position of the English fleet.

CHAP. III.

Arrival of the Army at Alexandria. Affair of the 30th of Ventose (21st of March).

WE learnt these details on our arrival at Rahmanieh. The situation of the French army became very critical. The English being masters of the dykes prevented the re-union of the troops before Alexandria, unless it had been possible to discover, in the bason of lake Mareotis, a road passable by artillery; they might even have let the sea into that bason, by cutting the dyke which separates it from lake Maadieh. The whole disposable troops were not yet concentrated, and the affairs of the 17th and 22d of Ventose (8th and 13th of March) had weakened the corps engaged on those days.

General Rampon arrived on the 26th at Rahmanieh. On the 27th, while at Birket, we received an account, that a practicable road for artillery had been discovered: we directed our march thither; and, passing by

Agazy, we arrived at Marabou. The army finally effected a junction, on the 29th, at Alexandria.

Meanwhile the English had laid siege to Aboukir. This little fort, soon overpowered by the superiority of artillery and a heavy bombardment, capitulated on the 28th of Ventose (19th of March) to avoid being taken by assault. The English had completed the entrenchments of their position with great activity, and had armed their redoubts with a prodigious quantity of artillery, but their only movement was to push a few patrols as far as Bedah. On the 27th, the 12th light horse met near this village 50 hussars of the 7th regiment, detached with a company of the carabineers of the 21st to reconnoitre their position on the canal. The light horse charged the hussars; who, rushing at the same time against them, broke through their squadron; then, suddenly wheeling, on their excellent Arabian coursers, took the English on the rear; who, unable to check their horses, were thus driven on the carabineers, whose fire completed their destruction.

The troops having once effected a junction, it would have been right immediately.

to have attacked the enemy. A victory would have ensured the possession of Egypt, would have enabled us to stop the march of the visir, as well as of the English forces from India. Our position could not be rendered much worse even by a check, than by remaining in presence of the English, temporising and consuming the scanty provisions of Alexandria, whilst the visir's army, spread over the interior of the country, would have time to take Damietta, Salahieh, and the other small forts, slaughter the feeble garrisons, and excite the natives to arms. Neither was it right to give the English army time for receiving reinforcements, and still further to strengthen themselves.

If lake Marcotis had at that time been passable, it would have been better to have postponed the attack, to have endeavoured, by a retrograde movement, to tempt the English to divide their forces by undertaking the siege of Alexandria; and also to draw part of their forces into a more open field of battle, where the French army, superior in cavalry and light artillery, might have ensured victory. But the marshy soil of the lake did not at that season admit of this

movement. The enemy were so greatly superior in number, and occupied so strong a position, that there was little hopes of success from an attack. It was only to be expected from a vigorous attempt upon one of their wings. The difficulty was, to induce a general in chief who had seen no service, and repelled all advice, to adopt a well concerted plan of attack. General Lanusse, indirectly applied to for a plan by general Menou, sent him, by a third person, one drawn up in concert with general Reynier, which was reduced into the order of the day, and delivered to the generals at ten in the evening.

The position of the English was not more than 1300 toises in extent. The two wings, supported, the right by the sea, and the left by lake Maadieh, were flanked by gun-boats, and the left was besides fortified by redoubts on the dyke of the canal of Alexandria, and covered by lakes. Redoubts on the height occupied by the centre commanded the whole rear of the left wing; and the centre was equally covered by the position of the right, and by a redoubt erected near the ancient Roman Camp.

The works of this entrenched position were filled with artillery, behind which the troops were encamped in two lines. The reserve formed a third line, in the rear of the left wing. An attack was practicable only on the right wing. We might expect to rout that by a great effort, overpowering it by the impetuosity of the French infantry. Afterwards the whole troops were to be pressed upon the centre, while the left was amused by a false attack. Finally, the favourable moment was to be seized to complete our success by a charge of the cavalry, and drive the enemy upon lake Maadieh.

The French army, whose forces are stated (according to corps) in the table No. 3, consisted of 8330 infantry, and 1380 cavalry, with 46 pieces of cannon. The English amounted to 16,000 infantry, 200 horse, 12 field-pieces, and 30 cannon in the redoubts, beside those of the gun-boats.

An hour before day-light the French troops assembled at the advanced posts *. General

* The troops were in movement thus early, that they might reach the English army without being much exposed to the fire of the redoubts and gun-boats. Perhaps it would

Lanusse believed that the English redoubts might be easily carried by grenadiers, supported by the head of the columns. He marched his two brigades in close column, intending to form them beyond the main redoubt and the Roman Camp, and fall upon the right of the English army. The brigade of general Silly was to march directly against the redoubt; that of general Valentin to follow the shore, passing between the sea and the Roman Camp. The centre was to march close to the right of general Silly's brigade, following it as a second line; and on the first success vigorously to attack (along with the right wing) the position of redoubts of the enemy's centre. But the division of the French centre into two bodies, each with its separate commanding officer, and subdivided again by the detaching of its gre-

have been more congenial to the temper of the French troops to have commenced the engagement by day-light. But as the entire success depended on the first shock on the enemy's right, it was expected that, our first movements being effected in the dark, we should the better mislead the enemy as to the real point of attack. The principal effort ought also to have been confided to the troops who being newly arrived had not suffered in the former engagements. But how was it possible to overcome the suspicions of general Menou, and induce him to make another disposition of the troops?

nadiers, deprived it of that combined action necessary to the complete accomplishment of its orders. The right wing was to form between the lakes and the centre, to attack the opposite wing of the enemy, as soon as the enemy's right was broken. They were also to detach a corps between the two lakes to occupy the left of the English, and prevent their sending a body against Alexandria; which, from their superiority in numbers, might have extremely embarrassed the French. This wing was to be supported by general Bron, detached with two regiments of cavalry to the bason of lake Mareotis, and also by a false attack of dromedaries on the side of Bedah. It was the more confidently to be expected that this false attack would greatly occupy the English, and prevent detachments from their left wing, as they were ignorant of the junction of the army before Alexandria, and might expect to be attacked on that side; and these movements, if successful, would give the advantage of acting with equal forces on their right. The cavalry were to march in a second line behind the infantry, till the left had broken the line of the English; when they were to

seize the moment of disorder, to decide the victory by a vigorous charge.

The false attack was commenced by the dromedaries before day-light. They surprised the first redoubt, made twenty prisoners, fired with a cannon which they found there upon the other redoubts, and greatly attracted the enemy's attention. General Lanusse then put his troops in motion, the officers of the other divisions doing the same. A company of carabineers of the 4th light soon took a small post with one piece. General Silly's brigade proceeded against the main redoubt. General Lanusse, at that moment, perceiving that general Valentin had quitted the sea-shore, and that, as he was directing his march towards the redoubt and the Roman Camp, his brigade was checked by a heavy fire, hastened to the spot, rallied, and led them back to the charge. At that moment he received a mortal wound. The impulse he had given the troops began to abate. No orders were given to form this brigade, which was dispersed by the enemy's fire behind the sand-hills. The 4th light, forming the head of general Silly's brigade, met, near the angle of the redoubt, the 32d,

which, in the dark, had gone too much to the left. A little disorder arose from this accident. The 4th light, unable to clear the ditches of the redoubt, proceeded round their left, and were repulsed by the first line of the English. The 18th, separated from the 4th, by the mistake of the 32d, were unable to force the redoubt.

The 32d, commanded by general Rampon, afterwards attacked the first line of the English, and was repulsed, Rampon having his horse shot under him, and his clothes pierced with balls. Sornet, adjutant commandant, was mortally wounded in advancing, and the grenadiers under his command could not penetrate the enemy's lines. General d'Estin followed the road of Aboukir, and advanced in the interval between the right and the centre of the enemy's first line, where, being received with a sharp fire from the second line and the redoubts, he retired from the field, after being slightly wounded. Hausser, who commanded the 21st light infantry, under D'Estin, had his leg and thigh carried away, and that demi-brigade remained without an officer to command it, in the midst of the English army, a regiment of which was detached to

cut off their retreat. The second battalion effected their retreat, but three companies of the third battalion, partly composed of Copts, enlisted in Upper Egypt, and who were detached as *sharp shooters*, were compelled to lay down their arms. Thirty-seven men who guarded the colours refused to yield, and were all slain. Eppler, chief of brigade, who had marched a little more to the right, was wounded, and his grenadiers repulsed. The small detached bodies forming the centre were too advanced, before their left was secured by the taking of the main redoubt. Almost all the corps had attacked in one line, without support, and insulated from each other. Their movements had been disconcerted by the darkness of the hour, and several of their principal officers were killed. The soldiers remaining exposed to a heavy fire, without receiving orders, dispersed themselves behind the sand-hills.

The right wing remained, according to the preconcerted dispositions, at the distance of something less than cannon shot from the centre of the English, waiting the success of the left, to begin its attack. As soon as general Reynier heard of the brave Lanusse's

wound, and the disorder of the centre, he made his wing advance to their support, giving orders to general Damas to remain with the 13th, between the two lakes, to occupy the enemy's left, and to push some *sharp shooters* towards the canal.

After the failure of this first attack, the dispersion of the troops, and the loss of general Lanusse, further efforts were useless; because, before the action, every expectation of success had been founded on a first shock. Several of the principal officers being slain, three-fifths of the army that were dispersed could not rally and form again under the enemy's fire, to hazard any new attack. The right wing was too weak to make any attempt by itself on the enemy's centre, protected by the main redoubt, the Roman Camp, and their right wing. If the French had retired at this moment, their loss would not have been very great; the English would have considered this affair merely as a general reconnoitring; and the army would have remained strong enough to keep the field, and to attempt some new movement on the first favourable occasion.

General Reynier, perceiving that general

Menou issued no orders, resolved to make a new attempt with the right wing upon that of the enemy. Its success would have afforded an opportunity to rally the scattered troops, and bring them again into action. While Friant's division and the 85th were in motion, to make this attack, and the light artillery advanced, by his order, to silence the redoubts, general Reynier proceeded to some sand-hills not far from the main redoubt, the more perfectly to observe the enemy's movements, and to discover what was best to be done, to attack them with some chance of success.

When the English were convinced that the principal attack was directed against their right, they marched their reserve to its support. General Hutchinson, who commanded their left wing, still kept his position with 6000 men, although he had before him no more than 800 men of the 13th, 350 horse from the 7th regiment of hussars, and the 22d of chasseurs, and 100 dromedaries.

While this passed, general Menou rode up and down in the rear of the army. General Lanusse, when he found himself wounded, had sent to request that he might be replaced

by general Damas; but the commander in chief returned no answer, nor took any measures to repair the disorder. Afterwards, meeting the cavalry, he gave them orders to charge. It was in vain that it was observed to him, that this was not the moment for a charge, and that they would be cut to pieces without rendering any service. It was not, however, till he had received the third order, that general Roize put the cavalry in motion*.

The cavalry passing through the intervals of the 61st and 75th retarded their march. General Reynier (after he had convinced himself that no new attack could be successfully made with the divisions of Lanusse and Rampon) was seeking Friant's division and the 85th, to make a new attempt, when he met the cavalry, already under the fire of the enemy's infantry. It was too late to stop this ill-timed charge. The cavalry would have suffered almost as much in halting where

* Remonstrances against orders, which are so reprehensible in armies, and suffer the favourable moment to escape, were excusable in the present instance; all the principal officers endeavouring to supply the want of experience in the commander in chief, and wishing to prevent his mistakes.

they were, as in executing the charge. General Reynier therefore hastened the movement of his troops to support the horse; but scarcely had the 61st reached the foot of the redoubt, when the cavalry were already repulsed.

General Silly had his leg and thigh carried away. Several of the commanding officers of corps were wounded, and the troops of the left and centre had no officer who might have taken advantage of their proximity to the enemy, when the cavalry threw their first line into disorder. General Baudot, at that time, had been mortally wounded at the head of the 85th.

General Roize, with all the principal officers under his command, grievously felt the error they were obliged to commit; but they conducted themselves like brave men, furious with despair at being vainly sacrificed. The first line, commanded by general Boussart, consisting of the 3d and 14th of dragoons, charged the enemy's first line behind the main redoubt. The 14th, stopped by the ditches in front of the camp, were obliged to turn them. The enemy's infantry were broken; the soldiers throwing them-

selves on their faces on the ground, or flying into the tents, among which the French cavalry were entangled. The fire from the redoubts and the enemy's second line having killed, wounded, or dismounted a great number of the officers and privates, this body of cavalry was obliged to retire, after general Boussart had received two musket shots. The English infantry then rallied, and were reinforced by the reserve. General Roize charged with his second line of cavalry, and penetrated to the second line of the enemy's infantry and the reserve. General Abercromby, who was there with his staff, was mortally wounded. General Roize was killed; a prodigious number of officers and privates shared his fate; and many others were wounded or dismounted. The broken corps of the cavalry retired in disorder; and, when they were again formed behind the infantry, there were not found the fourth of the number that had charged.

The destruction of the cavalry scarcely left any hope; and the army ought to have retreated to avoid more considerable losses, and that the scattered troops might be collected, to be in a condition afterwards to attempt

some new enterprise. General Reynier went several times to general Menou, to convince him that some prompt measure must be taken; that he ought either to retreat, or, with the troops of the right wing, which were still fresh, to make a new attempt, by which some advantage might be gained, if the main redoubt could be seized, and the enemy's right thrown into confusion; that it might yet be tried, if fortune would not favour some bold enterprise, although perhaps it was imprudent to expose to a disaster the only troops which could cover a retreat. General Reynier received no direct answer. The troops remained exposed to the fire of the enemy's lines and batteries without making any movement, and every instant lost a crowd of brave men. The ammunition of the artillery was expended. The English advanced some corps, which flanked the 4th light infantry, compelling them to quit the sand-hills they occupied. The *sharp shooters* under the main redoubt were also compelled to retire. At last, after two hours past in indecision, general Menou ordered a retreat, which was executed with the greatest order. The English

did not dare to quit their entrenchments; and the French, at eleven in the morning, re-occupied their position on the heights of Nicopolis.

CHAP. IV.

*Movements after the Affair of the 30th of Ventose.
Surrender of Rosetta and Rahmaniéh. Pas-
sage of the Desert by the Visir.*

THE day after the affair of the 30th, general Reynier, perceiving that general Menou gave no orders for the army to take a stronger position than that of Nicopolis, and for such a disposition of the various corps scattered over Egypt as circumstances required, went to his quarters, and represented to him, that the heights of Nicopolis were too extensive to wait the English there, who, with 15,000 men, might, by a vigorous attack, route the troops, and enter Alexandria with them; that a better position might be taken, by posting the right on the heights of Pompey's Pillar, the centre in the ancient works of the Arabs, and the left at Pharillon; but that important considerations gave the preference to more hardy measures. The junction of the troops at Alexandria wasted the magazines, which were very inconsider-

nable. The visir's army and the troops from India must be on their march; the English might attempt to seize Rosetta, send a flotilla into the Nile, and attack Rahmanieh, which movements it was necessary to oppose. To conclude, the remainder of the army being dispersed in various untenable posts which were useless, and could no longer be succoured, these insulated detachments would be cut off one by one, unless these forts were dismantled, and their garrisons added to the main body of the army. To meet the various dangers which threatened the French, general Reynier proposed to leave sufficient garrisons in the citadel of Cairo, at Alexandria, and at forts Julian and Lesbeh; and to concentrate the army at Rahmanieh, to watch a favourable opportunity to engage the English, when they should quit their position to attack Alexandria or Rosetta; or, if circumstances should require, to march against the visir as soon as he had passed the desert.

General Menou had talked so long of an anti-colonist party, that he had finished by persuading himself that every proposition to abandon the forts and to concentrate the army had the evacuation of Egypt for its object.

He adopted only indecisive and half measures. He withdrew the posts of Mit-khramr and Menouf; sent to Rahmanieh and Rosetta the 85th, and 100 dragoons of the 3d regiment; ordered general Belliard to send 1200 men to Rahmanieh*, to lessen the garrisons of Belbeis and Salahieh, and to press the return of the troops in Upper Egypt. He sent orders to general Morand to leave 100 men at Lesbeh, the same number in the towers of the Bogaz of Debeh and Omfarredje; and to march to Rahmanieh with the remainder of the 2d light infantry, of the 20th regiment of dragoons, and the artillery. This last order was sent by an Arab, who never delivered it.

While general Menou was at Cairo, he would not believe that the English could debark. When he was at Alexandria, he endeavoured to persuade himself that the visir would not march; that the English would undertake nothing; that, while he should be before their army, they neither dare quit their position nor send detachments against

* A few days after, he wrote to that general to send only 600.

Rosetta, and that they would speedily reim-
bark.

In proportion as troops esteem the experienced general and the courageous man, who, firm and enterprising in the midst of dangers, which he often braves at their head, knows how in difficult circumstances to extract from his valour and experience the resources which vulgar timidity thinks annihilated; in the same proportion, they despise the presumptuous coward, who, with his hands over his eyes, and his ears shut, endeavours to conceal from his thoughts, perils, whose magnitude he dare not contemplate; who, ignorant and vain-glorious, emphatically predicts, while at a distance from the enemy, the success, whose means he did not know how to prepare, and which he could not seize at its approach. It is a comparatively small evil that such a general loves to deceive himself. He also conceals from his troops the force they have to engage; a most vicious method, and of use at the best only with raw troops; but with veterans, to disguise the number of the enemy, is to doubt their courage and insult their glory. He who adopts

this method, who from arrogance will not acknowledge his faults, perfidiously ascribing them to others, thinks himself capable of parrying all events if he happens to gain the favour of the troops, and intrigues for their voices instead of ensuring success by the excellence of his military operations.

Ever a prey to his personal inquietudes, general Menou maintained spies only in his own army, and had none in the enemy's camp. The death of general Abercromby was not known in the French army till the 18th of Germinal (*8th April*), and then it was learnt from a deserter. A number of reports were circulated too absurd to call on the objects of their malice to refute them; but the instruments by which they were spread were protected; every kind of means was employed to intimidate all that refused to believe them, and even many such were arrested. Terror seized upon all minds. The principal officers, set at variance by every sort of artifice, could not concert together to advise the general in chief. No means of success existed to induce any one to burthen himself with the entire responsibility; and

the new mistakes and timidity of the English could not be foreseen.

A fleet of fifty-seven Turkish vessels, among which there were five ships of the line and six frigates, under the command of the capitan-pacha, arrived on the 5th of Germinal in the road of Aboukir, having on board 6000 Turkish troops, who landed on the 10th at La Maison quarrée. This post, which might have become important, had been evacuated and dismantled after the landing of the English. On the 14th, news was brought to Alexandria, that the Turks had established themselves at this point; but general Menou would give no credit to the intelligence. The officers who had reconnoitred them, and would have reported their strength, were menaced; while general Menou received with kindness those who had the weakness to tell him that the Turks were no more than between 700 and 800 men. He concerted no means to drive them from their post, and check their further progress. At this period the French army, concentrated in the field, might reasonably have hoped to defeat the combined English and Turks when

they should move from La Maison quarrée to attack Rosetta. The English, discouraged by the death of a general in chief who possessed their entire confidence, weakened by their losses, dissatisfied by the heat of a burning climate, and the want of fresh water, seeing that the visir had not passed the desert, and appeared little disposed cordially to aid them, would have lost all hope at the first check; and the foreigners that composed several of their corps would then have deserted and strengthened the French army.

General Hutchinson, constantly persuaded that the French would concentrate at Rosetta, was unwilling to march to that place. However, induced by the reports of Arabs, he sent a reconnoitring party of 500 men to that quarter; and, informed of the smallness of the French force there, he resolved to occupy that town, which was indispensable, to procure him provisions and fresh water, and to continue his operations. On the 16th, 3000 of the English advanced to La Maison quarrée. On the 17th, they encamped at Etko; and on the 18th marched to Rosetta in company with the Turkish corps. The 3d battalion of the 85th, with three com-

panies of the 61st, in that town, unable to oppose so considerable a force, passed the Nile while the enemy were approaching, and retired to Fouah. Fort Julian was left to defend itself with no more than twenty-five men of the 61st, a company of invalids, and a few artillery-men. Three armed boats, stationed at the Bogaz, had orders to proceed up the river to that fort, as soon as they should be compelled to retire.

The English and Turkish forces encamped on the heights of Aboumandour, entrenching their camp. Their advanced guard extended towards Hamat, on a slip of ground between the Nile and Lake Etko. They afterwards commenced the siege of fort Julian, and attacked the Bogaz. In a few days they sent a flotilla into the Nile. On the 29th fort Julian was compelled to capitulate, after a much more obstinate resistance than could have been expected from so weak a place; one part of which had been carried away by the last inundation, and which was now almost buried by a superior artillery. When a few invalids, who had defended the place, marched out, the English asked where the garrison was. The surrender of Rosetta

was known at Alexandria on the 20th ; and at the same time news was received from Cairo announcing the march of the visir as certain. As soon as general Belliard had ascertained the truth of that intelligence, he ordered the 600 men intended for Rahmanieh to return to Cairo. The visir's march excited the greatest uneasiness through the army ; but general Menou steadily maintained that the news was unfounded. Sometimes he announced that the grand-visir was dead ; at other times, that he was recalled to Constantinople ; and at last he declared that the English were not at Rosetta. He could not however refuse to send some troops to that quarter ; but, to defeat the English, he thought it sufficient to send general Valentin with the 69th, consisting of 700 men, and the 7th regiment of hussars, consisting only of 180 ; which detachment departed in the night of the 20th and 21st.

On the 23d general Reynier paid a visit to general Menou, to attempt once more to convince him of the injudicious position of the troops before Alexandria ; to point out the works absolutely necessary to the defence of that post ; and, if possible, to induce him to

concentrate the army, to check the progress of the enemy occupying Rosetta. Being unable to extort any direct answer in the interview, he repeated his remonstrances in writing *.

* *Letter from REYNIER, General of Division, to General MENOUE, Commander in Chief.*

“Camp of Alexandria, 23d of Germinal, 9th year
(13th of April, 1801).”

“I feel it incumbent on me, citizen general, to remind you of our conversation this morning, and to demand express instructions on a plan of defence, if we should be attacked by the enemy.

“I have observed to you that, since our left fell back a little to take a position more concentrated, better supported, and less exposed to the gun-boats, the enemy’s efforts must be on the right, which is extremely exposed, the 13th demi-brigade being in a situation from which they must retire, as well as the cavalry, if the enemy should advance with a superior force (which they could do along the canal and by lake Mareotis), and, taking those corps in the rear, should attempt to seize the heights in the neighbourhood, which post it is of the utmost importance to defend. The right flank of general Friant’s division being, by this movement, uncovered, the enemy, with three times the infantry we can oppose to them, would force our weak entrenchments; and it is even to be feared, should our troops obstinately defend the works, foot to foot, and the English follow with audacity, part of the fortifications of Alexandria would be seized, because the works where our troops must enter the town in their retreat are not mounted, nor even finished.

“I do not imagine the English will attack us in our present position for some days; because, according to the plan they

A party of dromedaries, sent to reconnoitre Rosetta, returned on the 24th, with intelli-

appear to have concerted, it is more serviceable to them to wait till they have secured themselves at Rosetta, taken Rahmanieh, and till the visir can act in Egypt, and our communications can be cut off. But, in war, every thing is to be foreseen.

“ To support the right, we ought to extend our lines to the right of the canal, and raise strong redoubts there; but we have not troops enough to defend all that ground. The only position that there is near Alexandria for a small army is with the right to the canal, near the heights of Pompey’s Pillar; the centre at the ancient works of the Arabs; and the left extending to Pharillon. I have already submitted this position to you since the affair of the 30th. It is protected by Fort Crétin, and other works of Alexandria; the fortifications necessary to this position would strengthen Alexandria; Cleopatra’s Redoubt, which is of the greatest consequence, might at this very time have been finished and mounted, and a strong redoubt constructed near Pompey’s Pillar; after which the enemy could not attack this position without very great loss, and probably not without a repulse.

“ That which determines me to insist upon precise instructions is, that I foresee what will happen if we are attacked in our present position. I shall be forced to order the right to fall back; the army will be defeated; and perhaps an attempt will be made to attribute the fault to me, which calamny, however, no military man will believe.

“ Ten years of a very active service, in which I have almost always had a share in directing the movements of great armies, give me some judgment on the strength of a position, the enemy’s designs, and the means of disconcerting them. I should think myself wanting to the rank I fill in this army, the interest I take in its glory and the preservation of Egypt,

gence, that from 3 to 4000 English, and from 5 to 6000 Turks, with twenty pieces of cannon, occupied that town ; but general Menou would give no credit to the report. He said to Cavalier, and to Sartelon, prin-

if I did not communicate my thoughts to you. I did so when we heard the news of the appearance of the English, to induce you promptly to march to Alexandria. After the unfortunate affair of the 30th of Ventose, I proposed to you to assemble the insulated corps, to throw sufficient garrisons into the citadels of Cairo and Alexandria, and to form an army in the field, ready to seize on occasion. The inactivity of the English, and the slowness of the Turks, greatly favoured this plan. It was possible to have routed the corps now established at Rosetta; dispersed the visir's army in the desert; and if the English had divided their forces to form the siege of Alexandria, to have gained some advantage over them. At this moment the enemy are established at Rosetta; the visir is on his march; and it is perhaps too late to make this movement with any hopes of success.

" Military operations should be decided and executed with promptness, in proportion as a general is inferior to the enemy. When none of the enemy's measures are foreseen, and a general divides his own forces, he is almost certain to be beaten.

" Whenever the troops shall be concentrated, they will present an invincible strength to the enemy. Our resources are no longer great; but we have to do with an enemy of little enterprise; and it is perhaps still possible to gain sufficient time to receive succours and orders from the government, and to wait the issue of negotiations, that are probably already begun, if it is true that Mr. Pitt is dismissed.

(Signed)

"REYNIER."

cial commissary, who accompanied the reconnoitring party, that he would order every man to be shot who should say there were more than 800 men in Rosetta; however, as Cavalier insisted that general Valentin was not strong enough to retake that city, he sent 500 of the 4th light infantry, and 160 chasseurs of the 22d regiment, to reinforce him.

At this time, general Menou named three generals of division, and three generals of brigade, and made other promotions. Several officers refused their new rank, which, however, they were compelled to accept.

On the 25th he dispatched to Rahmanieh the 13th demi-brigade, and the 20th of dragoons. This demi-brigade was the only one of Reynier's division that remained under the direct command of that general, who at the same time received orders to remain at Alexandria without troops. He again attempted to convince general Menou, that it was not by successive small detachments, but by concentrating the army, that the enemy's progress could be checked. If he could have prevailed on general Menou to adopt a wiser plan, he would have insisted on retaining his own troops; but all his represen-

tations being fruitless, he determined to go to Alexandria, and remain there a mere spectator of the unfortunate events he could not but foresee.

The English had, on the 24th, cut the dyke of lake Maadieh, to turn the water into lake Mareotis, by which they hoped to cut off the communication between Rahmanieh and Cairo; but their object was not entirely accomplished. The waters spread slowly over the bason. Their conduct would have been more military, if they had attacked the convoys, attended only by weak escorts, and had advanced sooner to Rahmanieh.

About this time, we learnt at Alexandria, that the visir's army had passed the desert. One column had arrived, on the 19th of Germinal, at Kantara-el-Khasneh; and another at Saffabiar. The weak garrisons of Belbeis and Salahieh had been ordered to blow up the forts, destroy the magazines, and retire to Cairo, on the first advice of the enemy's approach. As soon as it was determined not to reinforce these weak posts, it was proper the moment they were attacked to unite their weak garrisons to the army, as they could oppose no obstacle to the march of the enemy.

Besides, the principal object of these forts was to contain magazines for the troops, of which they could not avail themselves in their present dispersed state.

Salahieh was evacuated in the afternoon of the 19th; and the garrison retired to Belbeis, the works of which were blown up on the 21st. Previous to the two garrisons marching to Cairo, thirty dragoons of the 14th, forming the rear guard, were attacked on the 22d, near El-Menayer, by 200 Turks and Mamalukes. Fifty dromedaries, sent back to their succour, forced the enemy to retire with loss. The advanced guard of the visir's army arrived at Belbeis on the 22d, but did not reach Salahieh till the close of the month. It was accompanied by part of the artillery, and some English artillery-men.

We have seen troops were successively sent to Rahmanieh, but too late to prevent the English from establishing themselves at Rosetta, and in too small numbers to drive them from that post. The enemy followed this movement, and reinforced their detachment at Rosetta in proportion as they saw troops depart from Alexandria. Part of these reinforcements occupied the heights of Abouman-

dour ; and the rest joined the advanced guard, entrenched at Hamat.

General Valentin had marched from Rahmanieh with the 69th and 85th demi-brigades, the 7th regiment of hussars, and the third of dragoons. Some armed vessels followed him on the Nile. He halted at El-Aft, without reconnoitring more nearly the enemy's advanced guard, and a slip of land they occupied between the Nile and lake Etko. General La Grange arrived at Rahmanieh on the 28th, where he found general Morand, who had at length received the duplicate of the orders dispatched on the 1st of Germinal. These generals, on the 29th, joined general Valentin at El-Aft, where this little army began to entrench. It consisted of about 3900 men, but was too weak to attack the English in their position at Hamet, which they could not reach but by a narrow road, flanked and intersected by canals, and consequently very difficult for the march of the artillery and cavalry. The army was at this time divided into three bodies, all greatly inferior to the enemy respectively opposed to them. There remained at Alexandria 4500 disposeable troops, who could undertake nothing against

the English camp, which had received additional works, and was guarded by between 7 and 8000 men. At El-Aft 3900 men were opposed to the enemy in Rosetta, whose forces had been gradually augmented to 7000 English and 6000 Turks. At Cairo, there were 2500 infantry, after the arrival of the remainder of the 21st light, on the 16th Germinal, with general Donzelot, and the garrisons of Belbeis and Salahieh, and that of Suez, which had retired by the valley of *the Wandering*, when the troops from India were about to debark. This body of troops had to defend Cairo against the visir, who was approaching with an army of 25,000 men.

On the 10th of Floreal, the visir encamped and entrenched himself at Belbeis. His army was rapidly^B increased by hordes from Syria, and the other provinces of Asiatic Turkey, as soon as they learnt that the desert had been passed without danger, and that they could spread over Egypt for plunder. The English troops from India were to join the visir.

General Belliard received very positive orders from general Menou to preserve Cairo, and had not troops enough to march against the visir without deserting the city. He

posted his troops with a view to defend the avenues, to prevent the Turks from entering and raising the inhabitants. He established his main body between fort Camin and the tower of the Nile at Boulac, covered that quarter by redoubts, and encamped a moveable column between the citadel and port Kléber.

The division of the army into three bodies, each too weak to undertake any thing, could produce only disasters. As general Menou obstinately persisted in remaining at Alexandria with part of the troops, instead of concentrating the army, and the French had not forces to retake Rosetta, it would have been prudent for a while to abandon Rahmanieh, steal a few days march on the English, and, with the troops at Cairo, fall upon the visir before he had time to organise his disorderly troops; and, when he should be driven from the desert, Cairo being in safety, to descend by forced marches with all the troops to Rahmanieh. If, meanwhile, the English had advanced towards Rahmanieh, the French army, although inferior in infantry, still remaining greatly superior in cavalry, would have given them battle with great advantage in an open

country. If, on the contrary, the English had kept their position at Rosetta, more ample means would have offered of checking their progress. It would have been wise, in that case, to entrust Murad Bey with the safety of Cairo, throwing a garrison merely into the forts, if Murad Bey had been fortunately permitted to give his aid. But the troops at Cairo and at Rahmanieh were under separate commanding officers, and this plan could not be executed without the express orders of general Menou.

Affairs remained in this state till the 16th of Floreal, the two armies confining themselves to strengthening their positions; and in the mean time, convoys of from 4 to 500 camels passed constantly from Rahmanieh to Alexandria. But the great number of horses kept uselessly at Alexandria occupied the convoys in bringing forage; while provisions and ammunition, sent from Cairo by general Menou's order, remained at Rahmanieh, for want of convoys.

The water spread slowly over the lake Mareotis, reaching Mariout on the 5th of Floreal, and Arab's Tower on the 16th; after which, the French established ferries at Ma-

riout, where the lake grows narrower, and divides into two branches; and a few pieces of cannon were mounted in the isle, to protect the channel. A few armed vessels were also stationed here to observe the English flotilla in lake Maadieh. The convoys now became daily more insecure. The flotilla the English had sent into the Nile was successively augmented to forty vessels. On the 19th, the English army received a reinforcement of 2900 men at Aboukir, which repaired their losses.

The position taken by the French troops at El-Aft was badly chosen. Its front was fortified, but the enemy might turn it by penetrating between its left and the lake. They might also march between lakes Etko and Maadieh, and, advancing toward Rahmanieh, would compel the French to fall back to that post, to defend their magazines. The right of the position at El-Aft, protected by the Nile, was, it is true, flanked by some French gun-boats; but the English might erect batteries on the right branch of the river, to protect their flotilla, in itself much superior to that of the French. It perhaps would have been more prudent to have left merely a

small advanced guard near El-Aft, to observe the English; and, instead of shutting up the troops in weak entrenchments, to keep the field near Rahmanieh, to seize the moment when the English were advanced into a more open country, to attack one of their wings with that superiority which the rapidity of its march gives the French infantry.

The English, at length, commenced new operations. They divided their army, that they might at once maintain their position of Aboukir, which almost formed an island, and act in the interior of Egypt. Notwithstanding their advantage in number, they feared that the French would avail themselves of that moment to concentrate a considerable force, and attack them while thus divided; and all their movements betrayed their timidity. On the 16th of Floreal, 7000 English and 6000 Turks encamped near Deirout, pushing a reconnoitring party to the camp of El-Aft; and their flotilla ascended the Nile to the same point.

On the 18th a body of English and Turks passed to the right bank of the Nile at Fouah, with artillery, which was afterwards

mounted on batteries about El-Aft, while the Anglo-Turkish army advanced against the French.

The defects of the position of El-Aft have been mentioned above. They were now sensibly felt by the French, who declined an engagement, and fell back upon Rahmanieh. The batteries erected upon the right bank of the Nile excessively harassed the French flotilla in its retreat ; one of its gun-boats was burnt, others were sunk, and only four gained Rahmanieh.

On the 19th the Anglo-Turkish army advanced against Rahmanieh. The left, composed of Turks, followed the banks of the Nile. The English marched in columns on their right. A body from Damanhour was to join them.

If the French had been seriously determined to engage the English at Rahmanieh, they ought to have taken a position a little further from the Nile, to deprive the enemy of the aid of their flotilla, and avail themselves of the advantage they had in their cavalry and light artillery : they ought to have attacked the enemy's right wing, as soon as they had passed the canal of Alex-

andria, and permitted the Turks to have menaced the redoubt of Rahmanieh, too strong to be carried by a *coup-de-main* : and, to prepare for the worst event, they ought to have sent higher up the Nile more than 200 boats, laden with provisions and ammunition, which must be cut off as soon as the English should erect batteries on the right bank.

The French troops, under the command of general La Grange, were posted round the redoubt of Rahmanieh, and behind the dykes of the canal of Alexandria. The cavalry were drawn up on the banks of the Nile. As soon as the enemy were seen, the cavalry were detached to meet them, and pass the canal. Unsupported by the infantry, they could effect nothing against the English, who marched in close columns ; therefore they were forced to fall back and repass the canal, where they made a stand ; but the enemy's corps that advanced by Damanhour, and the infantry they detached by the canal, soon compelled them to retire. The English formed in face of the cavalry, on the banks of the canal ; but they contented themselves with pushing forward parties of their light

infantry till the close of day. The Turks advanced in a tumultuous manner, towards a canal of irrigation cut from the Nile, where a small number of the French *sharpshooters* held them in check a long time. At length they made themselves masters of the post; but 200 of the second light and of the 13th fell upon them at three in the afternoon, and forced them to fly with great loss. The English had made no disposition to support this body of Turks by any other corps; and general Hutchinson even countermanded a movement made by general Doyle, on his perceiving the disorder of the Turks.

A body of the Anglo-Turkish forces had proceeded along the right bank of the Nile, and erected batteries in front of Rahmanieh, and the arm of the river used as a port, in which lay the whole of the French flotilla. These batteries protected the English flotilla, then ascending the Nile. It was now seen, that no resistance could be made to the further attacks of the enemy, so greatly superior as they were, without hazarding the loss of this little army; and that the English flotilla, covered by the batteries on the right bank of the Nile, would take the French

troops in flank and in the rear. As soon, therefore, as the night fell, they retreated towards Cairo. The French flotilla, prevented by the batteries on the right of the Nile from quitting the port of Rahmanieh, was abandoned, with the ammunition for the artillery, and the provisions, with which it was laden, after as much of these had been destroyed as was possible. A large convoy of artillery and provisions from Cairo, coming by the canal of Menouf, unacquainted with the retreat of the French, fell also into the enemy's hands.

The redoubt of Rahmanieh was in no condition to hold out, and only a guard for the sick that could not be removed was left there. It capitulated on the 20th, on the first summons of the English. The dispatches that had been sent from the camp of El-Aft to general Menou induced him to send general Délegorgue to Birket, with the battalion of the 18th, another of the 25th, and 100 dragoons, to oppose the troops which the enemy might advance between the lakes Maadieh and Etko, and by Damanhour against Rahmanieh. That general left Alexandria on the 19th, and

arrived on the 21st at Birket; but being informed of the surrender of the fort, he returned to Alexandria.

The troops at Alexandria could then no longer receive any convoys. A forage was attempted in the villages of Bahireh, towards Amran. All the camels at Alexandria were assembled, and departed on the 24th, under the escort of the dromedaries, a battalion of the 25th, and 100 dragoons; the whole commanded by Cavalier, chief of brigade.

The loss of Rahmanieh, which insulated Alexandria from the rest of Egypt, raised great murmurs in the army against general Menou; who, having steadily persisted in the impossibility of the event, had concerted no measures to provide for its consequences. These murmurs reached his ear, together with expressions of the esteem and confidence with which the troops distinguished general Reynier. The report at that time in circulation, and believed by the English, that this general was appointed to the command of the army, and general Menou restricted to the civil administration of Egypt, augmented his jealousy, which was the

more violent, because he could not disguise from himself that general Reynier had foretold the successive disasters of the army, and pointed out the means of preventing them. He thenceforth resolved to banish that witness of his mistakes; and the only well-concerted military expedition in the whole campaign was executed on the night of the 23d and 24th of Floreal. 300 infantry, 50 horse, with one piece of cannon, and miners, were assembled, but ignorant of their destination, when they were ordered to invest the house of general Reynier, to convey him on board a vessel ready to sail for Europe, on board of which were at the same time sent general Damas, Daure principal commissary, Boyer adjutant *commandant*, and several other officers.

General Reynier had less dread of such an act of violence, than of other events, which might have compelled him to take the command, when few resources were left, and the most favourable accidents could only retard the capitulation of the troops. If he had been unfortunate enough to make the capitulation, it would have given a species of colour to the reports circulated by general

Menou's agents, respecting an anti-colonist party. In his situation, it was his interest to return to France, when that could be done without the imputation of his having abandoned the army, and without having shunned his share of its mortifications, and in a way which openly testified that he had no part in the mistakes of general Menou.

General Reynier, as soon as he was assured that there was no other design than to oblige him to sail for Europe, opened his doors to the troops, went on board of the brig the *Lodi*, with the other arrested officers, and wrote to general Menou, again offering him his counsels for the defence of Alexandria. Generals Damas and Daure embarked in the *Good Union*. The soldiers expressed their regret at being charged with the execution of such orders. These vessels did not sail till the 29th. The *Lodi* arrived in France, after being closely pursued by several English ships. The *Good Union* was taken, and plundered of Kléber's small property, which had been confided to the care of Damas.

General Menou had neglected, till that period, to dispatch vessels, to inform go-

vernment of the situation of the army. His jealousy of general Reynier alone determined him to send these vessels away; and they were sent without any detail of events. There were, however, several vessels in the port of Alexandria that might have been employed on this service, especially the frigates that brought reinforcements, which general Menou detained, although they had received orders to return as soon as their mission was executed.

CHAP. V.

March to reconnoitre the Visir's Army. Capture of a foraging Party from Alexandria. Evacuation of Damietta, Lesbeh, and Bourlos. Temper and Conduct of the Inhabitants of Egypt, and the Mamalukes. Death of Murad Bey. Investment of Cairo; and Treaty for the Evacuation of that City.

GENERAL Le Grange arrived on the 20th of Floreal at Cairo, with the troops from Rahmanieh. General Belliard by this junction was in a condition to march against the visir, before the approach of the English. If he could chase the Turks from the desert, a small garrison would constrain the inhabitants of Cairo; and the troops, concentrated in that quarter, might successfully give battle to the Anglo-Turks on their march against that city.

The English generals, apprehensive of this movement, had recommended to the visir, and the English officers directing his artillery, to avoid all engagement; every where to re-

tire before the French ; and, in case of being pressed too closely, to retreat through the Delta, and form a junction with the English. It is to be doubted whether the visir would have adopted this plan. He would have thought it inconsistent with his dignity, to fly through the villages of the Delta, with a dispersed army. Fearing also to put himself in the power of the capitan-pacha, by joining the English, he would have preferred repassing the desert ; and the assembled nations of Asia, composing his army, would have followed the track of his guards, as soon as they saw him take the route of Syria.

The tardiness of the English in all their operations seemed to promise time to execute this movement before they should advance to Cairo. Perhaps it would have been prudent entirely to have abandoned Cairo, holding only the citadel and Gizeh, to concentrate a stronger force ; but this plan, although excellent while the enemy were at a distance, was not at this time without inconvenience. The affair against the visir might not be decisive ; detachments from his army might throw themselves into the city ; the communication of the army with Gizeh and

the citadel would become difficult; the influence of the public opinion attached to the possession of the capital would be lost; besides, general Menou had given very express orders to general Belliard to preserve that city.

On the 24th, general Belliard collected the troops designed to reconnoitre the visir's position, and learn if it was still possible to attack him with advantage, leaving general Almeiras in Cairo, to occupy the forts and over-awe the inhabitants, with 1000 infantry, 500 Copts and Greeks, the invalids, dismounted cavalry, artillery men, workmen, &c. forming a garrison of 1300 men, exclusive of 900 sick in the hospitals, and the civil and military agents.

On the 25th, general Belliard began his march with 4600 infantry, 900 horse, and twenty-four pieces of cannon. After driving in some parties of the enemy's cavalry, he halted during the night at El-Menayer.

At day-break on the 26th, having put his troops in motion, he discovered, near the village of El-Zouameh, a body of the enemy, amounting to nearly 9000 Turkish horse and foot, supported by about 500 English, who directed the artillery. The French ad-

vanced upon the heights, terminating the desert, to the east of El-Menayer. The infantry, in hollow squares, formed the two wings, and the centre was occupied by the column of cavalry. The French artillery soon silenced that of the enemy. The cavalry charged the artillery, took two pieces of cannon, and put to flight the Turkish infantry and the English cannoneers; but they dared not pursue, because, in moving too far from the protection of the foot, they might be overpowered by the enemy's cavalry, infinitely superior in number, which already surrounded the French troops. The Turks attempted several times to charge the hollow squares, but knowing by the experience of preceding campaigns that it was impossible to break them, they did not dare to persist; and the fire of the artillery drove them off.

The hordes of the enemy yielded the ground in proportion as the French advanced. During several hours that these fruitless skirmishes continued, the soldiers suffered extremely in the desert from heat, and still more from the want of water; and, being greatly fatigued, they were ordered to halt at the wells near El-Zouameh. While the

troops halted, the visir's army, arriving from Belbeis, spread on every side of them. The French put themselves in movement against the more compact of the enemy's hordes, without being able to bring them to a decisive action. Some bodies of the enemy's horse at a distance appeared to take the route to Cairo. It was to be feared that they would penetrate into that city, or that the movements of the visir, who shunned a battle, were designed to give the English time to make themselves masters of Cairo and Gizeh. General Belliard judged it proper to secure those places; the troops returned on the 27th, and were distributed for the defence of the several avenues of the city.

Cavalier, chief of brigade, who, I have said, was sent to forage in the villages of Bahreh, departed from Alexandria on the 24th of Floreal, with 220 men of the 25th demi-brigade, 125 dragoons of the 14th and 18th regiments, eighty-five dromedaries, and one piece of cannon, escorting 600 camels. Being arrived on the 26th at El-Och, he found that village deserted, and without grain, the harvest not being yet completed. He then went to Amran, where he found the same impos-

sibility of loading his camels. After which, he formed the resolution to proceed to Cairo for provisions, which he proposed to convey to Alexandria by the desert.

Deceived by the reports of the inhabitants, he imagined the Anglo-Turkish army to be still at Rahmanieh. Having received at his departure from Alexandria provisions only for two days, he could not avoid the villages, where his troops always procured some subsistence, to take the route of the lakes of Natron. He therefore followed the borders of the desert and cultivated territories. Having reached Terraneh, he perceived a flotilla on the Nile; and scarcely had he recognised the English and Turkish flags, than he saw the enemy's columns in march against him. From the time of his departure from El-Och, he had always been surrounded by 7 or 800 Arab horse, who, without greatly harassing his troops, had prevented his reconnoitring with his cavalry. The camels, worn out with fatigue, could not speedily retreat. He attempted, however, to retire into the desert, but was soon overtaken by the enemy's horse, and compelled to slacken his march, and make a running fight, without breaking his

little troop. The first body of the enemy was soon joined by infantry, with several pieces of light cannon. These 450 French, attacked by 3000 English, and embarrassed with a convoy, could not possibly defend themselves; but they steadily rejected the first summons they received, to surrender prisoners at discretion. Their firmness induced the English to sign a convention with Cavalier, by which they engaged to convey this small body to France, with arms and baggage.

While 6000 Turks occupied Damietta, and 1000 landed at Debar, fourteen English and Turkish vessels blockaded the Bogaz, and it was plain every thing was in preparation for the attack of Lesbeh. This fort was well provided with artillery, but there were only twelve cannoneers to serve all the cannon. The works were also too extensive for the garrison; who therefore evacuated the place, after spiking the cannon, throwing the ammunition and provisions into the Nile, and sinking the gun-boats. The garrison, with the sailors, crossed the river on the 20th of Floreal, retiring to Bourlos, with a design of joining the troops at Rahmanieh; but,

learning that those troops had retreated to Cairo, and being unable to remain at Bourlos for want of provisions, they embarked on board of four vessels lying there, to throw themselves, if possible, into Alexandria. Two of the vessels were taken; and the others escaped and gained Italian ports.

Before the battle of Heliopolis, the enemy's movements on the frontier had constantly occasioned insurrections in Egypt, especially in cantons not constrained by the presence of troops. The victory of Heliopolis, the reduction of Cairo, and the clemency of the conqueror, who confined the chastisement for revolts solely to heavy contributions, produced such an effect on the inhabitants, that the landing of the English, their first advantages, the presence of the capitan-pacha, and the visir's preparations, in no manner destroyed their confidence in the French, or attachment to them. Prayers and wishes for the success of the French arms were universal. The mussulmen, even the most bigotted of them; who, to use their own expression, were happy to see infidels destroying each other; preferred the French yoke to that of a people they did not know. No

popular movement was excited by the *firmans* of the grand-visir and the capitan-pacha. As the visir penetrated into Egypt, the sheiks of villages, always faithful to their system of obeying the enemy that happens to be present*, hastened to make their submission; but they confined themselves to professions of attachment, and furnished neither money nor provisions, but by compulsion. The Arabs also joined his army with a part of their cavalry, less with an intention to serve as auxiliaries, than to avoid his anger, and chiefly with an intention to live, during this crisis, at the expense of the country, and to pillage the vanquished in a general action.

Cairo had suffered too much in the former siege, to expose itself again to the same evils. The most perfect quiet pervaded the city, notwithstanding the neighbourhood of the enemy's armies; but while they promised to make no movement, the inhabitants frankly confessed that they should be compelled to join the Turks, if they made their way into the city, and that the principal care of the

* They extend this denomination even to the troops of the government employed to enforce the collection of imposts.

French should be to guard all the avenues; General Belliard, the better to assure himself of their obedience, kept the principal sheiks hostages in the citadel.

I have already spoken of the insults Murad Bey, and his envoy, Osman-Bey-Bardisi, received from general Menou, and the gross manner in which Murad's friendship and aid were rejected. This conduct necessarily disgusted him with the commander in chief, and destroyed all hope of his aid in case of extremity. When general Belliard recalled the French troops from Upper Egypt, he invited Murad Bey to descend with his Mamalukes. This movement was made by Murad very tardily. A terrible plague, which at that time ravaged those provinces, attacked the Mamalukes, and each bey withdrew himself into the desert with his adherents.

As Murad Bey had not been led by any ostensible measures to declare himself openly before the events of the campaign were known, he availed himself of their situation to maintain a species of neutrality, that he might make terms with the conqueror. He had already learnt the first successes of the English,

by whose agents he was pressed to declare for them. The sworn enemy of the Turks, whose perfidy he well knew, he expected nothing but vengeance from them, preceded by fair promises; but he might expect some advantage from the protection of the English, and it was naturally to be supposed he would provide himself with a support in that quarter, against the case of the triumph of the Turks. These circumstances, however, little influenced his conduct. To the hour of his death he uniformly gave marks of an undiminished attachment to the French; and even at that period he prepared convoys of grain for them, of which he knew them to be in want. The disasters of the French army, and his inquietude for his future fortunes, extremely affected this bey. His health was impaired by his anxiety. He was seized with the plague, to which he fell a victim on the 2d of Floreal, after three days illness.

The beys and Mamalukes greatly felt his loss. The situation of affairs not permitting them to convey his body to the tomb of the Mamalukes, in which a place had been assigned to him near Ali Bey, he was interred at Saouagui near Tahta. The finest homage

that can be conceived was rendered to his courage; his companions in arms breaking his weapons over his tomb, and declaring that no one was worthy to wield them.

Murad Bey was far from an ordinary man. He eminently possessed the virtues and defects of the degree of civilisation of the Mamalukes. Hurried away by the impetuosity of his temper, the first moments of his passions were terrible, but those which succeeded often carried him to a contrary excess. Gifted by Nature with that ascendancy of mind which calls certain men to rule others, he had the habit of governing without always knowing the springs he touched. Equally prodigal and rapacious, he denied nothing to his friends, and afterwards oppressed the people to provide for his own wants. To these general features are to be added an uncommon strength of body, perfect bravery, and a constancy in misfortunes, which never abandoned him in the frequent difficulties of his active life.

The beys after his death acknowledged for their chief Osman-Bey-Tambourgi, who had been recommended to them by Murad Bey. The new chief sent to general Belliard his professions of attachment to the French, and

promises of supplies of grain; but all his movements were extremely tardy, the more completely to regulate his conduct by circumstances.

After the retreat of the troops from Rahmanieh, and the return of the troops that had reconnoitred the visir's army, the beys, seeing various armies advance in concert against Cairo, while the troops from India descended the Nile, now judged the affairs of the French to be desperate, and thought it time openly to desert their cause. They therefore encamped near the capitan-pacha and the English; yet, at the same time, they charged Hussein Bey, their envoy to the French, to inform them of this measure, and to offer excuses, and declare they would commit no hostility against the French. In fact, they kept their word.

The army of the East, at the time of their arrival in Egypt, had reached Rahmanieh in eight days after their landing; and ten days after that they fought the battle of the Pyramids. The troops, before they could recover from the effects of their voyage, made that long march without the means of convoys of provisions either by land or water,

and, before any regulations could be provided to furnish them with subsistence. They were incessantly harassed by the Mamalukes, Arabs, and the armed Fellahs. They lived on beans, pulse, maize, corn, with a few cattle which they accidentally found abandoned in some of the villages. The English army did not reach Rahmanieh till sixty-three days after their landing, although aided by their numerous transports, a perfectly organised system of convoys, by a large flotilla on the Nile, and a multitude of camels; and supported by the whole influence of the capitan-pacha, who represented them to the inhabitants as the defenders of Mahometanism. They were afterwards forty days in proceeding from Rahmanieh to Embabeh, which march the French troops usually performed in less than four days.

This tardiness of general Hutchinson could be occasioned only by his fear of being defeated by a sudden junction of all the French forces before the arrival of the visir should divert their attention towards various points; and, by the desire of combining his movements with those of the Turks, to prevent the French from quitting Cairo to give battle to

one of the armies without abandoning that city to the other. Perhaps also he waited for the junction of the troops from India. They had arrived at Suez towards the end of Germinal; and part of them that had debarked, and were waiting for the means necessary to pass the desert, were sickly, and the plague carried off several. General Baird, unable to procure camels sufficient for his convoys, and fearing the visir would be defeated before he could pass the desert, reembarked his troops to land them at Kosseir; and agents of the visir were sent into Upper Egypt to engage the Arabs to furnish a sufficient quantity of camels. These troops arrived at Kosseir on the 3d of Prairial, at Kenneh on the 19th, and afterwards very slowly descended the Nile. General Baird was in the neighbourhood of Siout when the convention for the evacuation of Cairo was signed.

On the 28th of Floreal, general Hutchinson arrived at Terraneh with the main body of his army, and the capitan-pacha's troops. He halted here some time, and halted again at Ouardan; and at this place it was he was joined by the Mamalukes. He did not arrive till the 1st of Messidor (*20th of June*)

in the neighbourhood of Embabeh, to invest Gizeh on the left bank of the Nile, while the visir pressed Cairo on the right bank. The English erected a bridge of boats over the river at Chobra, to keep open a communication with the Turks, posting a guard on each side.

The position of the French troops at Cairo became very dangerous. The enemy, it is true, continued to act with their usual timidity, employing strong detachments to drive in feeble out-posts; but they continually narrowed the position of the French without giving it strength, for the French were little less dispersed in the various forts and posts of the immense circuit of that city, of the citadel, of Boulac, Old Cairo, and Gizeh*. The troops were called upon at once to withstand the exterior attack of about 45,000 men, and overawe within a numerous populace, naturally disposed to commotions, who, perceiving that the French must evacuate the city, were tempted to find the means of conciliating the visir, and escaping from his vengeance, in facilitating his entrance by an insurrection.

The French army could not make a *sortie*

* This line included no less than 12,600 toises.

with forces sufficient to give battle to one of the two armies without withdrawing all the troops from the avenues of the city. If they marched against the English, they delivered Cairo to the Turks; and if they attacked the visir, the English would seize Gizeh, in which were part of the magazines. Such a movement might succeed if the enemy, deceived as to the strength of the posts, should suffer the favourable moment to escape; but the French might also lose every thing by a check.

It was in vain therefore longer to foster the hope of defeating the enemy under the walls of Cairo. A retreat to Damietta, where it was possible to find resources, and to take a tenable position, was scarcely practicable after that town and Lesbeh were occupied by the Turks. A retreat to Alexandria was not more promising. The troops would have had great difficulty to have reached that place, even leaving at Cairo all their magazines, baggage, &c., and would have accelerated the fall of Cairo by consuming its provisions. If Cairo was to be abandoned, nothing remained but to retire into Upper Egypt; but in that case ammunition was to be conveyed there, and almost all the boats were lost at

Rahmanieh. Besides, what resources could be expected in a country ravaged by a most dreadful plague.

If nothing was to be expected from quitting Cairo, not better founded was the hope of defending the town, in which there were not more than 6000 effective men, and those dispersed over an immense extent of posts, each too feeble to resist any serious attack. Most of the towers which defended the avenues might be thrown down by a few discharges of artillery. All these posts and fortifications, which appeared to the enemy to be formidable, were really capable only of a very short resistance. The troops had indeed raised with great exertion and rapidity some stronger redoubts between Cairo and Boulac. Shallow ditches sunk before the wall of the works of Gizeh stopped the English, who opened trenches to attack them. Hardly any post was strong enough to resist a *coup-de-main*. One being carried, the whole must follow. The junction of the insulated corps was become impracticable. Each remained at the enemy's mercy, and the revolt of the inhabitants, which would follow any disaster,

would have multiplied the embarrassments and losses of the French.

The provisioning the places had been neglected, and even opposed before the campaign. After its commencement, the receipt of imposts had been very inconsiderable, because sufficient detachments could not be sent into the provinces to enforce the payments. The director of the revenues in kind, although the enemy was at the gates of Cairo, went into Upper Egypt with an armed vessel; but the villages were ravaged by the plague, and deserted. He had not a detachment strong enough to penetrate into the interior of the country where Mulley Mahammed was in force, and he was compelled to return to Cairo. Foraging expeditions made in the province of Gizeh, where the harvest was scarcely got in, were not sufficient for the ordinary consumption of the troops and the convoys sent to Rahmanieh. The French were obliged to purchase grain; and, at the time of the blockade, they had provisions only to serve to the end of Messidor.

The treasury was empty at the commencement of the campaign, since which time no-

thing was received but the produce of some duties levied at Cairo. The officers and various persons attached to the army poured their savings into the treasury to provide for the daily expenditure. The magazines of the artillery had been drained at the repeated instances of general Menou; and what had been sent to Rahmanieh, had been lost there. At Cairo there were not 150 cartridges for each piece, and there was a want of carriages to remount the cannon.

The plague had appeared at Cairo some time before the commencement of the campaign, and afterwards its devastation was horrible. The old men could name but few instances when it had been equalled. The number of inhabitants in Cairo attacked in four months was estimated at 40,000. The number of French who entered the lazaretto with that malady had risen to 150 per day. The physicians, however, who owed their experience in the disease to their invincible courage, saved nearly two-thirds of their patients. The contagion began to diminish in Messidor; but the hospitals were still full, a great number of the soldiers being detained

there by the lingering nature of a recovery from that disorder.

General Belliard received only vague orders from general Menou. The only point on which the commander in chief insisted, was the defence of Cairo; and he sent no plan of defence. After the retreat of the troops from Rahmanieh, the communication with Alexandria had been difficult; nevertheless two detachments of dromedaries arrived by the desert; they brought no instructions to general Belliard, and he wrote to demand instructions.

This want of communication with Alexandria in part preserved a moral tranquillity to the troops at Cairo. Spies, and consequent terror and divisions, did not exist in the same degree as at Alexandria. General Menou had however previously established a correspondence with the subalterns, and had even turned the heads of some. Instead of strengthening the commanding officers with the confidence of their troops, the soldiery were taught to suspect several of them, especially those who were too frank to disguise their esteem for general Reynier.

Although these artifices were of a nature

to discourage the soldiery, they could not efface in them that zeal and devotion to the public cause they had exhibited in the worst of circumstances, disposing them to endure every thing, and undertake every thing to preserve Egypt, or at least postpone its loss; but means were necessary to success, and we have seen that they were wanting; the army could not move to engage the enemy without being exposed to great disasters; and the retreat into Upper Egypt presented no resource or hope. If the enemy made an attack upon part of the posts, they must force that quarter, and compel the troops at Cairo to surrender at discretion. All that could be done was to deceive the timid enemy by bold and steady appearances, and to dictate the conditions of retreat before success had taught them to estimate their power.

On the 3d of Messidor (22d of June), the French proposed a suspension of arms, and the conferences lasted till the 8th. The army had succeeded in their attempt to intimidate the enemy, feeble works presenting to them a formidable exterior. On the 9th a convention was signed, by which the French agreed to evacuate Cairo on conditions similar to

those of the treaty of El-Arish. They were to march with their arms, artillery, and baggage; and were besides to carry away a certain number of horses, and whatever they judged convenient, with which they were to be conveyed to France in English vessels. As the French at Cairo were ignorant whether the provisions at Alexandria would permit any longer defence of that place, a clause was inserted in the convention, empowering Alexandria to accept the same conditions within a limited time.

The garrison of Cairo had twelve days to prepare for the evacuation, after which they marched to Aboukir, where they embarked. They were accompanied in their march from Cairo to Rosetta by the English army, the troops of the capitan-pacha, and the Mamelukes. The most perfect harmony reigned between these adverse troops, who, a few days before, were compelled by their several duties to cut each other's throats.

The army could not endure to leave in Egypt the remains of Kléber, of a general whose loss was every day more painfully felt. The ceremony of conveying these remains from fort Ibrahim Bey, where they had been

deposited, was announced by salutes from all the forts. The English and Turks, who had been previously informed of the intended honour, that the firing of the artillery might in the circumstances of the armies create no jealousies, joined in the funeral honours, and answered by their cannon the salutes of the French.

CHAP. VI.

Blockade of Alexandria, till the entire Consumption of its Provisions.

WHILE one half of the English army and the two Turkish armies acted in the interior of Egypt, and till the evacuation of Cairo, no remarkable event happened at Alexandria. The troops remained encamped upon the heights of Nicopolis, round which they threw up a great quantity of earth. Pieces of cannon, of a large calibre, were taken from the works of Alexandria, to mount these entrenchments. This position, too extensive for the troops defending it, had another defect in preventing the assembling sufficient forces to prevent the English establishing themselves at Marabou, which must be their first offensive operation. But if general Menou had confined himself merely to the defence of the works of Alexandria, he might momentarily have displaced the cannon, to oppose all his forces to the enemy at the points where they

should present themselves. The greater part of the labourers were employed on the entrenchments of Nicopolis, and the strengthening the fortifications of Alexandria proceeded slowly. The new works round Alexandria were, however, at length lined; and general Menou ordered a new front to be constructed next the sea, to shut in on the side of the port the spot where he had fixed his head-quarters.

The necessity of shutting the avenues of the city, and strengthening the line of works, had hitherto retarded the construction of two forts, one on the heights of Cleopatra, and the other on the heights near Pompey's Pillar. The occupation of these posts was necessary to defend the approaches to the city; for the enemy being established on these points could thence command the whole city of Alexandria, the new port, and the communications between the posts, and might have made themselves master of the place in less than six days. The importance of these works had been frequently pointed out to general Menou, and the fortifying them had been recommended to him by general Reynier at his departure. When that officer had

left Egypt, a greater number of men were employed in these works, and they were rendered capable of a defence. The inundation of lake Mareotis, which now bathed the feet of the heights of Pompey's Pillar, and narrowed the position of the French, rendered the occupation of these heights still more important, because they compelled the enemy either to attack merely one part of Alexandria, or to divide their army entirely to invest the place.

General Samson and Bertrand, commanding the engineers, and general Songis, commanding the artillery, directed, as far as it depended upon them, these works upon an excellent system of defence; but making useless efforts to instruct general Menou, they were frequently constrained to pursue the ridiculous plans, and execute the useless works which he commanded.

General Menou had constantly deceived himself respecting the state of provisions at Alexandria, and the state of the magazines, till the instant when all communication with the interior of Egypt was cut off. It was not till Prairial (*part of May and June*) that he seriously began to introduce economy into the

consumption of provisions. It was seen that the corn in the magazines would be soon exhausted ; and rice was mixed with it in the making of bread, at first in the proportion of two-thirds of corn and one of rice, and afterwards in equal proportions. The Arabs, tempted by the desire of gain, brought corn to Alexandria ; and all that was brought was purchased at a high price for the magazines of the army. These convoys, some of which were considerable, furnished part of the consumption during two months. The treasury being empty, the officers, persons in civil employments, and the merchants, poured what money they had into its coffers, which served to pay the Arabs for their corn, and defray other expenses.

Although the spectacle of so many unfortunate operations, jealousies, informations, and the terror consequent on these, must universally discourage the troops, every individual was, nevertheless, resolved to suffer, to the extreme, for the honour of the army ; and it was universally felt, that, to give time to terminate the negotiations for peace, it was necessary to prolong the defence of Alexandria.

General Menou, when he sent away general Reynier, had not written directly against him. In subsequent dispatches he announced, that the departure of that general had extinguished all the parties that had paralysed his efforts: he renewed his engagements to preserve Egypt, and continued to deceive the government by false reports of the circumstances of the army, and the events of the campaign; hoping to destroy, by flattering appearances, the effect that must be produced by the denunciation of his many mistakes. Although general Menou's conduct to general Reynier could not be justified, success would have at least given him a plausible excuse; but then he must have known how to have obtained success—must have learnt to feel that the only means of success was the junction of the whole army, and active and bold movements in the interior of Egypt—and must have comprehended, that, instead of remaining shut up in Alexandria, the post of general in chief was with the main body of the army.

The members of the Institute and the Commission of Arts, who, after the first events

of the campaign, had come to Alexandria as the securest place for persons without military employment, had obtained, towards the end of Floreal (*about the middle of May*), permission to depart for France. They embarked in a small vessel; but when they were quitting the port, the English refused to let them pass. They attempted to return, and were menaced with being sunk by the French. After several days anxiously past, general Menou took off his prohibition to their entering the port, and they returned to Alexandria, where, incorporated in a national guard, composed of persons in civil situations, and other Frenchmen not belonging to the army, they did the interior duty of the place.

The article in the convention for evacuating Cairo, permitting the garrison of Alexandria to accept the same conditions, was notified to him on the 18th of Messidor (*7th of July*). Being informed of the negotiations carrying on for peace, it was certainly right to lengthen out the defence of Alexandria as long as its provisions, and the enemy's timidity, would permit. It was known also, that admiral Gantheaume's squadron was bringing suc-

cours. The corvette Heliopolis, which entered the port towards the end of Prairial, had been detached from that squadron when the admiral was obliged to bear away from Alexandria, having been seen by the English when at thirty leagues from that place. The squadron, however, might still arrive, and bring reinforcements. These motives were universally felt, and the proposition was rejected.

General Menou ought to have taken an immediate and exact account of the provisions of Alexandria, and calculated the time the place could hold out. He might have foreseen that the first operation of the English would be to seize on Marabou, to intercept the provisions brought by the Arabs; he ought to have lengthened out, as much as possible, by incidental negotiations, the parley for the acceptation of the treaty of the convention of Cairo, and thus to keep in his hands the means of saving the French vessels in the port of Alexandria.

General Menou was in haste to dispatch a vessel to France, to announce the evacuation of Cairo. He did not perceive that this was to be in haste to accuse himself, inasmuch as the evacuation was the result of his feeble

plans; and the main body of the army being at Cairo, he, the general in chief, ought to have been there also, to prevent the evacuation. General Menou added, in his dispatches, that he had provisions for several months, declaring that he would never capitulate at Alexandria, and promising to bury himself beneath the ruins of the city. He who makes such engagements in the face of Europe should know how to keep them.

The English and Turkish armies followed the garrison of Cairo to Áboukir. When the greater part of the garrison was embarked, the generals of these armies, learning that the terms of Cairo were rejected by the French in Alexandria, and that the Arabs conveyed provisions into the city, and being ignorant how long the garrison of that place could subsist, resolved on operations to accelerate its reduction.

On the 28th of Thermidor (*the 16th of August*), they increased their flotilla in lake Mareotis, where they also sent a great number of boats and vessels to convey the troops. Their plan was to draw the attention of the French, by a false attack on the camp on the heights of Nicopolis, while they landed near

Marabou, and established themselves on the neck of land which separates the lake from the sea. We have already seen, that beside the defect of the position of Nicopolis being too extensive for the number of the French, it had that also of occupying all the disposable troops, none remaining to oppose any other attack.

On the 29th of Thermidor, before day-break, a troop, consisting of 2000 Albanians, attacked a sand-hill which commanded the sea-shore before the left of the French camp, and instantly began to entrench themselves in that position. The troops occupying this advanced post retired into the entrenchments, whose artillery made a well-directed fire upon the enemy. Two companies of grenadiers then made a sortie, fell upon the Albanians, and forced them to fly, leaving behind many killed and wounded. The Albanians rallied near the English camp, but contented themselves with making irregular attacks during the rest of the day upon the advanced posts. The English troops had marched during these movements, and 6000 men formed behind the heights situated between the lakes and the first bridge of Alex-

andria. The advanced post on that side retired toward the bridge. These heights being within cannon-shot of the French camp, the English remained masked behind it, showing only a small body of troops. General Menou detached two companies of grenadiers of the 25th, two companies of the 75th, and a battalion of the same demi-brigade, amounting, in all, to 400 men, to drive back 6000 of the enemy. The soldiers attempted this movement with all the vigour that was to be expected of them. They ascended the hill with the step of a charge, and drove in the English advanced corps. But having gained the summit, they received the fire of the second line; and, finding themselves too weak, they returned to the camp without the enemy making any attempt to pursue them. The enemy at that time had cavalry, of which they did not avail themselves, to cut off the retreat of this little body of troops.

The French then saw lake Marcotis covered with boats and vessels filled with troops, and protected by fifty gun-boats. This flotilla at sun-rise was opposite to Pompey's Pillar. Contrary winds had retarded

its progress, and prevented its arriving at day-break at the appointed place of debarkation. It was seen to direct its course towards the mouth of a canal choked up, by which lake Mareotis formerly communicated with the sea. Here had been stationed the French flotilla, consisting of eighteen vessels under the protection of three 18-pounders, from the time of evacuating the isle of Mariout, which was a few days before. It was evident, that the English flotilla proceeded towards this point, and would land their troops a little beyond, to seize the neck of land of Marabou, and attack that post. But it was impossible to make general Menou comprehend that. General Songis, who first penetrated the enemy's design, in vain entreated him not to disquiet himself with their false attack on the camp of Nicopolis, and to march troops to oppose the execution of their real attack. General Menou still remained with the main body of the troops in the camp, ordering the flotilla to be followed only by a battalion of the 21st light, 100 foot guides, and 120 dragoons. This detachment, merely of 500 men, kept pace with the flotilla till it approached Marabou,

where the boats divided, to land the troops at two different points. The detachment was too weak to prevent the landing of 6000 of the enemy, which the transports contained, on a flat shore, commanded by the gun-boats, and retired towards the hollows of the ancient canal.

The French flotilla was too much inferior to that of the enemy to keep its station on the lake, and there was no creek to which it could retire with safety. The French therefore endeavoured to convert the vessels into fire-ships, to throw disorder into the English flotilla as it passed; but the wind not favouring this project, the vessels burnt at too great a distance to do any mischief.

The English having made good their landing, attacked the post of Marabou, keeping a heavy cannonade on it by land and sea. This post, which was no other than an old mosque, built on a rock detached from the continent, was soon a heap of ruins, and capitulated on the 3d of Fructidor (21st of *August*). Of three vessels anchored near the fort, two were sunk, and the third, on the 1st of Fructidor, gained Alexandria greatly damaged.

After the taking of Marabou, the English detached on the 4th of Fructidor into the outward harbour of the old port, one frigate, six corvettes, and several light vessels, and vigorously cannonaded the troops that were posted on the 9th of Thermidor on the banks of the ancient canal. They took the right of that body in rear, while the flotilla on lake Mareotis harassed the left with its fire. The English troops advanced to occupy this position, amounting at this time to 8000 men, having received various reinforcements, and, among others, a regiment of dragoons, and some Mamalukes. Notwithstanding this superiority, they did not vigorously push the small body of 600 French, who, ably commanded by general Eppler, checked them for a moment, and then retired in good order.

The French army then took a position with the right to fort le Turcq, and the left to the heights of Pompey's Pillar. Troops were drawn from the camp of Nicopolis to occupy these heights. There were only left 2200 men to defend Nicopolis against the English army. The rest of the troops occupied the works of Alexandria, with the sailors, the

invalids, the recovering sick, and national guard.

It was extremely important to prevent the enemy seizing on fort le Turcq; because, with batteries on that point, they could sink all the vessels in the old harbour.

The English remained several days without any new enterprise. On the 8th, about eleven o'clock at night, about 800 English horse and Mamalukes turned the first advanced posts of the French, making a few prisoners, while a column of infantry pursued the sea shore. The third battalions of the 18th and 21st long stopped their progress; but being taken and flanked by the cavalry, they fell back upon fort le Turcq. The English failing to carry this fort by surprise, took a position near the place, and opened trenches to attack it in form.

The troops were dispersed round Alexandria, every where too feeble to resist the enemy, who, at every point, could present infinitely superior forces. All that remained to be done to prolong the siege was to consider Alexandria as a great entrenched camp, to shut up the troops in the works, preserving always in the centre a strong disposeable

force, to oppose the enemy wherever they might attack the line of works. To effect this, it was necessary to evacuate the camp of Nicopolis, and to occupy without Alexandria only fort le Turcq, the heights of Pompey's Pillar, part of the Arabs' works, and Cleopatra's redoubt. By this disposition, Alexandria might still have been disputed some time with an enemy little given to enterprise; but even if general Menou had known how to embrace this plan, he had no longer opportunity, for provisions and water began to fail. There remained only sufficient to serve till the beginning of Vendémiaire (*the latter end of September*). The soldiers, for a long time receiving only bread made of equal quantities of corn and rice, with a little horse-flesh, were reduced by this unwholesome food; and the water, become brackish, occasioned several disorders, particularly the scurvy. There were more than 2000 sick in the hospitals. Others, recovering from sickness or maimed, were in a state only to do duty in the forts. There remained only 3000 men that could be brought into action, and they were worn out with privations and preceding fatigue.

From these circumstances it was seen, that even if Alexandria could be longer defended, famine would soon compel it to capitulate, and that it would be better to submit to a capitulation before the English had further pressed the town and gained greater success, because the French could still dictate the terms of capitulation. But no one dared speak on the subject to general Menou. He neither knew how to fight nor to capitulate; and forty days before had announced to the government, that he had provisions for six months, and had declared his unshaken resolution never to capitulate. On the 9th of Fructidor, however, some generals and commanders of corps communicated their opinion to him. General Menou immediately dispatched a person to the English, to demand a suspension of arms for three days, during which they might treat for the evacuation; which was granted. The generals were assembled the next day in a council of war, in which it was agreed, it was useless to prolong the defence of the town, and the conditions that should be proposed to the English were fixed. General Menou, faithful to his system of transferring his errors to

others, declared that the evacuation of Cairo had induced the necessity of that of Alexandria, and spoke no longer of burying himself beneath the ruins of that town. Minutes of this council of war, and of the motives which induced the generals to treat, were drawn up. The capitulation was signed on the 12th, and ratified on the 15th, by the principal generals.

On the 15th of Fructidor, forts le Tureq and Duvivier, and the camp of Nicopolis, were delivered into the hands of the English, who engaged to convey the garrison to France, and the French troops embarked with arms and baggage.

Three frigates, and other vessels in the port of Alexandria, were delivered up to the enemy. Captain Villeneuve, who commanded the frigates, wished, when the army was disposed to capitulate, to attempt to sail out of the port during the night, to save these vessels if possible, or at least not to lose them without resistance; but he could not obtain general Menou's approbation.

In a very awkward manner, an article was introduced into the capitulation, relative to the collections made by the members of the

Institute and the Commission of the Arts. The English were unwilling to agree to this article; but the collectors, by their steadiness in refusing to sacrifice their collections, and their menace to burn them, overcame the difficulty, and they left behind only some statues of rude sculpture, and a sarcophagus of granite.

The troops began their embarkation on the first *décade* of Vendémiaire, and some vessels quitted the coast of Egypt at the time that the preliminaries of peace were signing at London, containing the article by which this province was to be restored to the Turks.

Thus terminated the expedition to Egypt. So true is it, that a commander of mean talents destroys by his single influence all the powers and resources placed in his hands. But assuredly few armies have founded a better right to admiration than the army of the French in Egypt. Landed on a foreign soil, the fatal event of the naval engagement at Aboukir placed an impassable barrier between them and their country; but they were not dispirited. A rapid march conveys them into the heart of the country, and every

step is marked by a victory. Each day brings them almost infinite fatigue, dangers continually increasing, and privations of almost every kind; but none of those enjoyments which divide the soldier's time with danger, and make him forget the painful moments of his life. Officers and soldiers voluntarily supported this painful situation, appreciating, by the obstinacy of the enemy in their repeated attacks, how inestimable the possession of Egypt would be to their country; and this idea compensated in their eyes for all they could suffer.

The disasters of the last campaign do not extinguish the glory of the French army. Dispersed by the feeble plans of their general, they nevertheless long imposed at every point upon the enemy, always superior in numbers; and their determined aspect in the most critical situations constantly slackened the enemy's march.

The only military operation that does honour to the English is their debarkation; and the success of that they owe to their fleet; for 6000 men that they threw at once upon the coast were checked by 1700, forced to watch at the same time over the whole

extent of the bay of Aboukir, and consequently incapable of acting together at the point of attack.

The English army after its landing did not attempt to approach Alexandria until the 2d of Ventose. There they ought to have found the whole French army concentrated; but they found only 4000 men; who nevertheless disputed the ground, intimidating them to such a degree that they dared not attack the town; and, far from availing themselves of their advantages, stood on the defensive, and entrenched themselves.

On the 30th of Ventose the French marched out to attack them, in a strong and narrow position, time to fortify which had been given them. Gun-boats on the sea and lake Maadieh covered their flanks. Their troops were double in number. The darkness of the night, and the death of several commanding officers, threw disorder into the French army, and the commander in chief, keeping himself at a distance, neither could form the troops anew himself, nor would confide the charge to any other officer. His movements overthrew and dispersed the cavalry. The army is compelled

to retire, and the English lose this occasion also to avail themselves of their success.

Shut up in their entrenchments, they attempt no movement till twenty days afterwards, when they marched to Rosetta, an important post to them, but which the French army did not attempt to preserve.

They remain a month at Rosetta, before they proceed towards Rahmanieh, which it was equally important for them to occupy, to intercept the communication between Alexandria and Cairo. The troops they found there, too few to resist, retired towards Cairo. It was the interest of the English to follow them by rapid marches, and they employed forty days in marching over a space that the French usually traversed in four.

They finally arrive at Cairo with the capitán-pacha, where they are joined by the visir: and these armies, six times more numerous than the French, still fear the hazards of an engagement, and receive rather than dictate the law in the treaty of evacuation.

They then descend towards Alexandria, and the same supineness infects all their

operations ; and it is the want of provisions, rather than their enterprise, which accelerates the fall of that place.

The expedition of the English has succeeded ; but they have gathered only the laurels of success ; for never did they insure victory either by their military movements, their courage, or their enterprise. Their timid march, notwithstanding their enormous superiority, perfectly points out what would have been their fate if the chief of the army of the East had been worthy of his troops,

FINIS.

S. Hamilton, Printer, Falcon-Court, Fleet-Street.

		of dragoons
		Mamelukes and Syrians
BELBEIS.	{	Detachment of the 22d light	80.
		Ditto of the 14th of dragoons
		Artillery and miners	32
SALAHIEH.	{	22d light	430
		Dromedaries	30
		14th of dragoons
		Syrians
		Artillery and miners	110
		TOTAL....	7730	2744

Number of Troops capable of taking the Field, but spread ov

Infantry 13,372
Cavalry 1,661

Total 15,033

N. B. This statement includes only the privates, drummers, and band; 348 artillery-men serving the field-pieces; 751 guards, conductors, and army; 107 physicians, surgeons, and chemists; and 95 members of the auxiliary corps.

General of division Reynier.	{	General of brigade { 22d light, 2 four-	General of division Friant.	{	General of brigade {
		Robin. { 9th of the line, 2 —			Zayonchek. {
		General of brigade { 13th, 2 —			General of brigade {
		Baudot. { 85th, 2 —			Delegorgue. {
		A company of artillery, with 4 eight-pounders and 2 howitzers.			A company eight-pound
Artillery.	{	General of division Songis, <i>commandant</i> .	General of brigade Bron.		
	{	General of brigade Faultrier.			
Engineers.	{	General of brigade Samson, <i>commandant</i> .			
	{	General of brigade Bertrand.			
At Cairo.	{	General of division Beillard, <i>commandant</i> .	A co		
		Generals of brigade { Galbaud. Duranteau.			
Upper Egypt.	{	General of brigade Donzelot.			

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
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
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
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